

**WHAT YOU SEE DEPENDS ON WHERE YOU SIT:
MANAGERIAL PERCEPTIONS OF RED TAPE IN ENGLISH LOCAL
GOVERNMENT**

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Abstract

This exploratory study investigates red tape in English local government. We build on previous research by examining perceptions of internal and external measures of red tape among three tiers of public managers: corporate officers (includes the chief executive officer and corporate policy directors), chief officers (the most senior officers with specific service delivery responsibilities), and service managers (first-line supervisory officers and section heads). The results show that these officials perceive red tape differently depending on their respective roles and stations in local government and that the determinants of red tape are likely to vary at each tier. Where there is common ground it suggests that a developmental culture, logical incremental strategy formulation, reductions in regulation and stable external political contexts will work to reduce red tape. The implications for theory and practice are discussed.

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Introduction

The nature and impact of red tape on public agencies has long been debated.¹ In the UK, the discussion has focused on wasteful and inefficient processes, excessive bureaucracy, and inflexible organizational structures and professional practices. In the U.S., the term red tape has been used to denote formalization, structural complexity, excessive rules, and task delays. In the international community, red tape has been associated with corruption and declining trust in government. All of these manifestations have one thing in common: they are thought to make life hard for public servants and citizens, and to undercut governmental performance.

Bozeman's (2000, 12) widely cited definition of red tape – “rules, regulations, and procedures that remain in force and entail a compliance burden but [do] not advance the legitimate purposes the rules were intended to serve” – captures the essence of the red tape debate. Recent studies have found that red tape is prevalent in most countries, and particularly in Western democracies (e.g. Center for International Private Enterprise, 2001; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2001). While these studies define red tape differently, their overall findings and recommendations are remarkably similar and echo much of the academic literature and underlying logic of government reforms designed to combat red tape.

Red tape is therefore universally seen as something problematic that must be overcome. However, if it is problematic, we need to first understand its ontology – how is it conceived and discussed – and second, we need to understand its emergence, growth, existing levels, antecedents, and consequences. To achieve this second aim, a number of research questions need to be addressed: Does degree of red tape vary between different organizations? What characteristics are likely to result in higher levels of red tape within organizations? Is there any relationship between internal and external forms of red tape, and are these forms related to the organization's internal or external climate? Does red tape vary according to the organizations and officials that experience it? And is red tape linked to corruption and poor governmental performance? These questions are important and their answers are valuable to the study and practice of public management. Such knowledge is also integral to ongoing efforts to improve governmental performance.

Previous research on red tape has been limited by measurement and sampling difficulties, and has tended to dwell on public/private comparisons. We improve on these studies in several ways. First, we draw upon existing measures of red tape and also examine some global measures of the construct. Second, we address some of the research questions listed above by analyzing data from a large-scale survey of English local government (Walker and Enticott, 2004). The survey examines the structure, culture and strategy of councils, drivers of improvement, background variables, and a service improvement regime. Data are collected from multiple informants in each authority. Thirdly, we examine variations in perceptions of red tape among different groups of officials to capture the diversity of attitudes and practices toward red tape. Fourthly, we

¹ The red tape concept apparently originated in 17th Century England where strips of red cloth tape were used to bind reams of legal documents needed to adjudicate common law cases.

utilize data from 2003-2004 to estimate lagged multiple regression models. By focusing on English local government, this study also benefits from good secondary data sources.

The Context: English Local Government

Red tape was previously the preserve of the UK Conservative Party which sought to “roll back the state” and introduce market mechanisms and streamlined processes (Walsh, 1995). More recently, this agenda has been exploited by the Labour Party (Blair, 2002; Office of Public Service Reform [hereafter OPSR], 2002), which argues that red tape, demarcations, and restrictive practices all have to be reduced if public services are to be improved (OPSR, 2002, 19-20). Emphasis is also placed on innovation, which is seen as the antithesis of and best curative for red tape: “Innovation and efficiency are much more likely to be achieved where people are given the incentive to do so at the local level ...” (OPSR, 2002, 15). In the U.S., both major political parties also battle red tape.²

Public service improvement is a central facet of the UK Labour government’s domestic policy agenda forming the key point of debate in the 2001 and 2004 election campaigns. A key aspect of these reforms is the perceived necessity to cut red tape: “More effort is needed to cut back further on red tape, which steals valuable time from doctors, nurses, teachers, the police and other public servants” (OPSR, 2002, 18).

The need to tackle red tape in society was signaled by the establishment of the Better Regulation Executive (hereafter BRE) in the Cabinet Office in 1998: “The BRE’s Public Sector Team works closely with the five key delivery areas within the public sector (health, education, criminal justice, local government and transportation) to understand and minimise unnecessary bureaucracy, or ‘red-tape’ that prevents front-line staff from carrying out their core duties” (BRE, 2005). In relation to the delivery of services in local government, Prime Minister Blair has been explicit about the need to reduce “...bureaucratic demarcations, restrictive practices and red tape” (OPSR, 2002, 18). To resolve the problem of red tape public service organizations are encouraged to innovate and find new ways to respond to customer demands (OPSR, 2002). Reductions in red tape are seen to have positive consequences. For example: “Classroom assistants are allowing teachers to concentrate on education in the classroom. Bursars help heads concentrate on leading their schools. Their introduction enables schools and their pupils to get the best out of staff, allowing a greater focus on teaching and lesson preparation” (OPSR, 2002, 19).

Overall, these reform initiatives suggest that red tape is alive and well in English local government—the site of its origin several hundred years ago. In addition, it appears that governments everywhere are declaring war on red tape. In the next section, we review the academic literature on red tape and identify some limitations of previous research. These limitations provide the backdrop and impetus for this study.

² Explicit efforts to eliminate red tape date back to the late 1970s (Kaufman, 1977; U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 1979). These attempts have intensified in recent years and are now a central plank in government reform efforts for both Democrats and Republicans (Gore, 1993; Richardson and Ziebart, 1994; U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 2001). The political left proposes to combat red tape by decentralizing the public service, empowering public employees, and instilling an entrepreneurial spirit in government (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). The political right, in contrast, offers a more severe set of remedies that includes deregulation and increased contracting and privatization of public services (Heritage Foundation, 2005).

The Study of Red Tape

Citizens, businesses, and even government employees often complain about having to contend with too much red tape. Indeed, red tape is one of the oldest and most frequently cited pathologies of government bureaucracy (Wilson, 1989; Caiden, 1991; Hood, 1991; Rainey, 2003). Red tape is believed to create hardships on all who interact with or work in government, and in all likelihood, it is also tethered to corruption and probably undercuts government performance. It is thus understandable why contemporary reform movements in most nations have singled out red tape for eradication. Unfortunately, empirical research is less than clear on its fundamental nature, causes, and effects.

