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8 Article type : Original Article

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11 **Frequent recovery of influenza A but not influenza B virus RNA in aerosols in pediatric**  
12 **patient rooms**

13 Running head: Airborne influenza virus in pediatric wards

14

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This article has been accepted for publication and undergone full peer review but has not been through the copyediting, typesetting, pagination and proofreading process, which may lead to differences between this version and the [Version of Record](#). Please cite this article as [doi:](#)

[10.1111/ina.12669](#)

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46 **Acknowledgments**

47 We wish to acknowledge Vicky Fang from the School of Public Health, The University of  
48 Hong Kong for advice on statistical analyses; colleagues from the Department of Infection  
49 Control and the State Key Laboratory of Respiratory Diseases at the First Affiliated Hospital  
50 of Guangzhou Medical University, and Mr. Ao Luo from the Department of Building Science at  
51 the Tsinghua University for technical support; and Dr. William Lindsley from US Centers for  
52 Disease Control and Prevention for providing the air samplers.

53

54 This work was supported in part by the Theme-based Research Scheme from the Research  
55 Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (Project No. T11-  
56 705/14N), Guangzhou Medical University High-level University Clinical Research and  
57 Cultivation Program (Guangzhou Medical University released [2017] No. 160); Guangzhou  
58 Medical University High-level University Innovation Team Training Program (Guangzhou

59 Medical University released [2017] No. 159); and the Science Research Project of the  
60 Guangdong Province, China (Grant No. 2016A050503047).

61

62 **Potential conflicts of interest**

63 BJC has received honoraria from Sanofi Pasteur and Roche. The authors report no other  
64 potential conflicts of interest.

65 **Abstract**

66 Influenza transmission occurs through the air, but the relative importance of small droplets,  
67 or aerosols, in influenza transmission especially within healthcare facilities remains  
68 uncertain. Detections of influenza virus in aerosols in cough and exhaled breath from  
69 infected patients, and from the air in outpatient or inpatient healthcare facilities have been  
70 studied, but most studies were done in adults with very few data involving children. We  
71 aimed to assess the potential of influenza transmission via aerosols in pediatric patient  
72 rooms. Two-stage cyclone (NIOSH) air samplers were used to collect the air in 5-bed  
73 pediatric patient rooms with patients with PCR-confirmed influenza. Influenza A virus RNA  
74 was recovered in 15/19 (79%) air sampling occasions, in all size fractions ( $>4\mu\text{m}$ ,  $1\text{-}4\mu\text{m}$   
75 and  $<1\mu\text{m}$ ), and significantly less for influenza B virus (2/10 occasions, 20%). We estimated  
76 a ventilation rate of 1.46 ACH in a similar but unoccupied 5-bed patient room. High  
77 quantities of influenza A virus RNA detected in the air in pediatric patient rooms suggests  
78 other individuals in paediatric patient rooms including other patients, visitors, caretakers  
79 and healthcare workers could be exposed to influenza A virus while caring for infected  
80 children.

81

82 **Keywords:** Influenza virus; influenza transmission; aerosol; pediatrics; healthcare settings;  
83 infection control

84

85 **Practical implications:** Influenza virus has been thought to transmit predominantly via  
86 droplet, but our study suggested the potential transmission via airborne route by detecting  
87 substantial influenza A virus in the air. The viral detection in aerosols ( $<4\mu\text{m}$ ) further  
88 suggests a potential long-range transmission especially in a poorly ventilated setting.

89

90 Word count (abstract): 188

91 Word count (main text): 3,698

92

## 93 **BACKGROUND**

94 Influenza viruses are among the more important respiratory virus infections that cause  
95 considerable morbidity and mortality in individuals of all ages every year.<sup>1</sup> Influenza viruses  
96 are generally thought to transmit via multiple routes including contact, droplet and airborne  
97 mode.<sup>2</sup> Contact transmission occurs when a patient with influenza (infector) directly  
98 transfers virus-containing secretions to a susceptible person (infectee) such as shaking  
99 hands (direct contact), or via a contaminated object or surface (indirect contact). Droplet  
100 transmission occurs when the virus-containing large respiratory droplets from an infector  
101 deposit onto the mucosal surfaces (eyes, nose, mouth) of an infectee. Airborne transmission  
102 occurs when the virus-containing fine particle aerosols (usually believed to be particles with  
103 aerodynamic diameter  $\leq 5\mu\text{m}$ ), generated during breathing, coughing or sneezing by the  
104 infector,<sup>3</sup> is inhaled by an infectee and subsequently initiate the infection. Although many  
105 have stated droplet transmission as the predominant mode in influenza transmission, the  
106 relative importance of each transmission mode especially the fine particle aerosols remains  
107 uncertain.<sup>4</sup> Infectious influenza virus was recovered in fine particles of  $<5\mu\text{m}$  from exhaled  
108 breath of infected individuals.<sup>5</sup> Studies reported the detection of influenza virus in ambient  
109 air in community<sup>6</sup> and healthcare settings.<sup>6-10</sup>

