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- Publisher Website: 10.1016/j.respol.2023.104784
- WOS: WOS:000984233000001
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Article: Litigate or let it go? Multi-market contact and IP infringement-litigation dynamics
Title | Litigate or let it go? Multi-market contact and IP infringement-litigation dynamics |
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Authors | |
Issue Date | 19-Apr-2023 |
Publisher | Elsevier |
Citation | Research Policy, 2023, v. 52, n. 6 How to Cite? |
Abstract | We explore how multimarket contact (MMC) explains competitors' intellectual property (IP) infringement-litigation dynamics. We build on role congruity theory to propose that the role played by each firm in shared markets generates expectations about their behavior, determining which of the following dynamics arise: mutual forbearance (low probability of IP infringement and high probability of litigation) or mimetic behavior (high probability of IP infringement and low probability of litigation). We look into two possible roles, imitators and innovators, and claim that (1) mutual forbearance dynamics are more likely to arise when firms play the role of innovators, whereas (2) mimetic behavior dynamics are more likely to arise when firms play the role of imitators. We find support for our predictions in a sample of 813 patent infringement cases in the biopharmaceutical industry. Increasing MMC from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean leads to a 21.6 (20.6) percent decrease in the probability of infringement and a 22.7 (65.1) percent increase in the probability of litigation after infringement when the rival (focal firm) plays the role of an innovator in shared markets. Alternatively, this increase in MMC leads to a 14.3 % increase (no increase) in the probability of infringement and a 5.2 (16.4) percent decrease in the probability of litigation when the rival (focal firm) plays the role of an imitator in shared markets. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/328428 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 7.5 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 3.219 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Diestre, L | - |
dc.contributor.author | Lumineau, F | - |
dc.contributor.author | Durand, R | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-06-28T04:44:50Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2023-06-28T04:44:50Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2023-04-19 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Research Policy, 2023, v. 52, n. 6 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0048-7333 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/328428 | - |
dc.description.abstract | <p>We explore how multimarket contact (MMC) explains competitors' intellectual property (IP) infringement-litigation dynamics. We build on role congruity theory to propose that the role played by each firm in shared markets generates expectations about their behavior, determining which of the following dynamics arise: mutual forbearance (low probability of IP infringement and high probability of litigation) or mimetic behavior (high probability of IP infringement and low probability of litigation). We look into two possible roles, imitators and innovators, and claim that (1) mutual forbearance dynamics are more likely to arise when firms play the role of innovators, whereas (2) mimetic behavior dynamics are more likely to arise when firms play the role of imitators. We find support for our predictions in a sample of 813 patent infringement cases in the biopharmaceutical <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/economics-econometrics-and-finance/specific-industry" title="Learn more about industry from ScienceDirect's AI-generated Topic Pages">industry</a>. Increasing MMC from one <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/economics-econometrics-and-finance/measure-of-dispersion" title="Learn more about standard deviation from ScienceDirect's AI-generated Topic Pages">standard deviation</a> below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean leads to a 21.6 (20.6) percent decrease in the probability of infringement and a 22.7 (65.1) percent increase in the probability of litigation after infringement when the rival (focal firm) plays the role of an innovator in shared markets. Alternatively, this increase in MMC leads to a 14.3 % increase (no increase) in the probability of infringement and a 5.2 (16.4) percent decrease in the probability of litigation when the rival (focal firm) plays the role of an imitator in shared markets.<br></p> | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Research Policy | - |
dc.title | Litigate or let it go? Multi-market contact and IP infringement-litigation dynamics | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.respol.2023.104784 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 52 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 6 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1873-7625 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000984233000001 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0048-7333 | - |