Various writers have acknowledged the existence and potential negative effects of red tape over the years (e.g., Craig, 1955; Kaufman, 1977; U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 1978; 1979; Church, 1981). However, careful research on the topic is of relatively recent origin. Here, we discuss developments on the following fronts: attempts to define and measure red tape, and empirical studies on the causes and effects of red tape.

By its very nature, red tape is hard to measure. There are two types of red tape. Internal red tape refers to bureaucratic rules and routines that affect the internal operations of a public agency. External red tape refers to bureaucratic procedures and regulations that make it difficult for citizens and other stakeholders to interact with the agency or comply with legal mandates. In the case of business firms, burdensome regulations can affect firms' profitability and thus constrain the free market economy.

The former type has received more attention in the public management literature, while the latter has become the province of political economists conducting cross-country studies. These researchers sometimes refer to red tape as "regulation," connecting the construct to another sizeable literature on the relationship between government and business (see below). The following discussion is organized along these two tracks, which occasionally overlap.

Internal Red Tape. This conceptualization of red tape is most closely associated with public management. U.S. scholars in particular have developed measures of red tape and mounted a number of empirical studies investigating the forms and impact of the construct on public employees and the bureaucracy, describing it along the lines of formalization and complexity in management subsystems such as personnel, budgeting, and procurement. This tradition began with Buchanan's (1975) study comparing managers' perceptions of red tape in the public and private sectors, which stimulated a number of follow-up studies (e.g., Rainey, 1982; Baldwin, 1990).

Bozeman launched the first full bore effort to understand the red tape concept both theoretically and empirically. His early work extended the research front on public-private comparisons, and it also laid the groundwork for many of the challenges and controversies that characterize research on the topic today. For example, Bozeman (1993, 2000) allowed that some rules are functional, but others exert a compliance burden and can be expected to have a negative effect on performance. This assumption weighs heavy in Bozeman's (1993, 283) definition of red tape as "rules, regulations, and procedures that remain in force and entail a compliance burden for the organization but have no efficacy for the rules' functional object." Bozeman also pointed out the distinction

between organizational red tape and stakeholder red tape, which we refer to as internal and external red tape in this study.

Much of this early research focused on comparing levels of red tape and related concepts in public and private sector organizations (for example, see Bretschneider, 1990; Bozeman and Scott, 1996; Bozeman, Reed, and Scott, 1992; Rainey, Pandey, and Bozeman, 1995; Pandey and Kingsley, 2000). As Pandey and Scott (2002) pointed out, the sheer number of publications on the subject of red tape in the last decade suggest that considerable progress has been made in understanding how to deal with red tape. However, Pandey and Scott contend that a closer examination reveals a mixed picture. Relatively few studies go beyond exploring public-private differences in red tape. The limited focus and lack of progress on other aspects of red tape research is noted. These authors are commended for their careful research on the red tape concept, and for their candid assessments of the limitations of their (and others') work.

In recent years, the emphasis has shifted toward improved conceptual development and more intensive research on red tape in public organizations. For example, Pandey (2003) has collected a large, rich data set involving a national sample of state health and human services managers. He and his colleagues have utilized this data set and other resources to produce a torrent of new studies on the conceptual development of red tape and its relationship to other variables of interest, such as public service motivation and organizational performance. (Many of these studies are cited herein, while others are currently under review or in press.) The yield from this research effort is considerable and growing.

During this time, it appears that research on red tape is flourishing as scholars are beginning to include measures of the concept in multivariate models of bureaucratic behavior, policy implementation, organizational performance, and other outcomes of interest (e.g., various studies by Pandey and colleagues, Brewer and Selden, 2000; Brewer, 2006). However, some of these studies only focus on red tape peripherally and utilize different measures of the construct. As a result, the growing number of research findings is difficult to synthesize. In addition, most of these studies do not provide a panoramic view of red tape. Rather, they tend to focus in on certain occupations or organizations, and they sometimes investigate topics that are remotely related to red tape.

External Red Tape. Both Kaufman (1977) and Bozeman (1993) acknowledged the existence of external red tape, but very few public management studies specifically address it. It is more fully addressed in political and economic studies, and in sociology.

A number of cross-country studies have investigated external red tape—often referred to as regulation—and its effects. Of particular importance to these researchers is the set of relationships between red tape, corruption in government, and economic and bureaucratic performance. (Many of these researchers are political economists working for large international consortiums who utilize econometric models and methods.) As mentioned above, these studies often define red tape as excessive regulation and focus on the difficulty that businesses, citizens, and other stakeholders experience when interacting with government agencies and complying with legal mandates such as the tax code. However, these researchers generally find it hard to develop good measures of red tape that are applicable to the range of countries studied. The most common approaches are to rely on well-placed informants or to survey international businesses and compare the

levels reported in different countries.³ These studies generally confirm a strong relationship between red tape and corruption (Mauro, 1995; Bardhan, 1996; Banerjee, 1997; LaPorta et al., 1998; Guriev, 1999; 2004; Kaufman and Wei, 1999), and they find moderate to strong relationships between red tape and lowered economic and bureaucratic performance (Knack and Keefer, 1995; Mauro, 1995; LaPorta et al., 1998; OECD, 2001; 2003; Brewer, 2004). Another finding that emerges from these studies is that red tape is prevalent across different nations and political systems, but it is more common in highly developed countries—especially Western democracies with their elaborate mechanisms for allowing citizen participation and ensuring justice, fairness, and equity.

Following on this stream of research, a recent OECD (2003) report provides details on some popular and commonly adopted reforms designed to reduce and streamline administrative procedures such as one-stop shops (physical and electronic), simplification of permits and license procedures, time limits for decision-making, methods to measure administrative burdens, regulatory-compliance assistance for small and medium-size companies, and increasing reliance on IT-based solutions.

In summary, most previous research has not investigated internal and external red tape simultaneously. In addition, studies focusing on internal red tape have tended to emphasize public-private comparisons, and they have utilized data sets that are limited in scope—mostly cross-sectional surveys that tap specific policy areas or groups of employees. Research on external red tape, in contrast, has tended to measure red tape more bluntly and focus on cross-country comparisons, which do not tell us much about what is going on at the organizational level. This study improves on and extends past research in several ways, as explained below.