110  
111 Children are thought to play a significant role in the transmission of influenza because of  
112 less-developed immunity with increased susceptibility to infection, increased social contact  
113 at schools, and possibly increased viral shedding for longer period of time,<sup>11,12</sup> but there are  
114 only limited studies that investigated the importance of aerosol transmission in children.<sup>13,14</sup>  
115 Tseng et al. recovered influenza A virus in 8/33 (24%) of the air samples collected in the  
116 emergency room of a pediatrics department using a Nuclepore filter with  $0.4\mu\text{m}$  pore size.<sup>13</sup>  
117 Wan et al. recovered influenza A virus in 2/13 (15%) of air samples collected from a long  
118 distance (3.2m) from the bed of influenza-infected pediatric patients in patient rooms using  
119 a polytetrafluoroethylene filter with  $0.2\mu\text{m}$  pore size, but none in air samples collected from  
120 a short distance (0.6-1.8m) using a lower sampling airflow rate.<sup>14</sup>

121  
122 There is an urgent need to evaluate the importance of aerosol transmission in children, in  
123 particular in inpatient healthcare settings, because of the potential of increased

124 susceptibility of children to influenza infection, the increased infectiousness of children with  
125 influenza, and increased transmission between caretakers and infected children than adults  
126 in inpatient settings. Here, we conducted an air sampling study with size fractionation in  
127 pediatrics patient rooms with patients with influenza-like illnesses in a tertiary hospital in  
128 China, and provided basic information on the ventilation in patient rooms. The objective of  
129 our study was to assess the potential of infected children transmitting influenza virus via  
130 aerosols by quantifying influenza virus RNA concentration in the air in pediatric patient  
131 rooms.

132  
133

## 134 **METHODS**

### 135 **Selection Criteria for Air Sampling**

136 The First Affiliated Hospital of Guangzhou Medical University is a 1500-bed comprehensive  
137 3A (tertiary) hospital in Guangzhou, China. The pediatric department houses 86 beds which  
138 are distributed in two floors. At hospital admission, throat swabs were routinely collected  
139 from pediatric patients and tested for respiratory virus infection either by reverse  
140 transcription polymerase chain reaction (PCR) or antigen test. To monitor for nosocomial  
141 infections, throat swabs were also taken and tested for respiratory virus infection if the  
142 patient developed respiratory symptoms during their hospital stay. For our study, we  
143 initiated air sampling in a patient room if at least one pediatric patient <14 years old who  
144 was present with fever plus one or more acute respiratory symptom (sore throat, cough,  
145 runny nose or fatigue) was identified. If  $\geq 1$  eligible patient was identified, the patient with  
146 highest influenza RNA copies was selected.

147

### 148 **Air Sampling in Pediatric Patient Rooms**

149 We sampled air in 5-bed pediatric infectious disease patient rooms (Figure 1). The distance  
150 between beds was within 1.1 to 1.9m. The patient rooms were disinfected with sodium  
151 troclosene reagent at least once per day. For air sample collection, we used a stationary set-  
152 up consisting of a two-stage cyclone sampler, developed by the US National Institute of  
153 Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH),<sup>15</sup> mounted on a tripod at a height of 1.3m which is

154 equivalent to the height of a child sitting on the bed. The NIOSH sampler collected air  
155 particles of  $>4\mu\text{m}$  in a 15mL centrifuge tube, particles of 1-4 $\mu\text{m}$  in a 1.5mL tube and particles  
156 of  $<1\mu\text{m}$  on a hydrophobic, polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE) polymer membrane filter with  
157 3.0 $\mu\text{m}$  pore size, 37mm in diameter (Merck Millipore, Germany). A portable analyzer that  
158 recorded temperature and relative humidity was also mounted on the tripod. In each  
159 sampling occasion, we placed two stationary set-ups in the selected patient room, with one  
160 placed near the head position (within 1m) of the selected patient, and the other sampler  
161 placed either near the head or the end of bed of a neighboring patient (approximately 2m  
162 from the selected patient). We collected air in the patient room for 4 hours continuously at a  
163 flow rate of 3.5L/minute. Other information including admission of new patients and  
164 opening of door/window were collected at 0, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> hours during the collection.

