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Article: Executive Stock Options and Manipulated Stock-Price Performance

TitleExecutive Stock Options and Manipulated Stock-Price Performance
Authors
Zheng, LZhou, X
Issue Date2012
PublisherBlackwell Publishing Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journals/IRFI
Citation
International Review Of Finance, 2012, v. 12 n. 3, p. 249-281 How to Cite?
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2443.2011.01146.x
AbstractPrevious studies have examined the manipulation of executive stock option awards and exercises, focusing on information timing by managers. In this paper, we investigate managerial manipulation of stock-price performance motivated by stock options. To distinguish performance manipulation from information timing, we examine stock returns surrounding the departure of retiring CEOs, whose option holdings typically expire shortly after their departure and whose chances to manipulate option awards and exercises are minimized. Consistent with manipulated performance, we find significant abnormal stock returns in the months surrounding CEO departure for those with strong option incentives, which are reversed shortly after CEO departure. © International Review of Finance Ltd. 2011.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/177800
ISSN
1369-412X
2021 Impact Factor: 2.175
2020 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.489
ISI Accession Number ID
WOS:000208830200001
References
References in Scopus

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorZheng, Len_US
dc.contributor.authorZhou, Xen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-12-19T09:39:56Z-
dc.date.available2012-12-19T09:39:56Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.citationInternational Review Of Finance, 2012, v. 12 n. 3, p. 249-281en_US
dc.identifier.issn1369-412Xen_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/177800-
dc.description.abstractPrevious studies have examined the manipulation of executive stock option awards and exercises, focusing on information timing by managers. In this paper, we investigate managerial manipulation of stock-price performance motivated by stock options. To distinguish performance manipulation from information timing, we examine stock returns surrounding the departure of retiring CEOs, whose option holdings typically expire shortly after their departure and whose chances to manipulate option awards and exercises are minimized. Consistent with manipulated performance, we find significant abnormal stock returns in the months surrounding CEO departure for those with strong option incentives, which are reversed shortly after CEO departure. © International Review of Finance Ltd. 2011.en_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherBlackwell Publishing Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journals/IRFIen_US
dc.relation.ispartofInternational Review of Financeen_US
dc.titleExecutive Stock Options and Manipulated Stock-Price Performanceen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailZhou, X: xianzhou@hkucc.hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityZhou, X=rp01129en_US
dc.description.naturepostprinten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1468-2443.2011.01146.xen_US
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-84865653564en_US
dc.identifier.hkuros220631-
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-84865653564&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_US
dc.identifier.volume12en_US
dc.identifier.issue3en_US
dc.identifier.spage249en_US
dc.identifier.epage281en_US
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000208830200001-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Kingdomen_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridZheng, L=55348893300en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridZhou, X=8217375200en_US
dc.identifier.issnl1369-412X-

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