Data and Methods

Unit of Analysis. This study is situated in the English local government sector. English local governments are politically elected bodies with a Westminster style cabinet system of political management. They are multi-purpose authorities delivering education, social services, regulatory services (such as land use planning and environmental health), housing, libraries, leisure services and welfare benefits in specific geographical areas. In urban areas, authorities deliver all these services; in rural areas a two-tier system prevails with county councils administering education and social services, and district councils providing environmental, welfare and regulatory functions. Authorities are not all-purpose; for example health is provided by health authorities. They employ professional career staff, and receive around two-thirds of their income, and guidance on the implementation of legislation, from central government.

Our point of departure in this study is to focus on different interpretations of red tape by examining the views of different officer echelons.⁴ Given this concern, the unit of

³ Parsons (1991) illustrates an alternative approach by looking at the data on targeted public transfers and estimating the impact of complexity of screening procedures in the U.S. welfare system on individuals' willingness to apply for benefits, thus indirectly measuring the cost of red tape.

⁴ Perceptions are important, as Scott and Pandey (2000) showed in an experimental simulation that examined the effect of red tape on public servants' propensity to provide assistance to clients in a simulated public assistance agency. The findings showed that increased red tape produced a corresponding reduction

analysis in this study is the three groups of local government officers. Three groups are selected based on prior research that has shown that different explanations are derived from corporate officers, chief officers and service manager (Walker and Enticott, 2004). Corporate officers include the chief executive officer, or head of paid service, and corporate policy directors with cross-organizational responsibilities for service improvement. Chief officers are the most senior officers with specific service delivery responsibilities. They include directors of the seven previously mentioned departments. Service managers are first-line supervisory officers and include section heads, such as Head of School Organization and Planning, Head of Business Efficiency and Head of Benefits.

Data Source. Data are drawn from an electronic survey of English local authorities.⁵ The survey explored informants' perceptions of organization and management (culture, structure, strategy making and strategy content), drivers of service improvement, background variables and the Best Value regime (Boyne, Martin and Walker, 2004).⁶ In each authority, questionnaires were sent to up to three corporate informants, chief officers in each of seven service areas and three managers in each these service areas.⁷ All survey questions were in the form of a seven point Likert scale and informants were asked to rate their authority (for corporate respondents) or service (for chief officers or service managers) on different dimensions of red tape and management.

In order to explain potential variations between different groups of officers, data were collected from corporate officers, chief officers and service managers in the summer of 2003 and 2004. When independent variables are drawn from the survey they are from 2003 while the dependent red tape variables were collected in 2004. The sample in 2003 consisted of 102 English local authorities and in 2004 of 175 authorities. The 2003 sample was representative of all English local authorities on key measures such as performance, population, and deprivation (see Martin et al., 2003). The 2004 sample included these 102 authorities plus all other upper tier authorities; i.e., non-district councils. In 2003 102 all authorities responded. In 2004 responses were received from 166 authorities, for a 95% response rate. In 2003 206 corporate officers, 220 chief officers and 600 service managers responded. In 2004 224 corporate officers, 419 chief officers and 556 service managers responded to the survey. The data were aggregated into officer echelons for each responding authority in SPSS and resulted in an n of corporate officers from 84 different authorities, 80 chief officers and 74 service managers. The n for analysis falls from the possible maximum of 102 for each echelon

in benefits provided to clients, but that this relationship was strongly moderated by the public servant's perceptions of clients. Those perceived as more sympathetic consistently received higher levels of benefits.

⁵The survey was conducted by email following a pilot in 17 local authorities that tested the survey administration technique and item quality (Enticott, 2003). Email addresses were collected from authorities and questionnaires delivered as an Excel file attached to an email. The electronic questionnaires were self-coding and converted to SPSS for analysis. Informants had eight weeks to answer the questions within the file, save it and return by email. During the survey period, three reminders were sent to informants who had yet to complete it. There were no statistically significant differences between late and early respondents.

⁶ A copy of the full questionnaire is available at www.clrgr.cf.ac.uk or on request from the authors.

⁷ The seven key services were surveyed: education, social care, land-use planning, waste management, housing, library and leisure, and benefits.

because of non-response and missing data in the two years and externalisation of some services (e.g. housing management) or combination of others.

Measurement. Measurement is of central importance to the developing field of public management (Boyne, Meier, O’Toole and Walker., 2005). In order to achieve high levels of content validity measures used in the survey were, where possible, adopted from measures used by other researchers and pilot tested. Below we discuss our measures of red tape and the independent measures of management, resource, oversight and context.

Five measures of red tape were collected in the survey. Two are global measures (one each for internal and external red tape), and three are sub-facet measures (targeting specific aspects of personnel or administrative red tape) (see Pandey and Scott, 2002). In the survey, we followed Bozeman (2000) and others by defining red tape as “burdensome rules and procedures that negatively affect performance.”⁸ Immediately following this definition, informants were asked to agree or disagree (on a Likert scale of 1 = disagree and 7 = agree) with five statements on red tape.

For the global internal measure of red tape question, informants were asked to agree or disagree with the following statement: “the level of red tape is high in our service/authority.” We also included several personnel and administrative subsystem measures (titled ‘subsystem’ hereon in). The two measures of personnel red tape were: “even if a manager is a poor performer, formal rules make it hard to remove him or her from the organization” and “the formal pay structures and rules make it hard to reward a good manager with higher pay here.” The administrative-based red tape measure was: “reorganizing an organizational unit or department can be achieved within two or three weeks in our service/authority.” These measures were combined using Principle Components Analysis⁹. For each group of officers, the three measures loaded on one factor, all with acceptable eigenvalues.

We also developed a global measure of external red tape. We measured this construct by asking informants to agree or disagree with the following statement which was drawn from various sources cited above: “administrative rules and procedures are open and responsive allowing stakeholders (users, businesses, government agencies etc.) to freely interact with our service authority.” This measure was reversed for the empirical analysis so that all five measures of red tape would tend in the same direction.

Table 1 lists the concepts we developed hypotheses for, the operationalisation of these concepts, the anticipated direction of the relationship together with descriptive statistics.

[insert Tables 1 here]

In general, we tried to include independent variables that were prominent in the red tape literature and part of ongoing reform efforts to combat red tape. We were limited by the survey questions—most of which were not explicitly designed for this study. The

⁸ Pandey and Kingsley’s (2000, p. 782) definition of red tape was also useful in designing this study: “impressions on the part of managers that formalization (in the form of burdensome rules and regulations) is detrimental to the organization.” Simply put, red tape exists when managers view formalization as burdensome and detrimental to organizational purposes (Pandey and Scott, 2002, p. 565).”

