Competitive Cloud Resource Procurements via Cloud Brokerage

Abstract

In current IaaS cloud markets, tenant consumers non-cooperatively compete for cloud resources via demand quantities, and the service quality is offered in a best effort manner. To better exploit tenant demand correlation, cloud brokerage services provide cloud resource multiplexing so as to earn profits by receiving volume discounts from cloud providers. A fundamental but daunting problem facing a tenant consumer is competitive resource procurements via cloud brokerage. In this paper, we investigate this problem via non-cooperative game modeling. In the static game, to maximize the experienced surplus, tenants judiciously select optimal demand responses given pricing strategies of cloud brokers and complete information of the other tenants' demands. We also derive Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative game for competitive resource procurements. Performance evaluation on Nash equilibrium reveals insightful observations for both theoretical analysis and practical cloud resource procurements scheme design.