

"culture is causal effect of a." Rather, adopting an explicitly interpretive orientation, culture is conceived and explored as a web of intersubjective meanings through which human beings construct their world and in which their very identities are formulated.

Following an introductory overview provided by Yosef Lapid and an intriguing historical review of issues surrounding culture and identity by Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach, two substantive themes are addressed. Part 2 of the book focuses on critical engagements with neorealism and represents, in differing ways, efforts "to culture" IR's still dominant tradition (p. 12). The opening chapter by Alex Wendt develops his notion of "collective identity formation" as a way to reconceptualizing neorealism's anarchy problematique. Specifically, Wendt argues that international politics is about more than acting on material incentives in given anarchic worlds; it is also about "the reproduction and transformation, by intersubjective dynamics . . . of the identities and interests through which those incentives and worlds are created" (pp. 62-3).

Wendt's constructivist arguments are subjected, in turn, to critical examination by Naem Inayatullah and David Blaney, through the lens of "cultural encounters" (as developed by Tzvetan Todorov and Ashis Nandy), and by Sujata Chakrabarti Pasic, who reflects as well on the contributions of Barry Buzan and the legacy of the cultural historians of the British School (Toynbee and Wight). The section ends with a chapter by Lapid and Kratochwil in which they conclude that neorealism's treatment and understanding of contemporary nationalism will remain inadequate in the absence of a "progressive identity-based problem shift" in its research program (p. 15).

In the third section of the book, the emphasis shifts from realism to distinctively nonrealist approaches to world politics. David Deudney's contribution takes up the ecologically inspired question of the construction of human identity in relation to its biological and geographical contexts. Deudney predicts the rise of earth identities as serious challengers to ethnic and state-based nationalisms. J. Ann Tickner, in turn, explores the relevance of recent feminist theorizing for issues of culture and identity. Given the fact that "identity has been a central concern in contemporary feminist theory" (p. 148), it is not surprising that she finds much within the feminist literature that sheds light on contemporary problems in the discipline. Perhaps most important, Tickner observes that the disciplinary mainstream has difficulties with issues of culture and identity precisely because of the way these concepts are gendered.

In chapter 9, David Campbell takes up the question of subjectivity in distinctly postmodernist terms. His case study is that of U.S. (and, more generally, Western) policy toward the Balkan crisis. Campbell argues that Western inaction in the face of obvious human rights violations must be understood in terms of the construction of the state as ontologically prior to its foreign policy. Besides being intellectually suspect, the resulting notion of sovereign states in an anarchic realm, he argues, does not provide an adequate basis for ethics in the post-Cold War world. Accordingly, strategies of deconstruction must be deployed against the state if violence is to be resisted. Campbell's arguments are both intriguing and provocative. His conclusion that "without deconstruction there might be no questions of ethics, identity, politics, or responsibility" (p. 178) is meant as a clear challenge to modernist efforts. Yet, Campbell himself allows that strategies of deconstruction can/must be supplemented by others (p. 177), raising in turn the question of whether these other strategies will also be of postmodern provenance, or whether

some variant of modernist theorizing will have to be incorporated if violence is to be resisted effectively. The volume is rounded out by a consideration of the notion of citizenship, conceptualizing it as an "instituted process" fundamental to the problem of political order, followed by a concluding chapter, both by Kratochwil.

In mainstream parlance, which divides the discipline into "rationalists" and "reflectivists," the contributions to this volume would clearly fall into the latter camp. And notwithstanding the mainstream prejudice that reflectivists can be lumped together indiscriminately, the contributors are working out of quite different theoretical traditions (scientific realist, hermeneutic, postmodernist, feminist, etc.). Accordingly, there is an understandable and perhaps unavoidable element of disjointedness across the chapters. The high level of its discourse, moreover, limits the volume's potential as a textbook for all but the most advanced graduate students of IR. None of this detracts, however, from the fact that the book raises important questions and presents a series of thought-provoking arguments, the consideration of which can be only salutary for the discipline as a whole.

Nuclear Designs: Great Britain, France, and China in the Global Governance of Nuclear Arms. By Bruce D. Larkin. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 1994. 354p. \$34.95.

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The dramatic nuclear reduction measures taken by the United States and Russia after the Cold War has prompted a great deal of interest in studying the global governance of nuclear arms. Bruce Larkin's *Nuclear Designs* is a timely contribution to that study by focusing on the role of three second-tier nuclear weapon states, Great Britain, France, and China.

Their role has long been either neglected or taken for granted in international nuclear politics. Scholars and commentators have tended to examine their nuclear weapon policy and strategy separately, and very few studies have explored the commonality of these three nuclear powers in a comparative way. With the end of the Cold War, there is growing need for more involvement of these states in the global nuclear governance. Their increasing importance lies in the fact, as Larkin argues, that they "not only reinforce nuclearism—in which nuclear war is held at bay by terror and uncertain self-restraint—but also by their example complicate the case against proliferation" (p. viii). It is for this reason that the author chooses Britain, France, and China for his study.

Among the few works that treat these three nuclear weapon states together, Larkin's study stands out because of its comprehensiveness and organization. But, like other authors, Larkin first has to explain why such de facto nuclear states as Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Israel, India, and Pakistan are not included. He argues that the three identify strongly as "nuclear weapon states," while others do not. The United States and Russia have to give serious consideration to the "second-tier uncertainty" in their arms control and reduction measures, while other nuclear states present more a nuclear proliferation issue. Larkin uses three distinguishing criteria for the second tier. First, a state must have enough weapons and delivery capability to matter. Second, it must have a declared nuclear weapon program. Third, the program must have developed deliberately from nuclear research to weapon deployment. The states with small nuclear programs, he argues, fail the first test; the second criterion excludes

India, Israel, and Pakistan; and the third eliminates Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. These criteria simplify the selection issue for the study but raise more questions than they can answer. For instance, how should we assess a state's importance in the global governance of nuclear arms? How helpful is it to separate declared and nondeclared nuclear states? Does the distribution of nuclear capabilities among states really matter as we move toward more nuclear management?