⁹ Eigenvalues and percent of variance explained were: corporate officers 1.426, 47.53%; chief officers 1.584, 52.81%, service managers 1.778, 59.26%.

selection of the measures for devolution to the front-line, devolved management and devolved behaviour, builds upon theory and current UK policy debate. On the latter issue, the government argues that "... a key part of devolving power and responsibility will be the removal of needless bureaucratic rules" (OPSR, 2002, 18). Devolved behaviour is an important aspect of perceived ways to red tape. This measure, initially developed by Subramanian and Nilakanta (1996), has been shown to positively affect the propensity to innovation, but has a lesser impact on performance in studies of management reform (Walker and Boyne, 2004).¹⁰ The measure of devolved management has been shown in research on public service improvement strategy to have positive performance impacts (Walker and Boyne, 2004) and is championed as a key route to improvement in the UK public services (OPSR, 2003).

Target setting is anticipated to increase the level of red tape because it requires introducing complex systems of information management and the monitoring of this data. The measure used here captures the processes of performance measurement and target setting. The UK Labour government's policy literature frequently conflates formalisation or bureaucracy with red tape. However, it is important to separate out these concepts. We draw on Subramanian and Nilakanta (1996) operationalisation of formalisation in this paper (also see Bozeman and Scott, 1996).

The measurement of a developmental culture draws upon its operationalisation in the red tape literature (Pandey and Moynihan, 2006) to include measures of innovation and risk taking. The measures were combined using Principle Components Analysis resulting in good eigenvalues for the three echelons¹¹. This notion of developmental culture is cognisant with policy debate, where innovative behaviour is seen as a central solution to the problems of red tape (Blair, 2002; OPSR, 2002).

Multiple measures were used to create our indexes of logical incrementalism and rational planning¹². Our measures of rational planning capture the intensive, detailed and carefully evaluated nature of proposed changes in technology and procedures that will take place in advance of taking action. We include within this a measure of consultation with stakeholders reflecting the strategy making processes in public organizations (Boyne and Walker, 2004) and the political requirements of public sector strategy making in English local government (Blair, 2002; OPSR, 2002). The second major dimension of strategy making processes in public agencies is logical incrementalism (Quinn, 1980). The planning processes associated with logical incrementalism are included in our measures: political processes, bargaining and negotiation, incremental development of processes and broad goals.

Alongside our measures of management and planning we also propose that the internal climate is likely to affect the level of red tape in an organization. The measure we use here is a combination of informants' views on the internal political context and the

¹⁰ The indicator was initially developed as a measure of centralization but has been reversed in this analysis.

¹¹ Eigenvalues and percent of variance explained were: corporate officers 1.74, 87.14%; chief officers 1.66, 86.13% and service managers 1.59, 79.63%.

¹² Eigenvalues and percent of variance explained for rational planning were: corporate officers 1.97, 65.80; chief officer 1.86, 62.09; service managers 2.05, 68.27. For logical incrementalism the results were: corporate officers 1.69, 33.87; chief officer 1.80, 36.05; service managers 1.83, 36.62

extent to which they perceived that it was changing, uncertain and complex¹³. Higher levels of complexity are anticipated to increase the level of red tape.

Argument has been presented about the likely impact of resources on red tape. Rather than measure actual expenditure per se we have explored informants' perceptions of resources within the organization. These measures tap perceptions of cost cutting and constraints; cost cutting may reduce flexibility within an organization while constraints or efficiency may better target resources to programmes or goals. One justification of this approach is the relatively high levels of funding from central government. At least two-thirds of resources are provided by central government through grants. These resources are allocated by needs-based formulae. A measure of slack resources within the organization (actual expenditure divided by the standard spending assessment (see Andrews, Boyne, Law and Walker, 2005)) was included in earlier models but was not significant nor did it affect the overall results.

The relationship between the external environment and red tape were discussed. We argue that oversight will have an adverse consequence for red tape. To explore this concept two measures have been used. The first explores the role of inspectors in English local government. The level of inspection has grown substantially over recent years (Ashworth, Boyne and Walker, 2002). Every service included in this analysis has its own inspection service, education is inspected by the Office for Standards in Education, social services by the Social Service Inspectorate, benefits and revenues by the Benefits Fraud Inspection Service and all remain services, including the corporate centre of a local authority by the Audit Commission Inspection Service. Inspectors are powerful stakeholders and able to influence the future strategies and direction of an authority, we therefore questioned informants about the extent to which the reports of inspectors influenced their improvement strategies. One consequence of consistent negative ratings by inspectors is direct intervention in local government by central government. This is typically done when an authority is defined as 'failing' in some part of its service delivery or wider accountability activities. A failing organization is subject to a number of measures which have included the replacement of the entire management team or enforced competitive tendering of service delivery. To explore this aspect of oversight we asked about the impact of direct intervention by government on improvement strategies.

Five measures were used to estimate the impact of the external context on internal and external red tape. Three of these are archival measures of the environment that focus on service need. Measures of level of affluence, such as income data, are not readily available at the local authority level. The level of service need is consequently operationalised through a measure of lone parent households (taken from the 2001 census, Office for National Statistics, 2003). This is a proxy measure for the capacity of local residents to co-produce services, and time and money pressures on such households are likely to impede positive contributions to service delivery, requiring additional services and therefore heightening the level of need (Andrews, Boyne, Law and Walker, 2005). As the range of service providers becomes more varied, it becomes harder for local authorities to determine the relative needs of different groups and to provide standardised services that meet their requirements. We use ethnic diversity to measure variations in the level of service need (Andrews, Boyne and Walker, forthcoming). A

¹³ Eigenvalues and percent of variance explained were: corporate officers 2.42, 80.50; chief officers 2.33, 77.66; service managers 2.58, 85.929

Hehrfindahl index was created by squaring the proportion of each ethnic group (taken from the 2001 census, Office for National Statistics, 2003) within a local authority and then subtracting the sum of the squares of these proportions from 10,000. The measure gives a proxy for 'fractionalisation' within the local authority area, with a high level of ethnic diversity reflecting in a high score on the index. The final archival measure looks at change in population. This measure captures features of a dynamic area because evidence suggests that in areas of population growth new residents are likely to be economically skilled and socially enterprising (Armstrong and Taylor, 2000).

