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- Publisher Website: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.06.009
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-85071966326
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Article: Optimal Equity Auctions with Two-dimensional Types
Title | Optimal Equity Auctions with Two-dimensional Types |
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Authors | |
Keywords | Global violation of regularity Adverse selection Dimensionality reduction |
Issue Date | 2019 |
Publisher | Academic Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jet |
Citation | Journal of Economic Theory, 2019, v. 184, p. article no. 104913 How to Cite? |
Abstract | We analyze the design and performance of equity auctions when bidder's valuations and opportunity costs are private information, distributed according to an arbitrary joint density that can differ across bidders. We identify, for any incentive compatible mechanism, an equivalent single-dimensional representation for uncertainty. We then characterize the revenue-maximizing and surplus-maximizing equity mechanisms, and compare revenues in optimal equity and cash auctions. Unlike in cash auctions, the adverse selection arising from bidders' two-dimensional types in equity auctions can lead to a global violation of the regularity condition, which represents a maximal mismatch between incentive compatibility and maximization of revenue or surplus. Such mismatch can lead a seller to exclude bidders and demand a bidder-specific stake from a non-excluded bidder, providing insights into when a firm should employ an auction and when it should just negotiate with a single bidder. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/284502 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 1.4 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 3.218 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Liu, T | - |
dc.contributor.author | Bernhardt, D | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-08-07T08:58:34Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-08-07T08:58:34Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2019 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Economic Theory, 2019, v. 184, p. article no. 104913 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0022-0531 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/284502 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We analyze the design and performance of equity auctions when bidder's valuations and opportunity costs are private information, distributed according to an arbitrary joint density that can differ across bidders. We identify, for any incentive compatible mechanism, an equivalent single-dimensional representation for uncertainty. We then characterize the revenue-maximizing and surplus-maximizing equity mechanisms, and compare revenues in optimal equity and cash auctions. Unlike in cash auctions, the adverse selection arising from bidders' two-dimensional types in equity auctions can lead to a global violation of the regularity condition, which represents a maximal mismatch between incentive compatibility and maximization of revenue or surplus. Such mismatch can lead a seller to exclude bidders and demand a bidder-specific stake from a non-excluded bidder, providing insights into when a firm should employ an auction and when it should just negotiate with a single bidder. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Academic Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jet | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Economic Theory | - |
dc.subject | Global violation of regularity | - |
dc.subject | Adverse selection | - |
dc.subject | Dimensionality reduction | - |
dc.title | Optimal Equity Auctions with Two-dimensional Types | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.email | Liu, T: tjliu@hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.authority | Liu, T=rp02221 | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jet.2019.06.009 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85071966326 | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 312335 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 184 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | article no. 104913 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | article no. 104913 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000498285500007 | - |
dc.publisher.place | United States | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0022-0531 | - |