165  
166 After each collection, 15mL tube (which collected air particles of  $>4\mu\text{m}$ ) and 1.5mL tube  
167 (which collected air particles of 1-4  $\mu\text{m}$ ) were unscrewed from the sampler; while the PTFE  
168 filter (which collected air particles of  $<1\mu\text{m}$ ) was removed from the rubber cassette and  
169 placed into a 15mL tube immediately. 1mL of virus transport media (consisted of minimum  
170 essential medium (MEM) with 0.5% gelatin, 0.05% bovine serum albumin (BSA), 20  $\mu\text{g}/\text{ml}$   
171 amphotericin B, 100 U/ml penicillin and 100  $\mu\text{g}/\text{ml}$  streptomycin) was added into each of  
172 the three tubes. All tubes were then vortexed and spun down for 1 minute each. For the  
173 15mL tube containing the PTFE filter, after spinning down the filter was removed from the  
174 tube. The virus transport media of all the three size-fractions of air samples were then  
175 aliquoted into 2ml tubes and stored in  $-80^{\circ}\text{C}$  for subsequent laboratory analysis.

176

### 177 **Estimating Ventilation in Patient Rooms**

178 Both ventilation rate (i.e. the amount of outdoor air introduced into the room) and the total  
179 supply air flow rate into the room (i.e. the total amount of air, including recirculated air,  
180 supplied by the mechanical ventilation system) were measured in a different but identical 5-  
181 bed pediatric patient room without any patients in the same hospital. The ventilation rate  
182 was estimated using a tracer gas method.<sup>16</sup> The patient room was 86.32m<sup>3</sup> in size. Sulfur  
183 hexafluoride (SF<sub>6</sub>) was first injected into the cubicle with a constant emission rate of  
184 150mL/minute controlled by a mass flow controller (MC 10SLPM, Alicat Scientific, USA). The

185 SF6 concentrations at six different sampling points (above each of the five beds, and the  
186 exhaust) inside the room were monitored continuously by a SF6 analyzer (KX-1000F,  
187 Zhengzhou Kaixuan Tech Co., LTD, China) together with a multipoint sampler with flow rate  
188 of 5L/minute. The injection of SF6 was stopped when steady state was reached, and the  
189 decay of SF6 concentration was monitored until the SF6 concentration became very low  
190 (approximately 2 hours). The ventilation rate (i.e. the air change rate) was then estimated  
191 based on the SF6 concentration decay. The total supply air flow rate was estimated based on  
192 the average air speed at the supply diffusers, measured using an anemometer (TESTO 435,  
193 Lenzkirch, Germany), and the total supply air area.

194

### 195 **Laboratory Analysis**

196 RNA from air samples was extracted with 1mL of TRIzol™ reagent (Invitrogen Life  
197 Technologies) and dissolved in RNase-free water. 300µl of air samples in virus transport  
198 media were used for RNA extraction, and the final eluted purified RNA volume was 25µl.  
199 Influenza virus RNA was identified by commercial TaqMan real-time PCR assay (Guangzhou  
200 Institute of Respiratory Medicine Company Limited) according to the manufacturer's  
201 protocols. In brief, 25µl of reaction mix containing Moloney murine leukemia virus reverse  
202 transcriptase, Taq polymerase and 4µl of the RNA eluent were used for the real-time PCR.  
203 Details of the PCR cycling conditions are as follows: an initial reverse transcription at 55°C  
204 for 10 minutes, incubation at 94°C for 2 minutes, followed by 40 cycles of 94°C for 10  
205 seconds and 55°C for 35 seconds (ABI-7500 real-time PCR instrument; Life Technologies,  
206 Singapore). The limit of detection of the RT-PCR is 600 copies per 1ml original sample, and  
207 we considered samples with clear reaction signal growth curve with Ct values ≤40 to be  
208 positive for influenza.

209

210 In samples that were PCR-positive, virus culture with MDCK cells was done.<sup>17</sup> In brief, MDCK  
211 cells were cultured to reach approximately 80-90% confluent and washed once with PBS  
212 before inoculation with air samples. The suspension was removed after 1 hour of incubation,  
213 and the cells were cultured in MEM containing 100 µg/ml streptomycin, 100 U/ml penicillin  
214 and 2 µg/ml trypsin. The cells were then incubated for 2 to 3 days at 37°C with 5% CO<sub>2</sub>. The  
215 presence of cytopathic effects (CPE) was determined under a microscope.



216

## 217 **Statistical Analysis**

218 We described the concentration of influenza A or B virus RNA detected per m<sup>3</sup> air in each 3  
219 size fractions (>4µm, 1-4µm and <1µm) collected by each NIOSH air sampler; and number of  
220 patients in the patient room positive for influenza by each air sampling occasion. We  
221 compared the number of occasions with virus RNA detected in the air between influenza A  
222 and B virus in all air sampling occasions, or only in occasions with influenza-positive  
223 patients by Fisher's exact test. In the subset of air sampling occasions with only one  
224 influenza A-infected patient, for each air size fraction we investigated any significant  
225 difference in viral load between the two air samplers placed at different locations by  
226 Wilcoxon signed-rank test. All analyses were conducted with R version 3.5.1 (R Foundation  
227 for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria).