Two perceptual measures of the environment that focus on the malleability of external environmental influences are included in this analysis. The first measure captures informants' perceptions of the external political environment, exploring with informants their views on change, complexity and uncertainty¹⁴. The higher informants rate the external political context on these dimensions the more likely they are to be associated with higher levels of red tape. A key function of management is to interact and manipulate the organizational environment. However, managing outward to other contexts and departments within the authority implies that organizations are able to influence the socio-economic, political and internal political contexts. We quizzed informants on these three dimensions of the organizational environment and anticipated that those organizations that feel that they have the ability to manage this environment will experience lower levels of red tape¹⁵.

Results and Discussion

Our informants report a moderately high level of red tape in English local government (see Table 1). On the two global measures, corporate officers report seeing more red tape than service managers, and the difference is especially pronounced in the case of external red tape. However, on the more specific personnel and administrative subsystem measures, the lower echelons tend to report less red tape than top-level officials. The two global measures of internal and external red tape are correlated at $r = .14$ ($p = .18$), $r = .18$ ($p = .10$) and $r = .05$ ($p = .62$) for corporate, chief officers and service managers, respectively. This suggests very weak relationships between the two global measures and that they are not interrelated. However, the internal global measure and the subsystem measures are interrelated, with moderate correlations reported: $r = .29$ ($p = .01$), $r = .46$ ($p = .00$) and $r = .34$ ($p = .00$) for corporate, chief officers and service managers, respectively.

Results of the regression analysis are presented in Tables 2, 3 and 4¹⁶. These findings reveal substantial divergences in the determinants of red tape, as yet hitherto reported.¹⁷ Table 2 presents the results using the internal global measure of red tape as the

¹⁴ Eigenvalues and percent of variance explained were: corporate officers 2.37, 78.83; chief officer 2.36, 78.75; service manager 2.47, 82.18

¹⁵ Eigenvalues and percent of variance explained were: corporate officers 1.86, 61.92; chief officer 1.74, 57.93; service manager 1.64, 54.83

¹⁶ The highest variation inflation factor in the reported results is 3.78, well below the critical value of 10 (Bowerman and O'Connell, 1990), indicating that there are no problems of multicollinearity.

¹⁷ A $p = .10$ threshold for statistical significance is used because we have directional hypotheses, and therefore means that we are essentially employing 0.05 chance of rejecting a true null hypothesis (King, Zeckhauser, and Kim, 2004). This approach to statistical significance also reflects the design science nature of public management research.

dependent variable. The model explains the most variation in the corporate echelon, followed by the chief officers and finally the service managers. Contrary to the anticipated relationship between devolution and red tape, corporate officers find overall levels of red tape to be higher when management and behaviour is devolved—this suggests that the solution to high levels of red tape offered by senior managers is to centralise management and decision-making. The most significant factor seen to reduce the effect of red tape is developmental culture. The coefficients for the measures of planning are in the anticipated direction, and statistically significant. Our measures of planning produce coefficients in the anticipated directions: logical incrementalism works to reduce red tape while rational planning increases it. Resources do have an impact on internal global red tape, in this case in contradictory directions. Resource constraints, implying the need for efficiency in the provision of services and their improvement, reduce red tape. However, the process of cost reduction increases red tape. Ironically, this suggests that senior managers in English local government see the process of reducing costs as leading to the introduction of burdensome rules and procedures. It is possible to speculate that these may be necessary in order to control expenditure at lower levels of the organization. One of the two measures of oversight was significant, and in the anticipated direction. Regulation, as measured through inspectors' reports, was a contributory factor in higher levels of global red tape, however, direct intervention was not statistically significant. External variables were unlikely to influence the level of internal global red tape according to the corporate officers; only one of the five variables was statistically significant. The requirement to produce larger numbers of standardised units of provision to a diverse population was associated with higher levels of internal red tape—presumably a requirement to develop internal systems necessary to deliver a complex set of services.

[place Table 2 here]

The findings from the chief officers corroborate those of the corporate officers in three cases. They also saw a developmental culture having positive effects to reduce the level of red tape. Logical incrementalism was likely to reduce red tape and rational planning to increase it. While both groups of officers have statistically significant coefficients for the reducing costs variables, for chief officers, occupying a middle position between the corporate centre and front-line supervisory officers, the effect of this was to reduce not increase red tape. The variable direct intervention was statistically significant and in the anticipated direction, this echelon of officers saw the activities of a key external stakeholder having detrimental impacts on the level of red tape. For chief officers, it was not the diversity of service needs that increased red tape, but its existence. They also, contrary to expectations, felt that when the external environment was malleable that this was likely to increase the level of red tape. It is possible to speculate that as the environment becomes more malleable, so they have to interact to achieve influence and need to put in place rules and procedures that they see as onerous.

While the model for the service managers explains the least variation, the statistically significant coefficients in this model are different from those of the corporate

and chief officers.¹⁸ Nearer the front-line, this group of officers reports that formalisation does increase red tape, as does increased complexity, change, and uncertainty in the external political environment. Rather perversely they see rational planning reducing levels of red tape. It is possible that they see rational planning as a tool to cut through rules and procedures, rather than as creating internal red tape. Research evidence from the UK suggests that the problems of implementing rational planning associated with some of the reforms being implemented by local governments are surmountable (Boyne, Gould-Williams, Law and Walker, 2004). Nonetheless, additional research is required to understand these findings in relation to red tape.

In Table 3, the results of the models with the dependent variable for personnel and administrative subsystem red tape are presented. The results for each model offer higher levels of explanation than for the global measure of red tape, reinforcing the importance of the detailed and complex nature of red tape. Among these models, the service officer echelon explains the highest level of variation, followed by the corporate officers and chief officers echelons.

[place Table 3 here]

The corporate officers associate reductions in red tape with formalization. This suggests that the presence of written policies and procedures guides the action of employees and assists them in navigating through personnel and administrative subsystem red tape. Additional research is required here to explore the precise ways in which policies and procedures reduce red tape for this group of officers, particularly in light of the findings reported in the service manager model which offer contradictory results. The results for the planning coefficients are statistically significant and in the anticipated directions. The actions of external stakeholders, here inspectors, and the reports that they produce for local authorities has a clear detrimental impact on red tape.

Chief officers also find that logical incrementalism has a positive effect and reduces red tape while rational planning increases it. The results for the reducing costs variable are in the anticipated direction. Two external environmental factors are seen to increase the level of red tape. First, the level of service need is associated with higher levels of red tape, while the capacity of an authority to positively interact with the external environment and shape it in the organizations favour increases—not decreases—red tape. It is possible to speculate that this is because a malleable environment requires that organizations develop processes and procedures which are time consuming, leading to reduce time to focus on personnel and administrative issues.

