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Conference Paper: Ranked items auctions
| Title | Ranked items auctions |
|---|---|
| Authors | |
| Keywords | Simultaneous Pooled Auction VCG Mechanism Cutoff Type Ranked Items Auctions Unit Demand |
| Issue Date | 2005 |
| Citation | IIE Annual Conference and Exposition 2005, 2005 How to Cite? |
| Abstract | We study ranked items auctions where each buyer has unit demand for multiple ranked objects. This study may find applications in areas such as the sale of condominiums and Pay-Per-Click advertising in search engine business. We first characterize the simultaneous pooled auction (SPA) from both the seller and the bidders' perspectives. One severe problem inherent in SPA is that some bidders may incur ex post losses. We propose a tailored VCG mechanism that generates the same expected revenue as SPA does, while the bidders do not incur any losses. |
| Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/295996 |
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Zhan, Roger L. | - |
| dc.contributor.author | Shen, Zuo Jun Max | - |
| dc.contributor.author | Feng, Juan | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-02-11T04:52:37Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2021-02-11T04:52:37Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2005 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | IIE Annual Conference and Exposition 2005, 2005 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/295996 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | We study ranked items auctions where each buyer has unit demand for multiple ranked objects. This study may find applications in areas such as the sale of condominiums and Pay-Per-Click advertising in search engine business. We first characterize the simultaneous pooled auction (SPA) from both the seller and the bidders' perspectives. One severe problem inherent in SPA is that some bidders may incur ex post losses. We propose a tailored VCG mechanism that generates the same expected revenue as SPA does, while the bidders do not incur any losses. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.relation.ispartof | IIE Annual Conference and Exposition 2005 | - |
| dc.subject | Simultaneous Pooled Auction | - |
| dc.subject | VCG Mechanism | - |
| dc.subject | Cutoff Type | - |
| dc.subject | Ranked Items Auctions | - |
| dc.subject | Unit Demand | - |
| dc.title | Ranked items auctions | - |
| dc.type | Conference_Paper | - |
| dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-84859279770 | - |