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Article: Political Investment Cycles of State-Owned Enterprises

TitlePolitical Investment Cycles of State-Owned Enterprises
Authors
Issue Date2020
PublisherOxford University Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/
Citation
The Review of Financial Studies, 2020, v. 33 n. 7, p. 3088-3129 How to Cite?
AbstractUsing a large panel of more than 140,000 state-owned enterprises (SOEs), this study examines SOEs’ investment behavior surrounding 82 national elections in 25 European countries between 2001 and 2015. We find that SOEs increase their corporate investment by about 29% of the sample average during national election years. This effect is more pronounced in fixed timing and closely contested elections. The effect is also stronger in countries with low institutional quality, more centralized political systems, and state-controlled banking systems. In contrast, we find the matched non-SOEs significantly decrease their corporate investment during national election years.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/279015
ISSN
2021 Impact Factor: 8.414
2020 SCImago Journal Rankings: 12.800
ISI Accession Number ID

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLi, Q-
dc.contributor.authorLin, C-
dc.contributor.authorXu, L-
dc.date.accessioned2019-10-21T02:18:04Z-
dc.date.available2019-10-21T02:18:04Z-
dc.date.issued2020-
dc.identifier.citationThe Review of Financial Studies, 2020, v. 33 n. 7, p. 3088-3129-
dc.identifier.issn0893-9454-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/279015-
dc.description.abstractUsing a large panel of more than 140,000 state-owned enterprises (SOEs), this study examines SOEs’ investment behavior surrounding 82 national elections in 25 European countries between 2001 and 2015. We find that SOEs increase their corporate investment by about 29% of the sample average during national election years. This effect is more pronounced in fixed timing and closely contested elections. The effect is also stronger in countries with low institutional quality, more centralized political systems, and state-controlled banking systems. In contrast, we find the matched non-SOEs significantly decrease their corporate investment during national election years.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherOxford University Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/-
dc.relation.ispartofThe Review of Financial Studies-
dc.rightsPre-print: Journal Title] ©: [year] [owner as specified on the article] Published by Oxford University Press [on behalf of xxxxxx]. All rights reserved. Pre-print (Once an article is published, preprint notice should be amended to): This is an electronic version of an article published in [include the complete citation information for the final version of the Article as published in the print edition of the Journal.] Post-print: This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in [insert journal title] following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version [insert complete citation information here] is available online at: xxxxxxx [insert URL that the author will receive upon publication here].-
dc.titlePolitical Investment Cycles of State-Owned Enterprises-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.emailLin, C: chenlin1@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityLin, C=rp01808-
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/rfs/hhz090-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-85090664952-
dc.identifier.hkuros308089-
dc.identifier.volume33-
dc.identifier.issue7-
dc.identifier.spage3088-
dc.identifier.epage3129-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000562481500006-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Kingdom-
dc.identifier.issnl0893-9454-

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