228

## 229 **Ethics Statement**

230 This study was approved by the Institutional Review Boards of The University of Hong Kong  
231 and The First Affiliated Hospital of Guangzhou Medical University. All parents and legal  
232 guardians provided oral informed consent. Written consent was deemed unnecessary  
233 because the study involved only environmental sampling and information related to patient  
234 diagnoses was collected anonymously.

235

## 236 **RESULTS**

### 237 **Characteristics of the Patients and Sampling Occasions**

238 During the local influenza seasons in three consecutive years (2015-17), we performed 26  
239 air sampling occasions in 5-bed pediatric patient rooms, contributing to 156 air samples  
240 from all size fractions. Pediatric patients presented during the air sampling occasions had a  
241 mean age of 3.5 years old (IQR 0.6-4.8), with average body temperature of 37.4°C (IQR 36.8–  
242 38.2) measured at admission and hospital stay of 8 days (IQR 5–10). Common respiratory  
243 diagnoses were pneumonia (72%) and upper respiratory infections (34%); other non-  
244 respiratory diseases included tonsillitis (5%) and enteritis (7%). Room temperature and  
245 relative humidity was on average 24°C (IQR 23–25) and 73% (IQR 67–77). We recorded the

246 number of HCWs and visitors during the 3 sampling time-points: at least 3 visitors and at  
247 most 4 HCWs were present during any sampling episode.

248

#### 249 **Influenza Virus RNA Detection in the Air**

250 During all 26 air sampling occasions conducted, there was on average 0.9 (SD 0.7) patients  
251 with laboratory-confirmed influenza A and 0.6 (SD 0.9) patients with influenza B virus  
252 infections. We recovered influenza A or B virus RNA in 22/26 (85%) and 2/26 occasions  
253 (8%) respectively. In particular, 19/26 (73%) occasions had  $\geq 1$  patient (mean 1.3 patients,  
254 SD 0.6) with laboratory-confirmed influenza A virus infections, and 10/26 (38%) occasions  
255 had  $\geq 1$  patient (mean 1.5 patients, SD 0.7) with laboratory-confirmed influenza B virus  
256 infections. From these, we recovered influenza A virus RNA in 15/19 (79%) (Table 1) and  
257 influenza B virus RNA in 2/10 (20%) occasions (Table 2) respectively. We also recovered  
258 influenza A virus in the air from the 7 occasions with no patients found to have laboratory-  
259 confirmed influenza A virus infection (Table 1), but none from the 16 occasions where no  
260 patient was infected with influenza B virus (Table 2). Probability of detection in the air was  
261 significantly higher for influenza A than B virus, whether in all 26 sampling occasions  
262 ( $p=2.31 \times 10^{-8}$ ), or only in occasions with  $\geq 1$  patient positive for the corresponding influenza  
263 A or B virus infections ( $p=4.52 \times 10^{-3}$ ).

264

265 Due to limited number of air samples with influenza B virus detected, further analyses  
266 focused on influenza A virus only. In all the 26 sampling occasions, influenza A virus RNA  
267 was frequently detected in all air size fractions  $<1\mu\text{m}$  (13/26, 50%), 1-4 $\mu\text{m}$  (11/26, 42%)  
268 and  $>4\mu\text{m}$  (16/26, 62%) (Figure 2). Virus culture was done for almost all air samples with  
269 influenza A virus RNA detected by PCR but none were culture-positive. In 10 air sampling  
270 occasions in which only the selected patient had laboratory-confirmed influenza A infection,  
271 we recovered influenza A virus in the air from both air samplers that were placed near  
272 (within 1m) the selected patient (7/10 sampling episodes), or next to a neighboring patient  
273 (6/10 sampling episodes) approximately 2m apart from the selected patient. Influenza A  
274 virus was detected more frequently near the selected patient (5/10 in  $<1\mu\text{m}$ , 4/10 in 1-4 $\mu\text{m}$   
275 and 6/10 in  $>4\mu\text{m}$ ) than the neighboring patient (3/10 in  $<1\mu\text{m}$ , 3/10 in 1-4 $\mu\text{m}$  and 2/10 in

276 >4  $\mu\text{m}$ ). However, no significant difference in viral load was observed between the two air  
277 samplers for air size fractions <1 $\mu\text{m}$  ( $p=0.27$ ), 1-4 $\mu\text{m}$  ( $p=0.82$ ), and >4 $\mu\text{m}$  ( $p=0.39$ ).  
278

