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Article: Approximation algorithms for the selling with preference

TitleApproximation algorithms for the selling with preference
Authors
KeywordsSelling with preference
Approximation algorithms
Approximation ratio
Issue Date2020
PublisherSpringer Verlag Dordrecht. The Journal's web site is located at http://springerlink.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=journal&issn=1382-6905
Citation
Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, 2020, v. 40, p. 366-378 How to Cite?
AbstractWe consider the market mechanism to sell two types of products, A and B, to a set of buyers I={1,2,…,n}. The amounts of products are mA and mB respectively. Each buyer i has his information including the budget, the preference and the utility function. On collecting the information from all buyers, the market maker determines the price of each product and allocates some amount of product to each buyer. The objective of the market maker is designing a mechanism to maximize the total utility of the buyers in satisfying the semi market equilibrium. In this paper, we show that this problem is NP-hard and give an iterative algorithm with the approximation ratio 1.5. Moreover, we introduce a PTAS for the problem, which is an (1+ϵ)-approximation algorithm with the running time O(21/ϵ+nlogn) for any positive ϵ.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/294276
ISSN
2019 Impact Factor: 0.843
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.093

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLi, P-
dc.contributor.authorHua, Q-
dc.contributor.authorHu, Z-
dc.contributor.authorTing, HF-
dc.contributor.authorZhang, Y-
dc.date.accessioned2020-11-23T08:29:02Z-
dc.date.available2020-11-23T08:29:02Z-
dc.date.issued2020-
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Combinatorial Optimization, 2020, v. 40, p. 366-378-
dc.identifier.issn1382-6905-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/294276-
dc.description.abstractWe consider the market mechanism to sell two types of products, A and B, to a set of buyers I={1,2,…,n}. The amounts of products are mA and mB respectively. Each buyer i has his information including the budget, the preference and the utility function. On collecting the information from all buyers, the market maker determines the price of each product and allocates some amount of product to each buyer. The objective of the market maker is designing a mechanism to maximize the total utility of the buyers in satisfying the semi market equilibrium. In this paper, we show that this problem is NP-hard and give an iterative algorithm with the approximation ratio 1.5. Moreover, we introduce a PTAS for the problem, which is an (1+ϵ)-approximation algorithm with the running time O(21/ϵ+nlogn) for any positive ϵ.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherSpringer Verlag Dordrecht. The Journal's web site is located at http://springerlink.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=journal&issn=1382-6905-
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Combinatorial Optimization-
dc.rightsThis is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in [insert journal title]. The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/[insert DOI]-
dc.subjectSelling with preference-
dc.subjectApproximation algorithms-
dc.subjectApproximation ratio-
dc.titleApproximation algorithms for the selling with preference-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.emailTing, HF: hfting@cs.hku.hk-
dc.identifier.emailZhang, Y: yongzh@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityTing, HF=rp00177-
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10878-020-00602-3-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-85086407103-
dc.identifier.hkuros319616-
dc.identifier.volume40-
dc.identifier.spage366-
dc.identifier.epage378-
dc.publisher.placeNetherlands-

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