A study on the doctrines of Śrĩlãta as seen in the *Abhidharma-Nyãyãnusãra : with special emphasis on his model of perception

Abstract

Śrīlāta, represented in the *Nyāyānusāra as Sthavira, is a leading Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntika master who lived during the 4th century C.E. While his writings are no longer extant, available sources with regard to his doctrines are also sparse, making him not a popular topic for research. Nevertheless, his standpoint on “only dhātu-s are real,” his doctrine of the *anudhātu, citta-caitta-s etc. are all important contributions, especially on the understanding of the mind, during the Abhidharma period, and certainly deserve further attention.

On one hand, Śrīlāta’s well-known dictum “only dhātu-s are real” carries a sense of realism; on the other hand, his assertion on “all dharma-s are in fact the object domain of manas” and that “all dharma-s are nonetheless the activity of the mind, all are subsumed under the dharma-āyatana,” suggests an idealistic predilection. This thesis aims at deciphering this seeming contradiction mainly through the study on the model of cognition in Śrīlāta’s tenet, relying mainly on information found in the *Nyāyānusāra authored by Saṃghabhadra, a contemporary of Śrīlāta.

The findings indicate that the dhātu-s which Śrīlāta considers the ultimate reals are not equivalent to what are cognized by the mind which are merely facsimiles of the real carried within the *anudhātu. A study on a passage in the *Nyāyānusāra where Xuan Zang translates the same Sanskrit word, believed to be “saṃcita”, as either “he-he” (collected / 和合) or “he-ji”(agglomerated / 和集) leads us to the conclusion that for Śrīlāta, even the sensory faculty and its object which arises at the first moment of cognition, rather than being external existents, are none other than the creation of the mind.

According to Śrīlāta, the dharma-dhātu which is the object domain of mental consciousness subsumes within it the totality of dharma-s. Since mental consciousness is having non-existent as object because it always arises subsequent to its object, these dharma-s within the dharma-dhātu rather than being real are therefore only the facsimiles carried within the *anudhātu.

The mutual subsumption between the vedanā, saṃjñā and saṃskāra of the five skandha-s and the dharma-dhātu of the eighteen dhātu-s further supports the fact that the dharma-dhātu is in fact purely mental and what the mind cognizes is only the creation of the mind.

However this does not amount to Śrīlata being an idealist, he acknowledges the existence of external reality in the form of arising and ceasing dharma-s which are beyond the object domain of the mind. In fact, our findings indicates that it is with regard to these flashing dharma-s that his dictum “only dhātu-s are real” is said.

This thesis concludes by systemizing the previous findings and presents an overall perspective on the model of perception basing on the thinking of Śrīlāta.