### 279 **Ventilation of the Patient Rooms**

280 The steady state SF<sub>6</sub> concentrations at the six sampling points all fell within the range of 100  
281 to 120 ppm. Based on the SF<sub>6</sub> concentrations decay, we estimated the ventilation rate was  
282 1.46 ACH. Separately, the measured average air speed at the supply diffusers was 2.15 m/s  
283 and the total supply air area was 0.14 m<sup>2</sup>. Since the volume of the patient room was 86.32  
284 m<sup>3</sup>, we estimated the total supply airflow rate was 12.24 ACH.  
285

### 286 **DISCUSSION**

287 Influenza virus infections in children are occasionally severe enough to warrant  
288 hospitalization. Within healthcare facilities, nosocomial infection may occur if infected  
289 patients and susceptible individuals occupy the same area. The present study is among the  
290 few to evaluate influenza aerosols in healthcare settings particularly from children.<sup>18</sup> We  
291 were able to identify influenza A (Table 1), and to a significantly lesser extent influenza B  
292 virus (Table 2), in air particles including both droplets (>4 $\mu\text{m}$ ) and aerosols (1-4 $\mu\text{m}$  and  
293 <1 $\mu\text{m}$  fractions) (Figure 2) collected from pediatric patient rooms, consistent with the  
294 estimates from a study of secondary transmission in influenza-exposed household  
295 contacts.<sup>19</sup> Lindsley et al. also showed more detection of airborne influenza A than B virus  
296 RNA in an urgent care medical clinic, although it was attributed to a higher prevalence of  
297 influenza A virus during the study period and no patient with influenza B virus infection was  
298 identified.<sup>10</sup> Moreover, when there was a patient with influenza A in the ward, we had a 79%  
299 chance of detecting influenza A virus RNA in the air, compared to just a 20% chance of  
300 detecting influenza B virus RNA when there was an influenza B patient in the ward.

301  
302 Our study was conducted in a natural hospital setting. Our study did not aim to observe  
303 transmission directly as it is difficult to attribute a transmission event solely to a particular  
304 route of transmission; however, the high prevalence of influenza A virus RNA in the air in  
305 patient rooms implies other patients, health care workers and visitor could be exposed to

306 potential infection via contaminated air. On the other hand, although we detected influenza  
307 A virus RNA in the air in most occasions, none of them were culture positive. In comparison  
308 to one study which isolated viable avian influenza virus from air samples with over  $10^5$  RNA  
309 copies/ $m^3$  air using the same NIOSH samplers,<sup>20</sup> we expected a low probability of recovering  
310 viable virus from aerosols in our study. Cao et al. evaluated the collection efficiency of  
311 NIOSH sampler and reported a very low retention of virus infectivity with significant decline  
312 after 60 minutes of collection, and suggested the loss of infectivity due to desiccation or  
313 degradation.<sup>21</sup> Two other studies evaluated the collection efficiency of other commercially  
314 available air samplers and similarly inferred a loss of infectivity in air samples due to drying  
315 of the aerosol particles.<sup>22,23</sup> A previous study showed that if an enhanced infectivity  
316 detection method is used infectious viruses could be identified from air samples with  $10^7$   
317 viral copies/ $m^3$  air collected using the NIOSH samplers.<sup>21</sup> Despite the inability to recover  
318 infectious virus in our air samples, if for aerosol transmission the putative human infectious  
319 dose (HID) was 0.6–3 TCID<sub>50</sub> and equivalent to 90–1950 RNA copies,<sup>4,8,24</sup> all our PCR-  
320 positive samples exceeded the upper bound of the HID<sub>50</sub> and might indicate the potential to  
321 initiate infection via the aerosol route.

322

323 Systematic measures such as increasing ventilation rates of patient rooms might be more  
324 feasible than providing and ensuring personal respiratory protection of healthcare workers,  
325 visitors or nearby patients. It is suggested that ventilation may play a role in reducing the  
326 risk of influenza transmission,<sup>25</sup> and therefore could be an especially important engineering  
327 intervention in healthcare settings if the aerosol route is found to be important for the  
328 nosocomial transmission of influenza. In the present study, it was not possible to measure  
329 the ventilation in parallel with each air sampling session as there were occupants in the  
330 room. Instead, we estimated the ventilation rate and the total supply air flow rate in a similar  
331 5-patient room within the same hospital using data obtained from an earlier study. The  
332 steady state SF<sub>6</sub> concentrations at all the sampling points were found to be very close,  
333 together with the high total supply air flow rate, indicated the air was relatively well mixed  
334 in the patient room. Although the estimated ventilation rate of 1.46 ACH was slightly less  
335 than the suggested value of 2 ACH for patient rooms by the Chinese national guidelines,<sup>26</sup> we  
336 would expect a similar influenza virus detection rate in the air would be observed even if the