The main contribution of this book is its comparative examination of the three states' nuclear programs and policies through capability and scriptic analysis. After an overview of the British, French, and Chinese nuclear programs, chapters 3 through 6 examine the arms control position of each. Solid empirical work is presented on their policies regarding test bans and nonproliferation, nuclear arms reduction, verification, and coordination and transactions among nuclear weapon states. Chapters 7 through 9 address the why and why not of British, French, and Chinese commitments to nuclear weapons.

Unlike the deterrence approach to the nuclear weapon problem, British, French, and Chinese nuclear policies are treated here as a broader issue than national security strategy. It is especially appropriate to trace the source of those policies to the domestic political base of their independent nuclear deterrents and the central governance of nuclear weapons in the three states. In building a comparative framework, the author focuses on the following questions: (1) How was the nuclear program undertaken? (2) What are threat perceptions, declared purposes of nuclear programs, and arms control positions? (3) Who in the state favors and who opposes nuclear forces? How are nuclear weapons governed? Does the internal political contest to govern affect positions on nuclear forces? Given such a broad topic area, the author's comparative framework does not seem adequate to address the why and why not issues of these three second-tier nuclear states; it concerns more the how than the why.

Another matter that is raised but not resolved is the role of the three states with respect to proliferation. Is there any linkage between their nuclear programs and proliferation? Following the footsteps of the superpowers, Britain, France, and China acquired nuclear weapons for security, and the political leadership in the three states still strongly advocates nuclearism. This makes the case, Larkin argues, for non-nuclear states to follow suit. Yet, nuclear motivation is complex, and the judgment on the link between the three second-tier nuclear states and proliferation is arbitrary. From the perspective of nuclear arms and nuclear security, the three states should take no more blame for proliferation than the superpowers. The behavior of Britain, France, and China clearly indicates a learning curve in their nonproliferation policy, and they are now facilitators, rather than spoilers, of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Larkin argues strongly for nuclear abolition. He also implicitly suggests some mechanisms for global nuclear management and abolition. The three second-tier states, in his view, have a special part to play as the world moves toward nuclear management and disarmament. More than any others, they could bring their weight to bear on Russia and the United States to reduce even more or abolish nuclear weapons. To potential nuclear powers, the three could make a compelling case for renouncing nuclear deployment and aspirations. As their current nuclear policies indicate, however, it may not be practical to expect the three to play such a special role in global nuclear governance. London, Paris, and Beijing strongly reject the notion that they have any special responsibility to change the status quo. In this sense,

Larkin's study is valuable for contemplating the path to a future nuclear management regime. It broadens our thinking on global nuclear governance and raises some questions of central importance for further research on the issue.

Reputation and International Politics. By Jonathan Mercer. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996. 236p. \$34.95.

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This book draws upon the work done in experimental psychology to develop a set of hypotheses about how and in what ways leaders of states do or do not acquire reputations that exist in the minds of other statesmen. The result is a book full of fascinating and suggestive insights into the cognitive processes relevant to international relations. Mercer compels us to accept the proposition that reputations do not simply reflect past behavior. Resolute leaders, he convincingly shows, do not always gain reputations for resolve, and irresolute leaders do not always gain a reputation for weakness. Mercer's book should be read as arguing that it is difficult for statesmen to create the reputations they seek to create, a proposition the author clearly proves. Yet, the book can be read as making a stronger claim: Reputations rarely develop in the way predicted by standard deterrence theory, and they are not worth fighting for. This claim seems less well established by Mercer's theory or cases.

Mercer begins by asking what reputations are and how leaders acquire them. He quickly and correctly moves to the position that reputations exist in the minds of observers, not in our own minds, and consist of judgments about the character of actors that lead observers to believe a leader will behave in the same way in a variety of circumstances. Mercer then links this conception of reputation to the work done on attribution theory in experimental psychology, that is, subjects are given descriptions of the behavior of another person and then are asked to explain that behavior. The explanations are grouped into those that attribute the behavior to the situation ("he ran away because his life was in danger") and those that attribute the behavior to the person's disposition ("he ran away because he was a coward"). The psychologists found that subjects tend to attribute unexpected and desirable behavior of members of out-groups, from the standpoint of the experimental subject, to the situation, not to the positive disposition of the out-group member. Negative actions of members of out-groups that were expected and undesirable were attributed to their personal disposition. In other words, people tend to think the worst of members of out-groups; they explain bad behavior in terms of permanent bad dispositions and explain away good behavior by citing compelling external circumstances.

The link is then made to international politics. There, from the standpoint of a national leader, foreign adversaries are clearly members of out-groups. So also, argues Mercer, are allies, at least sometimes. In a crisis, if an adversary refuses to back down in response to the policies of a national leader, s/he is clearly acting in a way that is expected and undesirable; thus, leaders should attribute that behavior to the person's negative and fixed disposition. It then is possible that the next crisis will be seen as in some way the same as the first crisis. If it is, then the crises and crisis behavior may, in Mercer's words, be linked or interdependent. If the behavior of the adversary is attributed to permanent dispositional factors and if the crises are interdependent, then the adversary will have gained a reputation. Mercer notes that the theory is silent on just which dispositional factors will be attributed to the adversary, but since the adversary is not