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- Publisher Website: 10.1016/S0142-0615(00)00059-4
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-0035283986
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Article: A game-theoretical model of private power production
Title | A game-theoretical model of private power production |
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Authors | |
Keywords | Private power production Build–operate–transfer Game theory Two-level optimization |
Issue Date | 2001 |
Publisher | Elsevier Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ijepes |
Citation | International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems, 2001, v. 23 n. 3, p. 213-218 How to Cite? |
Abstract | Private power production has sprung up all over the world. The build–operate–transfer (BOT) arrangement has emerged as one of the most important options for private power production, especially in developing countries with rapidly growing demand and financial shortages. Based on oligopoly theory, the paper proposes a Stackelberg game model between a BOT investor and an electric utility whereby they can negotiate a long-term energy contract. Asymmetric pricing schemes are taken into account such that a host utility purchases electricity from a BOT company at its “avoided cost”, and sells its electricity to end users at its “average cost”. Our Stackelberg game model is transferred into a two-level optimization problem, and then solved by an iterative algorithm. The game model is demonstrated by an illustrative example. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/73606 |
ISSN | 2021 Impact Factor: 5.659 2020 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.050 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Xing, W | - |
dc.contributor.author | Wu, FF | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-09-06T06:53:00Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-09-06T06:53:00Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2001 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems, 2001, v. 23 n. 3, p. 213-218 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0142-0615 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/73606 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Private power production has sprung up all over the world. The build–operate–transfer (BOT) arrangement has emerged as one of the most important options for private power production, especially in developing countries with rapidly growing demand and financial shortages. Based on oligopoly theory, the paper proposes a Stackelberg game model between a BOT investor and an electric utility whereby they can negotiate a long-term energy contract. Asymmetric pricing schemes are taken into account such that a host utility purchases electricity from a BOT company at its “avoided cost”, and sells its electricity to end users at its “average cost”. Our Stackelberg game model is transferred into a two-level optimization problem, and then solved by an iterative algorithm. The game model is demonstrated by an illustrative example. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Elsevier Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ijepes | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems | - |
dc.rights | NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in [Journal title]. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in PUBLICATION, [VOL#, ISSUE#, (DATE)] DOI# | - |
dc.subject | Private power production | - |
dc.subject | Build–operate–transfer | - |
dc.subject | Game theory | - |
dc.subject | Two-level optimization | - |
dc.title | A game-theoretical model of private power production | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.openurl | http://library.hku.hk:4550/resserv?sid=HKU:IR&issn=0142-0615&volume=23&spage=213&epage=218&date=2001&atitle=A+Game+Theoretical+Model+of+Private+Power+Production | en_HK |
dc.identifier.email | Wu, FF: ffwu@eee.hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.authority | Wu, FF=rp00194 | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/S0142-0615(00)00059-4 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-0035283986 | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 73181 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 23 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 3 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 213 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 218 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000167091100006 | - |
dc.publisher.place | United Kingdom | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0142-0615 | - |