337 suggested ventilation rate was reached. Therefore, our results suggested that further  
338 research is needed to design a ventilating system that could minimize the transmission of  
339 nosocomial infections through the aerosol route but at the same time cost-effective, for  
340 diseases which we expect to be less severe. Design of ventilation systems that minimize  
341 airflow from one patient to another patient or to the surrounding should also be considered  
342 since direction of airflow has been suggested to associate with the spread of airborne  
343 infectious diseases.<sup>27,28</sup>

344  
345 We recovered about 1 log<sub>10</sub> higher viral load in the present study conducted in 5-bed  
346 pediatric patient rooms in Guangzhou (Figure 2), when compared to our earlier similar  
347 study in 2-bed adult patient rooms in Hong Kong.<sup>7</sup> Such difference might be explained by  
348 differences in environmental factors (e.g. ventilation, temperature and relative humidity), or  
349 the number and infectiousness of infected individuals in the patient rooms. For the adult  
350 patient rooms in our previous study, a negative pressure isolation ward, the ventilation rate  
351 was maintained at 12 ACH.<sup>7</sup> There were more visitors and infected patients in the pediatric  
352 than the adult patient rooms which could possibly contribute to a higher viral load in the  
353 pediatric environment. Some studies postulated children may be more infectious than adults  
354 by longer duration of virus shedding<sup>18</sup> or increased peak viral load, but a systematic review  
355 found no difference in quantity of virus RNA in respiratory swabs by age.<sup>29</sup>

356  
357 Our study has several limitations. First, we could not identify any viable influenza A virus by  
358 virus culture from PCR-positive air samples as discussed above. Second, we were not able to  
359 estimate the ventilation rate in parallel for each session of the air sample collection, for  
360 example by tracer gas method as the patient rooms were in use, nor by indoor carbon  
361 dioxide concentration increment above the outdoor level as there were frequent changes in  
362 the numbers of individuals in the patient rooms.<sup>30</sup> Instead, we provided information on the  
363 ventilation estimated in a similar 5-patient room within the same hospital using data  
364 obtained from an earlier study for indicative purposes. Third, we were not able to confirm  
365 the source of virus generation as identified in the air samples. Some patients were diagnosed  
366 with antigen test and therefore lacked the data on viral shedding. Although more virus  
367 detection of influenza virus in the air collected from infected patient than the neighboring

368 (uninfected) patient suggested patients with laboratory-confirmed infection in the sampled  
369 patient rooms were the likely source of the virus in the air, we also detected influenza virus  
370 in rooms in the absence of laboratory-confirmed cases. Other individuals in the room  
371 including patients without respiratory symptoms, visitors and healthcare workers, or  
372 inadequate ventilation in the hospital, might have contributed to viruses in the air in these  
373 occasions. In future studies, virus sequencing might be used to link the viruses detected in  
374 the air with individual patients.

375

376 As seasonal influenza virus is thought to transmit predominantly via droplets, currently  
377 Droplet Precautions is recommended for healthcare workers when caring for influenza  
378 patients.<sup>31,32</sup> Droplet Precaution measures include proper use of personal protective  
379 equipment for example surgical masks, appropriate patient placement for example either in  
380 single rooms or with other patients infected by the same pathogen, and reducing patient  
381 movement.<sup>31,32</sup> Because influenza A virus RNA was identified frequently in the air in  
382 paediatrics patient rooms in the present study, some may raise the concerns on the need to  
383 adopt Airborne Precautions, which would entail the use of respirators and isolation of  
384 patients in negative-pressure airborne isolation infection rooms (AIIR). Although our  
385 present findings and other similar studies<sup>33</sup> demonstrated the presence of airborne  
386 influenza virus RNA, evidences on the infectivity of these airborne virus remains very  
387 limited. As we discussed in a recent review on the controversy of airborne transmission of  
388 respiratory viruses and the implications for infection prevention in healthcare settings,  
389 additional studies to identify the presence of viable (infectious) virus in the recovered air  
390 samples, and infection in susceptible individuals initiated from the inhalation of airborne  
391 viruses, are needed to provide more definitive support on the importance of aerosol  
392 transmission for influenza. Furthermore, Airborne Precautions for a respiratory disease will  
393 only be justified if the disease is believed to be with moderate or high severity.<sup>34</sup>

394

395 In conclusion, our findings suggested there is a greater potential of aerosol transmission of  
396 influenza A and less for influenza B virus; and other individuals in paediatrics patient rooms  
397 including other patients, visitors, caretakers and healthcare workers could be exposed to  
398 influenza A virus aerosols while caring for infected children.