Service managers offer a detailed account of personnel and administrative subsystem red tape. The model may fit well here because these forms of red tape are those likely to be experienced by front-line supervisory staff on a regular basis, whereas corporate officers with responsibilities for strategy and wider organizational direction may more clearly perceive of red tape as a global issue. Personnel and administrative subsystem red tape is most likely to be affected by a developmental culture. An emphasis on innovation and risk taking clearly cut through problematic bureaucracy. The coefficient for devolved behaviour is in the anticipated direction, service managers feel

¹⁸ The service managers model is not statistically significant, suggesting perhaps that these variables do not capture the determinants of red tape for this group of officers.

that decision-making close to the front line helps to reduce personnel and administrative subsystem red tape. As with the global measure of red tape, service managers associate formalisation with personnel and administrative subsystem red tape. One of the two planning variables is significant but not in the anticipated direction—rational planning is seen as an obstacle to overcome resistance to pay, personnel performance and restructuring at the service level. Along with service managers findings in relation to formalisation this is a critical area for additional research. It is possible, for example, that service managers see systematic processes of strategy formulation as a way to address personnel and administrative problems in their services. The coefficient for the internal political context variable is negative and highly significant. The implication of this result is that greater internal turbulence reduces red tape and that by deduction greater stability in the internal organizational environment would increase red tape. This finding counteracts conventional wisdom on the importance of stability within public organizations and needs to be examined more closely to reconcile it with the wider research literature.

Reducing costs is seen to add to red tape, perhaps presenting this group of managers with other goals beyond service delivery and accountability which may create problems in removing and rewarding staff and putting into place new organizational structures. Both coefficients for the oversight variables are significant. The regulation variable is in the anticipated direction—inspectors add to personnel and administrative subsystem red tape, by perhaps identifying rules and procedures that they expect that services should develop. As with the internal global model, and indeed the external global model, direct intervention by government is seen as a tool to reduce red tape, this may be because one of the tasks of central government intervention is to assist with service delivery improvements and cut through prior problems and difficulties, of which red tape could be one. One of the five external environmental variables is significant, that for changing needs. The sign on this coefficient is in the anticipated direction—probably meaning that more prosperous citizens are able to assist in the co-production of services.

Table 4 presents the results on the determinants of external global red tape amongst the three tiers of officials. As with the models on personnel and administrative subsystem red tape, the service managers model explains the largest proportion of variation, followed by the corporate officers and chief officers. In the corporate officers model the coefficient for both devolution variables is negative and statistically significant (at the lower level of .10). Apparently corporate officers believe external red tape declines as control and decision-making is pushed down the organization. In relation to our operationalisation of the concept of external red tape, senior managers at the centre of the organization perceive administrative rules and procedures open up and are responsive to stakeholders needs when lower tiers of management take control for service delivery and corrective action. Target setting is also statistically significant—systems of performance management and target setting are seen to make the organization more closed and less responsive to stakeholders. This finding is potentially very important and should be explored further in future research. The statistically significant negative coefficient for developmental culture indicates that innovation and risk taking activities also serve to reduce levels of external as well as personnel and administrative subsystem red tape for corporate officers. Constraints on resources were seen to reduce global red tape. Corporate officers apparently believe that efficiency-related activities help their

governmental authorities and organizations focus on interaction with stakeholders in the external environment.

[place Table 4 here]

The final statistically significant coefficient is for regulation. This is the only significant external variable in the corporate officers model. While our measure of external red tape is focused on an organization's ability to interact with stakeholders in the external environment, it was anticipated that complexity, uncertainty and change in the environment (as captured by the external political context, ability to influence, diversity of service need and change in service need) would contribute to external red tape. However, it is the direct actions of inspectors that are seen to hinder openness and responsiveness. This finding is of particular policy interest because the intention of the inspection regime led by the Audit Commission, the primary inspection agency for local government in England, is to develop corporate cultures predicated on openness and responsiveness, and that use stakeholder information to assist in organizational strategy-making (Andrews, Boyne, Law and Walker, 2003).

Only two variables are statistically significant for the chief officer echelon. External red tape is reduced by logical incrementalism. This implies that administrative rules and procedures are kept open and responsive through the strategy process of adaptation, bargaining, and negotiation. We hypothesized that change in service need would reduce red tape because more affluence was thought to result in higher levels of co-production of services. Chief officers, with the highest level of responsibility for service delivery, do not see it this way. They apparently believe that new groups of users place greater burdens on public agencies, despite the possibility of improved co-production. This may be because these more affluent groups are exercise more voice and make demands felt at this level of management. More research is required to explore this proposition.

Seven internal variables and six external variables are statistically significant in the service managers model. Unlike their corporate senior officers, service managers see devolved management increasing external red tape. This suggests very different perceptions about the types of management practices that need to be instituted in English local authorities if reduction in red tape is a key organizational goal. Additional research focusing upon organizations where these two views are divergent would be of particular value in understanding the results in more detail. The coefficient for target setting is positive and significant. This mirrors the findings for corporate officers. While target setting is a key part of the reform agenda in English public services (Walker and Boyne, 2004), it is possible that these processes are primarily internally focused and that they come bundled with rules and regulations that make interaction with external stakeholders more closed and less responsive.

One of the more consistent findings reported in this study is that developmental culture reduces red tape, and based on the models presented thus far, we can say *any type of red tape*. Innovation and risk taking behaviours are also consistent with findings reported elsewhere (for example, see Pandey and Moynihan, 2006) and as prescribed by government as a solution for excessive red tape. Planning processes associated with logical incrementalism are again significant in this model and in the anticipated direction.

As was the case with developmental culture, in each of our models and for each echelon, logical incrementalism is a key organizational process that should be adopted in organizations trying to reduce red tape. In keeping with the findings for internal political context for personnel and administrative subsystem red tape, the sign on the coefficient is negative implying that turbulence is not a determinant of red tape. Again, additional research needs to be undertaken to explore this counterintuitive finding.

Resources had an impact on external red tape. Reducing costs increased this type of red tape while constraints on resources reduced it. This suggests that cost cutting makes interaction with stakeholders more rule-and-procedure-bound, perhaps because insufficient resources are available to undertake the necessary activities. However, a focus on resource constraint or efficiency may have positive benefits because resources are appropriately directed. Further research would be beneficial to unpack these issues in more detail. Of the two oversight variables, direct intervention was statistically significant with a negative coefficient. As was the case with personnel and administrative subsystem red tape, direct intervention is seen by service managers as a tool to reduce the level of red tape.

