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Article: The global financial crisis and the financial stability board: Hardening the soft law of international financial regulation?

TitleThe global financial crisis and the financial stability board: Hardening the soft law of international financial regulation?
Authors
KeywordsGlobal financial crisis
Financial stability board
G20
Global administrative law
Policy networks
Issue Date2009
PublisherUniversity of New South Wales. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.unswlawjournal.unsw.edu.au
Citation
University of New South Wales Law Journal, 2009, v. 32 n. 2, p. 488-513 How to Cite?
AbstractThis article considers the Finanical Stability Board and the extent to which this extension of the current 'soft law' regime can be a substitute for a 'hard law' regime with greater enforcement powers. The article concludes that greater institutional backing for the FSB is achievable without moving to a fully treaty-based, hard law solution. However, while these arrangements are likely to enhance the ongoing supervision of crossborder financial groups and will lead to generally higher supervisory standards throughout the world, it is unlikely that they will be able to deliver improvements to the second major issue on which enhanced coordination is being sought, namely improved crisis management arrangements and agreements on burden sharing. In the latter case, only a hard law solution, perhaps imposing binding arbitration on the relevant parties, is likely to be effective, but the political will to develop such an approach has not yet been evident.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/130550
ISSN
2023 Impact Factor: 1.2
2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.180
SSRN

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorArner, DW-
dc.contributor.authorTaylor, M-
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-23T08:56:10Z-
dc.date.available2010-12-23T08:56:10Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.citationUniversity of New South Wales Law Journal, 2009, v. 32 n. 2, p. 488-513-
dc.identifier.issn0313-0096-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/130550-
dc.description.abstractThis article considers the Finanical Stability Board and the extent to which this extension of the current 'soft law' regime can be a substitute for a 'hard law' regime with greater enforcement powers. The article concludes that greater institutional backing for the FSB is achievable without moving to a fully treaty-based, hard law solution. However, while these arrangements are likely to enhance the ongoing supervision of crossborder financial groups and will lead to generally higher supervisory standards throughout the world, it is unlikely that they will be able to deliver improvements to the second major issue on which enhanced coordination is being sought, namely improved crisis management arrangements and agreements on burden sharing. In the latter case, only a hard law solution, perhaps imposing binding arbitration on the relevant parties, is likely to be effective, but the political will to develop such an approach has not yet been evident.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherUniversity of New South Wales. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.unswlawjournal.unsw.edu.au-
dc.relation.ispartofUniversity of New South Wales Law Journal-
dc.subjectGlobal financial crisis-
dc.subjectFinancial stability board-
dc.subjectG20-
dc.subjectGlobal administrative law-
dc.subjectPolicy networks-
dc.titleThe global financial crisis and the financial stability board: Hardening the soft law of international financial regulation?-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.emailArner, DW: dwarner@HKUCC.hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityArner, DW=rp01237-
dc.identifier.hkuros178271-
dc.identifier.volume32-
dc.identifier.issue2-
dc.identifier.spage488-
dc.identifier.epage513-
dc.publisher.placeAustralia-
dc.identifier.ssrn1427084-
dc.identifier.issnl0313-0096-

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