Do Managerial Incentives Matter? Evidence from SOE Pay-Cap Reforms in China
Grant Data
Project Title
Do Managerial Incentives Matter? Evidence from SOE Pay-Cap Reforms in China
Principal Investigator
Professor Lin, Chen
(Principal Investigator (PI))
Co-Investigator(s)
Mr Liu Sibo
(Co-Investigator)
Duration
30
Start Date
2018-01-01
Amount
473885
Conference Title
Do Managerial Incentives Matter? Evidence from SOE Pay-Cap Reforms in China
Presentation Title
Keywords
CEO compensation, innovation, investment efficiency, Managerial incentives, state-owned enterprises
Discipline
Economics,Finance
Panel
Business Studies (B)
HKU Project Code
17504117
Grant Type
General Research Fund (GRF)
Funding Year
2017
Status
Completed
Objectives
1 We will examine how the ""pay-cap"" reform affects shareholder value. 2 We will examine how the reform shapes a broad range of corporate policies including investment and operating efficiency, innovation, profitability and etc. 3 We will examine whether the reform drives the competent executives to work in private companies and leads to a loss of managerial human capital. 4 We will examine how manager’s political promotion propensity moderates the effect of the reform.
All Publications
| Title | Author(s) | Issue Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
De-politicization and Corporate Transformation: Evidence from China Journal:The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization | 2021 |