For service managers, external factors play a key role in the creation of higher levels of external red tape. It is possible that service managers see external red tape as a two way process. As the external environment becomes more complex, so their interaction with it leads to more administrative rules and procedures. Service managers do not see high levels of need per se as increasing red tape (the sign is negative suggesting that higher level of need reduces external red tape), but they do see diversity and change in service need as important factors together with the external political context. Furthermore when they are unable to influence the external environment, this too contributes to greater levels of external red tape.

Conclusion

In this paper we have sought to advance the debate on the determinants of red tape in public agencies by providing evidence from a new dataset and by examining perceptions of red tape amongst different organizational echelons. By focusing on different groups in public agencies, we have provided richer and more detailed results than has been the case hitherto. These results suggest that red tape and its determinants are very complex, with different variables influencing different types of red tape amongst different groups of organizational actors.

Where common ground does exist it would imply that developmental culture and the introduction of strategy making processes associated with logical incrementalism are likely to be solutions to excess red tape, no matter what its type. For each echelon they identify different factors that affect red tape. Corporate officers consistently point towards the problems that oversight brings, and in particular the reports of inspectors. Chief officers consistently highlight a solution to red tape, that of strategy formulation through logical incrementalism. Service managers point to external factors as the creator of higher levels of red tape and in particular greater levels of complexity, uncertainty and change in the external political context. The policy prescription for the reduction of red tape would therefore include: promoting developmental cultures, pursuing logical incrementalism at the primary strategy formulation approach, ensuring the activities of

inspectors are kept to a minimum and ensuring a calm and untroubled external political context.

This study has a number of weaknesses. We explore a limited number of red tape measures and use single item measures in two cases. While single item measures are not problematic in themselves (Wanous and Hudy, 2001), and Pandey and Scott (2002) argue that the internal index measure adopted here captures many aspects of red tape additional measures covering both additional dimensions of red tape as well as offering multiple item scales would enhance our analysis. Our study is based in one country, in one sector—further analysis in different contexts may reveal different patterns amongst the determinants of red tape. With the current dataset we have it is possible to examine these relationships in different services—a task to be addressed in the near future.

The model presented here is lagged. However, interesting questions have not been explored about potential reciprocal relationships between determinants and red tape: do higher levels of red tape influence management, resources, oversight and the environment? Additional research could fruitfully examine this. Similarly we know that performance management can interact with red tape to reduce the potential negative consequences of red tape. Similar interactions need to be explored in future analysis of the determinants of red tape. In this study developmental culture and logical incrementalism were often statistically significant variables. However, given the additive nature of our model potential interactive effects between them will be explored in the next stage of our research.

One clear finding of this study is that perceptions of red tape are contingent on organizational position. This finding echoes earlier work that emphasized the contingent nature of the construct. For example, Waldo (1959, 369) observed that “one man's red tape is another man's system” and Kaufman's (1977, 4) later remarked that “one person's red tape is another's treasured safeguard.” This finding suggests that a variant of Mile's law is operative in public organizations as well. What one sees depends at least partly on where one sits. This finding also has practical implications—policy-makers and public managers tasked with reducing red tape in public organizations need to consider carefully who they are targeting in their reform efforts and realize that such efforts may have confounding effects among some groups of officials and in some functional areas.

In conclusion, this study has produced a rich, interesting set of findings that raise many additional questions about the nature, causes, and effects of red tape in English local government (and elsewhere). Fortunately for us, these questions can only be answered through additional, sustained research efforts.

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Table 1: Concepts, Measures, Anticipated Relationships and Descriptive Data

Concept	Measure	Anticipated direction	Corporate		Chief Officer		Service Manager	
			M	sd	M	sd	M	Sd
Red tape								
Internal global	The level of red tape in our service/authority is high		4.21	.87	4.29	.92	3.95	.90
Subsystem	Even if a manager is a poor performer, formal rules make it hard to remove him or her from the organization; the formal pay structures and rules make it hard to reward a good manager with higher pay here; reorganizing an organizational unit or department can be achieved within two or three weeks in our service/authority		16.48	2.05	15.82	2.52	15.25	2.87
External global	Administrative rules and procedures are open and responsive allowing stakeholders (users, businesses, government agencies etc.) to freely interact with our service/authority		4.23	.81	3.76	.79	3.40	.72
Devolution:								
Devolved management	Control is devolved to service managers	-	5.05	.87	5.68	.78	5.31	.53
Devolved behaviour	When our results deviate from our plans, the decision to take appropriate corrective action usually comes from top managers (reversed)	-	5.00	.84	4.78	1.04	4.61	.73
Target setting	There is a well developed framework of performance measures and targets to drive what we do	+	5.24	.99	5.70	1.01	5.67	.54
Formalisation	Written policies and procedures are important in guiding the action of employees in the service	+	4.81	.86	5.30	.86	5.40	.55
Developmental Culture	The service/authority is prepared to take risks; The service/authority is at the forefront of innovative approaches	-	10.21	2.14	10.79	1.82	10.53	
Planning:								
Logical incrementalism	The strategy with the greatest political support is usually adopted as our policy; When we make strategy we produce policy options which are very similar to those we already have; Strategy develops through an	-	23.58	2.74	22.86	3.05	23.21	1.74

	ongoing process of adjustment; When we make strategy we produce broad goals; Strategy develops through a process of bargaining and negotiation between groups or individuals							
Rational planning	When the service formulates strategy, it is planned in detail; When the service formulates strategy, options are identified and evaluated before the best option is selected; Strategy is made in consultation with our external stakeholders (e.g. users, other agencies etc.)	+	15.18	2.35	16.52	1.89	15.72	1.65
Internal political context	The internal political context the service operates in was: Changing rapidly during the last financial year; Uncertain during the last financial year; Very complex during the last financial year	+	12.15	4.57	11.15	4.24	11.71	3.11
Resources:								
Reducing costs	Reducing the costs of service delivery was a major part of our approach	-	5.15	.98	5.08	1.04	4.71	.83
Resource constraints	Resource constraints were important in driving improvement in our service/authority	-	5.15	1.13	4.74	1.11	4.79	.89
Oversight:								
Regulation	Inspectors' reports were important in driving improvement in our service/authority	+	5.37	1.12	4.83	1.22	5.19	.87
Direct intervention	Direct intervention from central government was important in driving performance in our service/authority	+	2.09	1.36	2.05	1.20	2.82	1.05
External context:								
External political	The external political context the service operates in was: Changing rapidly during the last financial year; Uncertain during the last financial year; Very complex during the last financial year	+	12.05	3.33	12.56	3.80	12.46	2.56
Ability to influence	The service was/is able to exert a lot of influence over the: Social and economic context during the last year; External political context during the last year; Internal political context during the last year	-	11.91	2.64	10.67	2.84	10.51	1.74
Service need	Percentage of lone parent households	+	21.68	5.23	21.83	5.84	22.24	5.72
Diversity of service need	Hehrfindahl index of ethnicity	+	2141.5	1953.3	2350.7	2122.7	2364.3	2099.9
Change in service need	Percentage change in population 1991 to 2001.	-	8	5	4	8	6	8
			.77	.79	.77	.74	.81	.88