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## Table

### **Table 1. Recovery of influenza A virus RNA in the air from 5-bed pediatric patient rooms over a 4-hour sampling period.**

Two NIOSH samplers mounted on separate tripods were used in each sampling occasion. One NIOSH sampler (NIOSH 1) was placed near the head position of the bed of the selected patient, and the other NIOSH sampler (NIOSH 2) near the head or the end of the bed of a neighboring patient. The two NIOSH samplers were placed approximately 2 meters apart. We attempted to recover viable virus from all PCR-positive samples by culture (except for occasions 1, 2, 12 and 18 where there were insufficient samples) but all were culture negative.

Air sampling occasions are numbered in chronological order. '-' represents viral RNA not detected in the air sample by PCR. \* indicates if the selected or neighboring patient had laboratory-confirmed influenza A virus infection. Ventilation conditions, i.e. opening of door or window, were recorded as opened ('Y'), closed ('N') or changed ('Mixed') during the course of air sampling. N/A: Not applicable.

### **Table 2. Recovery of influenza B virus RNA in the air from 5-bed pediatric patient rooms over a 4-hour sampling period.**

Two NIOSH samplers mounted on separate tripods were used in each sampling occasion. One NIOSH sampler (NIOSH 1) was placed near the head position of the bed of the selected patient, and the other NIOSH sampler (NIOSH 2) near the head or the end of the bed of a neighboring patient. The two NIOSH samplers were placed approximately 2 meters apart. We attempted to recover viable virus from all PCR-positive samples by culture (except for occasions 1, 2, 12 and 18 where there were insufficient samples) but all were culture negative.

Air sampling occasions are numbered in chronological order. '-' represents viral RNA not detected in the air sample by PCR. \* indicates if the selected or neighboring patient had laboratory-confirmed influenza B virus infection. Ventilation conditions, i.e. opening of door or window, were recorded as opened ('Y'), closed ('N') or changed ('Mixed') during the course of air sampling. N/A: Not applicable.

**Table 1. Recovery of influenza A virus RNA in the air from 5-bed pediatric patient rooms over a 4-hour sampling period.**

Air sampling occasion	Month/Year	Influenza A virus viral load (copies/m <sup>3</sup> air)								Patient information					Ventilation condition	
		Air particles from NIOSH sampler at selected patient				Air particles from NIOSH sampler at neighboring patient				No. positive patients / No. tested	Flu A patient bed No.	No. Flu A patients used nebulizer	Selected patient bed no.	Neighboring patient bed no.	Door opened	Window opened
		<1µm	1-4µm	>4µm	Total	<1µm	1-4µm	>4µm	Total							
<b>With at least 1 patient with laboratory-confirmed influenza A infection (n = 19)</b>																
1	06/15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2/4	2,4	0	4*	5	Y	N
2	06/15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1/2	4	0	4*	5	Y	N
3	06/15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1/3	4	0	4*	5	Mixed	N
4	06/15	-	-	-	-	-	-	18993	18993	1/3	2	0	2*	1	Y	N
5	07/15	31583	28812	10274	70669	19676	38762	19815	78253	3/4	1,2,4	2	2*	1*	Y	Y
6	07/15	14729	19263	14117	48109	-	-	-	-	1/3	3	0	3*	2	Y	Mixed
7	07/15	-	-	35361	35361	-	-	-	-	1/4	3	0	2	1	Y	N
10	07/15	32259	39873	47239	119371	-	57569	13724	71293	1/5	5	0	5*	4	Y	N
12	04/16	17205	-	-	17205	-	-	-	-	1/5	1	0	4	5	Y	N
13	04/16	-	14117	-	14117	18464	-	-	18464	1/4	3	1	1	2	Y	N
14	04/16	24492	8253	-	32745	-	9709	15919	25628	1/4	5	1	3	2	Y	N
15	04/16	-	3715	-	3715	12001	-	-	12001	1/3	5	0	5*	4	Y	N
16	04/16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2/5	1,3	1	5	4	Y	N
19	05/16	-	-	7319	7319	-	25016	-	25016	1/4	1	0	2	1*	Y	N
20	05/16	-	-	20097	20097	-	-	-	-	1/6	2	0	2*	1	Y	N
21	05/16	3487	-	8733	12220	13342	-	-	13342	1/5	4	0	4*	5	Y	Y
23	05/16	-	31140	-	31140	-	-	-	-	2/4	2,4	1	4*	5	Y	N
25	07/17	27616	16608	-	44224	16259	16375	34134	66768	1/4	3	0	3*	2	Mixed	Mixed
26	08/17	45923	-	25372	71295	-	23978	-	23978	1/4	5	0	5*	4	Y	N
<b>Without any patient with laboratory-confirmed influenza A infection (n = 7)</b>																
8	07/15	-	-	-	-	-	-	20383	20383	0/5	N/A	0	2	1	Y	N
9	07/15	50339	-	16259	66598	18334	-	-	18334	0/4	N/A	0	4	5	Mixed	Mixed
11	04/16	-	-	-	-	-	-	26658	26658	0/3	N/A	0	4	5	Y	N
17	04/16	-	-	-	-	-	-	16844	16844	0/5	N/A	0	4	5	Y	N
18	04/16	-	-	-	-	10948	-	-	10948	0/5	N/A	0	3	2	Mixed	N
22	05/16	28408	-	11916	40324	284078	-	-	284078	0/5	N/A	0	1	2	Y	N
24	07/17	19676	21568	-	41244	-	16031	-	16031	0/5	N/A	0	3	2	Y	Y

