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- Publisher Website: 10.1257/aer.20151538
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-84994236098
- WOS: WOS:000387342200011
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Article: Endogenous Entry to Security-bid Auctions
Title | Endogenous Entry to Security-bid Auctions |
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Authors | |
Issue Date | 2016 |
Publisher | American Economic Association. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/index.php |
Citation | The American Economic Review, 2016, v. 106 n. 11, p. 3577-3589 How to Cite? |
Abstract | We endogenize entry to a security-bid auction, where participation is costly and bidders must decide given their private valuations whether to participate. We first consider any minimum reserve security-bid of a fixed expected value that weakly exceeds the asset's value when retained by the seller. DeMarzo, Kremer, and Skrzypacz (2005) establish that with a fixed number of bidders, auctions with steeper securities yield the seller more revenues. Counterintuitively, we find that auctions with steeper securities also attract more entry, further enhancing the revenues from such auctions. We then establish that with optimal reserve securities, auctions with steeper securities always yield higher expected revenues. (JEL D44). |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/247642 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 10.5 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 22.344 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Sogo, T | - |
dc.contributor.author | Bernhardt, D | - |
dc.contributor.author | Liu, T | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-10-18T08:30:21Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2017-10-18T08:30:21Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2016 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | The American Economic Review, 2016, v. 106 n. 11, p. 3577-3589 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0002-8282 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/247642 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We endogenize entry to a security-bid auction, where participation is costly and bidders must decide given their private valuations whether to participate. We first consider any minimum reserve security-bid of a fixed expected value that weakly exceeds the asset's value when retained by the seller. DeMarzo, Kremer, and Skrzypacz (2005) establish that with a fixed number of bidders, auctions with steeper securities yield the seller more revenues. Counterintuitively, we find that auctions with steeper securities also attract more entry, further enhancing the revenues from such auctions. We then establish that with optimal reserve securities, auctions with steeper securities always yield higher expected revenues. (JEL D44). | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | American Economic Association. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/index.php | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | The American Economic Review | - |
dc.rights | The American Economic Review. Copyright © American Economic Association. | - |
dc.title | Endogenous Entry to Security-bid Auctions | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.email | Sogo, T: tjliu@hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.email | Liu, T: tjliu@hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.authority | Sogo, T=rp02221 | - |
dc.identifier.authority | Liu, T=rp02221 | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1257/aer.20151538 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-84994236098 | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 280732 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 106 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 11 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 3577 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 3589 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000387342200011 | - |
dc.publisher.place | United States | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0002-8282 | - |