Table 2: Regression results for internal global measure of red tape across three groups of officers

	Corporate			Chief Officer			Service Manager		
	β	Se	Beta	β	Se	Beta	β	se	Beta
Constant	5.11***	1.42		4.52**	1.39		1.09	2.53	
Devolved management	-.26+	.14	-.25	-.00	.15	-.01	-.23	.25	-.13
Devolved behaviour	.25+	.13	.25	.00	.01	.01	.30	.19	.24
Target setting	.13	.00	.15	.00	.11	.04	.18	.26	.11
Formalisation	.00	.12	.06	.01	.15	.07	.64*	.28	.39
Developmental culture	-.31*	.13	-.33	-.31*	.14	-.30	.22	.16	.21
Logical incrementalism	-.22*	.11	-.23	-.42**	.13	-.40	.01	.15	.09
Rational planning	.28+	.14	.30	.28*	.14	.29	-.37*	.16	-.39
Internal political context	.00	.11	.00	.18	.12	.18	.01	.15	.07
Reducing costs	.17+	.10	.19	-.35**	.11	-.39	.13	.20	.12
Resource constraints	-.22*	.00	-.28	.00	.10	.01	.00	.15	.03
Regulation	.21**	.00	.27	-.08	.10	-.12	.15	.14	.14
Direct intervention	.00	.00	.08	.16+	.01	.21	-.14	.11	-.17
External political context	.14	.12	.15	.01	.13	.06	.23+	.14	.23
Ability to influence	-.13	.16	-.14	.24+	.13	.23	.16	.13	.07
Service need	-.00	.00	-.01	.01*	.02	.33	.00	.00	.00
Diversity of service need	-.00*	.00	-.29	-.00	.00	-.10	-.00	.00	.15
Change in service need	.00	.12	.00	.07	.14	.06	-.00	.14	-.01
R ²	.45			.39			.28		
F	3.16***			2.28**			1.29		
N = 84									
+ < .1, * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001									

Table 3: Regression results for subsystem red tape amongst three groups of officers

	Corporate			Chief Officer			Service Manager		
	β	Se	Beta	β	Se	Beta	β	se	Beta
Constant	.25	1.34		2.23+	1.20		-3.03+	1.74	
Devolved management	-.16	.13	-.16	-.01	.13	-.08	-.14	.16	-.10
Devolved behaviour	.01	.12	.08	.01	.01	-.07	.24+	.12	.22
Target setting	-.01	.01	-.11	-.12	.01	-.18	-.06	.19	-.04
Formalisation	-.24*	.11	-.25	-.01	.12	-.06	.49**	.19	.34
Developmental culture	-.16	.11	-.18	-.18	.12	-.22	-.48***	.12	-.51
Logical incrementalism	-.34***	.01	-.39	-.23*	.11	-.26	.00	.11	.03
Rational planning	.39**	.14	.45	.21+	.12	.26	-.30**	.11	-.36
Internal political context	.01	.01	.09	.14	.11	.17	-.35***	.10	-.41
Reducing costs	.14	.01	.17	-.19*	.01	-.25	.36**	.14	.33
Resource constraints	-.01	.01	-.12	-.13	.01	-.18	.00	.00	.03
Regulation	.38***	.01	.49	-.00	.01	-.04	.33***	.00	.36
Direct intervention	-.00	.01	-.01	.01	.01	.17	-.19**	.00	-.26
External political context	.00	.11	.04	-.01	.11	-.11	.21*	.00	.23
Ability to influence	-.01	.01	-.08	.31**	.11	.33	-.11	.01	.12
Service need	.02	.02	.12	.04*	.01	.31	-.00	.00	-.01
Diversity of service need	-.00	.00	-.10	-.00	.00	-.05	-.00	.00	-.11
Change in service need	-.06	.11	-.06	.19	.12	.18	-.30**	.01	-.35
R ²	.47			.39			.58		
F	3.43***			2.37**			4.41***		
N = 80									

+ < .1, * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001

Table 4: Regression results for global external red tape amongst three groups of officers

	Corporate			Chief Officer			Service Manager		
	β	Se	Beta	β	Se	Beta	β	se	Beta
Constant	2.87*	1.41		4.33***	1.2		1.44	1.40	
Devolved management	-.23+	.14	-.24	.00	.12	.04	.22+	.12	.16
Devolved behaviour	-.24+	.12	-.24	.00	.09	.04	.00	.01	.04
Target setting	.17+	.10	.20	-.01	.01	-.08	.33*	.14	.22
Formalisation	.00	.11	.10	-.01	.13	-.08	-.00	.14	-.01
Developmental culture	-.26*	.13	-.30	.04	.13	.04	-.53***	.01	-.66
Logical incrementalism	-.11	.10	-.13	-.33**	.11	-.37	-.30***	.01	-.37
Rational planning	-.00	.14	-.05	-.00	.12	-.00	.01	.01	.08
Internal political context	.01	.10	.08	-.01	.11	-.11	-.24**	.01	-.33
Reducing costs	.01	.10	.10	-.01	.10	-.11	.49***	.01	.56
Resource constraints	-.26**	.01	-.37	.01	.01	.09	-.16*	.01	-.20
Regulation	.22**	.01	.29	.00	.00	.07	-.10	.01	-.12
Direct intervention	.00	.01	.02	.01	.07	.13	-.15**	.01	-.22
External political context	.01	.12	.02	.11	.11	.13	.17**	.01	.23
Ability to influence	.01	.01	.07	.11	.11	.13	-.16*	.01	-.20
Service need	-.00	.00	-.08	-.00	.00	-.13	-.00***	.00	-.38
Diversity of service need	.00	.00	.02	-.00	.00	-.16	.00***	.00	.56
Change in service need	-.01	.11	-.09	.52***	.12	.48	-.41***	.01	-.46
R ²	.43			.33			.77		
F	2.89**			1.79*			10.31***		
N = 74									

+ < .1, * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001