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Article: A signaling theory of grade inflation

TitleA signaling theory of grade inflation
Authors
Chan, WLi, HWing, S
Issue Date2007
PublisherWiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc.. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.wiley.com/bw/journal.asp?ref=0020-6598
Citation
International Economic Review, 2007, v. 48 n. 3, p. 1065-1090 How to Cite?
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2007.00454.x
AbstractWhen employers cannot tell whether a school truly has many good students or just gives easy grades, a school has incentives to inflate grades to help its mediocre students, despite concerns about preserving the value of good grades for its good students. We construct a signaling model where grades are inflated in equilibrium. The inability to commit to an honest grading policy reduces the efficiency of job assignment and hurts a school. Grade inflation by one school makes it easier for another school to do likewise, thus providing a channel to make grade exaggeration contagious. © 2007 by the Economics Department Of The University Of Pennsylvania And Osaka University Institute Of Social And Economic Research Association.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/85616
ISSN
0020-6598
2021 Impact Factor: 1.418
2020 SCImago Journal Rankings: 2.658
ISI Accession Number ID
WOS:000248269300012
References
References in Scopus

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorChan, Wen_HK
dc.contributor.authorLi, Hen_HK
dc.contributor.authorWing, Sen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-06T09:07:13Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-06T09:07:13Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_HK
dc.identifier.citationInternational Economic Review, 2007, v. 48 n. 3, p. 1065-1090en_HK
dc.identifier.issn0020-6598en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/85616-
dc.description.abstractWhen employers cannot tell whether a school truly has many good students or just gives easy grades, a school has incentives to inflate grades to help its mediocre students, despite concerns about preserving the value of good grades for its good students. We construct a signaling model where grades are inflated in equilibrium. The inability to commit to an honest grading policy reduces the efficiency of job assignment and hurts a school. Grade inflation by one school makes it easier for another school to do likewise, thus providing a channel to make grade exaggeration contagious. © 2007 by the Economics Department Of The University Of Pennsylvania And Osaka University Institute Of Social And Economic Research Association.en_HK
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.publisherWiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc.. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.wiley.com/bw/journal.asp?ref=0020-6598en_HK
dc.relation.ispartofInternational Economic Reviewen_HK
dc.titleA signaling theory of grade inflationen_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.openurlhttp://library.hku.hk:4550/resserv?sid=HKU:IR&issn=0020-6598&volume=48&spage=1065&epage=1090&date=2007&atitle=A+Signaling+Theory+of+Grade+Inflationen_HK
dc.identifier.emailWilliam, C: wchana@hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityWilliam, C=rp01049en_HK
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1468-2354.2007.00454.xen_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-34547199432en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros131514en_HK
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-34547199432&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume48en_HK
dc.identifier.issue3en_HK
dc.identifier.spage1065en_HK
dc.identifier.epage1090en_HK
dc.identifier.eissn1468-2354-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000248269300012-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Statesen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridChan, W=26631464400en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLi, H=25960883900en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridWing, S=17347246300en_HK
dc.identifier.citeulike1463607-
dc.customcontrol.immutablecsl 141111-
dc.identifier.issnl0020-6598-

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