**Table 2. Recovery of influenza B virus RNA in the air from 5-bed pediatric patient rooms over a 4-hour sampling period.**

Air sampling occasion	Month/Year	Influenza B virus viral load (copies/m <sup>3</sup> air)								Patient information					Ventilation condition	
		Air particles from NIOSH sampler at selected patient				Air particles from NIOSH sampler at neighboring patient				No. positive patients / No. tested	Flu B patient bed no.	No. Flu B patients used nebulizer	Selected patient bed no.	Neighboring patient bed no.	Door opened	Window opened
		<1μm	1-4μm	>4μm	Total	<1μm	1-4μm	>4μm	Total							
<b>With at least 1 patient with laboratory-confirmed influenza B infection (n = 10)</b>																
11	04/16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3/3	2,3,4	1	4*	5	Y	N
12	04/16	-	-	-	-	2801	-	-	2801	1/5	4	0	4*	5	Y	N
14	04/16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2/4	1,3	0	3*	2	Y	N
15	04/16	-	9176	-	9176	-	-	-	-	2/3	1,3	0	5	4	Y	N
16	04/16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1/5	5	0	5*	4	Y	N
17	04/16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2/5	2,4	0	4*	5	Y	N
18	04/16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1/5	3	0	3*	2	Mixed	N
19	05/16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1/4	1	0	2	1*	Y	N
21	05/16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1/5	3	0	4	5	Y	Y
22	05/16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1/5	1	0	1*	2	Y	N
<b>Without any patient with laboratory-confirmed influenza B infection (n = 16)</b>																
1	06/15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0/4	N/A	0	4	5	Y	N
2	06/15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0/2	N/A	0	4	5	Y	N
3	06/15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0/3	N/A	0	4	5	Mixed	N
4	06/15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0/3	N/A	0	2	1	Y	N
5	17/15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0/4	N/A	0	2	1	Y	Y
6	07/15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0/3	N/A	0	3	2	Y	Mixed
7	07/15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0/4	N/A	0	2	1	Y	N
8	07/15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0/5	N/A	0	2	1	Y	N
9	07/15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0/4	N/A	0	4	5	Mixed	Mixed
10	07/15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0/5	N/A	0	5	4	Y	N
13	04/16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0/4	N/A	0	1	2	Y	N
20	05/16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0/6	N/A	0	2	1	Y	N
23	05/16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0/4	N/A	0	4	5	Y	N
24	07/17	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0/5	N/A	0	3	2	Y	Y
25	07/17	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0/4	N/A	0	3	2	Mixed	Mixed
26	08/17	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0/4	N/A	0	5	4	Y	N

## Figure

**Figure 1. Layout of 5-bed patient room where the air sampling was conducted.** The distance between beds was 1.7–1.9m on the side with the restroom, and 1.1 – 1.7m on the opposite side. During each air sampling occasion, there were two NIOSH sampler-set up (i.e. one NIOSH sampler mounted on a tripod connected to a pump which was stored inside a sound-proof box), one placed near the head position (within 1m) of the selected patient (NIOSH 1) and the other set-up placed near the head or the end of bed of the neighboring patient (NIOSH 2). The two NIOSH samplers were placed approximately 2 meters apart. This figure is given as an illustration of the positions of the NIOSH air samplers relative to the selected patient, where the selected patient could in reality be on any beds (number 1 – 5).

**Figure 2. Distribution of influenza A virus RNA recovered in different size-fractions of air particles.** Influenza A virus RNA in the air was detected from both NIOSH samplers in all size-fractions of air particles. Samples negative, is below the lower limit of detection of the PCR assay, are plotted as 'Undetectable'. Limit of detection (LOD) is defined as 600 copies per 1ml original sample, which converts to 714 copies per m<sup>3</sup> in our samples.



