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- Publisher Website: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2007.07.003
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-36349034500
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Article: Corporate governance and earnings management in the Chinese listed companies: A tunneling perspective
Title | Corporate governance and earnings management in the Chinese listed companies: A tunneling perspective |
---|---|
Authors | |
Keywords | Agency Problems Corporate Governance Earnings Management Tunneling |
Issue Date | 2007 |
Publisher | Elsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jcorpfin |
Citation | Journal Of Corporate Finance, 2007, v. 13 n. 5, p. 881-906 How to Cite? |
Abstract | This paper examines the relation between earnings management and corporate governance in China by introducing a tunneling perspective. We document systematic differences in earnings management across the universe of China's listed companies during 1999-2005, and empirically demonstrate that firms with higher corporate governance levels have lower levels of earnings management. We study two China-specific situations, in which the listed firms have strong incentives to manage earnings in order to meet certain return on equity (ROE) thresholds, and earnings management has been shown to be the most conspicuous. We identify tunneling evidence for each. Our empirical findings, although not being able to completely exclude other explanations, strongly suggest that agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority investors account for a significant portion of earnings management in China's listed firms. © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/177750 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 7.2 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 3.182 |
ISI Accession Number ID | |
References |
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Liu, Q | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Lu, ZJ | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-12-19T09:39:48Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-12-19T09:39:48Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal Of Corporate Finance, 2007, v. 13 n. 5, p. 881-906 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 0929-1199 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/177750 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper examines the relation between earnings management and corporate governance in China by introducing a tunneling perspective. We document systematic differences in earnings management across the universe of China's listed companies during 1999-2005, and empirically demonstrate that firms with higher corporate governance levels have lower levels of earnings management. We study two China-specific situations, in which the listed firms have strong incentives to manage earnings in order to meet certain return on equity (ROE) thresholds, and earnings management has been shown to be the most conspicuous. We identify tunneling evidence for each. Our empirical findings, although not being able to completely exclude other explanations, strongly suggest that agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority investors account for a significant portion of earnings management in China's listed firms. © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. | en_US |
dc.language | eng | en_US |
dc.publisher | Elsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jcorpfin | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Corporate Finance | en_US |
dc.subject | Agency Problems | en_US |
dc.subject | Corporate Governance | en_US |
dc.subject | Earnings Management | en_US |
dc.subject | Tunneling | en_US |
dc.title | Corporate governance and earnings management in the Chinese listed companies: A tunneling perspective | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.identifier.email | Liu, Q: qliu@hku.hk | en_US |
dc.identifier.authority | Liu, Q=rp01078 | en_US |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2007.07.003 | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-36349034500 | en_US |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 130411 | - |
dc.relation.references | http://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-36349034500&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpage | en_US |
dc.identifier.volume | 13 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issue | 5 | en_US |
dc.identifier.spage | 881 | en_US |
dc.identifier.epage | 906 | en_US |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000251930100011 | - |
dc.publisher.place | Netherlands | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopusauthorid | Liu, Q=55429572300 | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopusauthorid | Lu, ZJ=23009263600 | en_US |
dc.identifier.citeulike | 2022149 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0929-1199 | - |