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Article: Political Elites and Hometown Favoritism in Famine-stricken China

TitlePolitical Elites and Hometown Favoritism in Famine-stricken China
Authors
KeywordsO12
D73
N95
Issue Date2020
PublisherAcademic Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jce
Citation
Journal of Comparative Economics, 2020, Epub 2020-07-08 How to Cite?
AbstractChina's Great Leap Famine has remained to this day the severest in human history, and yet few studies have invoked the human factor in explaining its outcome. In sharp contrast to Mao's aggressive extractive policy against the peasantry, the 181 Central Committee (CC) members—the political elite of the Chinese Communist Party—may have alleviated the casualty of this most devastating famine, by arranging more “resale grain” to be shipped to their hometowns. Specifically, having an additional native CC member in a prefecture reduces the excess death of that prefecture by 46,500, accounting for 2.3 percentage points in the death rate when evaluated at the mean. The effect is more pronounced if a CC member worked in the central planning apparatus in charge of grain transfer. Moreover, evidence suggests that the counties with more CC members tended to receive more resale grain, while grain procurement remained affected.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/283989
ISSN
2019 Impact Factor: 1.992
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.066

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorKung, JKS-
dc.contributor.authorZhou, T-
dc.date.accessioned2020-07-20T05:55:08Z-
dc.date.available2020-07-20T05:55:08Z-
dc.date.issued2020-
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Comparative Economics, 2020, Epub 2020-07-08-
dc.identifier.issn0147-5967-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/283989-
dc.description.abstractChina's Great Leap Famine has remained to this day the severest in human history, and yet few studies have invoked the human factor in explaining its outcome. In sharp contrast to Mao's aggressive extractive policy against the peasantry, the 181 Central Committee (CC) members—the political elite of the Chinese Communist Party—may have alleviated the casualty of this most devastating famine, by arranging more “resale grain” to be shipped to their hometowns. Specifically, having an additional native CC member in a prefecture reduces the excess death of that prefecture by 46,500, accounting for 2.3 percentage points in the death rate when evaluated at the mean. The effect is more pronounced if a CC member worked in the central planning apparatus in charge of grain transfer. Moreover, evidence suggests that the counties with more CC members tended to receive more resale grain, while grain procurement remained affected.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherAcademic Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jce-
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Comparative Economics-
dc.subjectO12-
dc.subjectD73-
dc.subjectN95-
dc.titlePolitical Elites and Hometown Favoritism in Famine-stricken China-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.emailKung, JKS: jkskung@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityKung, JKS=rp02402-
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jce.2020.06.001-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-85087676218-
dc.identifier.hkuros311149-
dc.identifier.volumeEpub 2020-07-08-
dc.publisher.placeUnited States-

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