File Download
There are no files associated with this item.
Links for fulltext
(May Require Subscription)
- Publisher Website: 10.1257/aer.103.6.2412
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-84886010021
- WOS: WOS:000328054000012
- Find via
Supplementary
- Citations:
- Appears in Collections:
Article: Spontaneous discrimination
Title | Spontaneous discrimination |
---|---|
Authors | |
Issue Date | 2013 |
Citation | American Economic Review, 2013, v. 103, n. 6, p. 2412-2436 How to Cite? |
Abstract | We consider a dynamic economy in which agents are repeatedly matched and decide whether or not to form profitable partnerships. Each agent has a physical color and a social color. An agent's social color acts as a signal, conveying information about the physical color of agents in his partnership history. Before an agent makes a decision, he observes his match's physical and social colors. Neither the physical color nor the social color is payoff relevant. We identify environments where equilibria arise in which agents condition their decisions on the physical and social colors of their potential partners. That is, they discriminate. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/329289 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 10.5 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 22.344 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Pȩski, Marcin | - |
dc.contributor.author | Szentes, Balázs | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-08-09T03:31:44Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2023-08-09T03:31:44Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2013 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | American Economic Review, 2013, v. 103, n. 6, p. 2412-2436 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0002-8282 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/329289 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We consider a dynamic economy in which agents are repeatedly matched and decide whether or not to form profitable partnerships. Each agent has a physical color and a social color. An agent's social color acts as a signal, conveying information about the physical color of agents in his partnership history. Before an agent makes a decision, he observes his match's physical and social colors. Neither the physical color nor the social color is payoff relevant. We identify environments where equilibria arise in which agents condition their decisions on the physical and social colors of their potential partners. That is, they discriminate. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | American Economic Review | - |
dc.title | Spontaneous discrimination | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1257/aer.103.6.2412 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-84886010021 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 103 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 6 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 2412 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 2436 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000328054000012 | - |