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Conference Paper: Analysis of moral hazard in virtual enterprise based on probability constraints

TitleAnalysis of moral hazard in virtual enterprise based on probability constraints
Authors
Chen, GHuang, MChing, WK
KeywordsMoral Hazard
Principal-Agent
Probability Constraints
Virtual Enterprise
Issue Date2010
Citation
2010 Chinese Control And Decision Conference, Ccdc 2010, 2010, p. 1370-1373 How to Cite?
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/CCDC.2010.5498191
AbstractIn this paper, the moral hazard in Virtual Enterprise (VE) is studied based on the principal-agent theory with probability constraints. The probability is used to quantify the partners' risk attitude in VE, and the principal-agent model under probability constraint is used to deal with the problem. Firstly, the probability constraints is used to modify the participation constraints of the traditional principal-agent model, then the model is solved and the optimality decision is analysed, which shows the usefulness and effectiveness of the model. ©2010 IEEE.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/158872
ISI Accession Number ID
WOS:000290460300275
References
References in Scopus

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorChen, Gen_US
dc.contributor.authorHuang, Men_US
dc.contributor.authorChing, WKen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-08T09:04:01Z-
dc.date.available2012-08-08T09:04:01Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.citation2010 Chinese Control And Decision Conference, Ccdc 2010, 2010, p. 1370-1373en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/158872-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, the moral hazard in Virtual Enterprise (VE) is studied based on the principal-agent theory with probability constraints. The probability is used to quantify the partners' risk attitude in VE, and the principal-agent model under probability constraint is used to deal with the problem. Firstly, the probability constraints is used to modify the participation constraints of the traditional principal-agent model, then the model is solved and the optimality decision is analysed, which shows the usefulness and effectiveness of the model. ©2010 IEEE.en_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.relation.ispartof2010 Chinese Control and Decision Conference, CCDC 2010en_US
dc.subjectMoral Hazarden_US
dc.subjectPrincipal-Agenten_US
dc.subjectProbability Constraintsen_US
dc.subjectVirtual Enterpriseen_US
dc.titleAnalysis of moral hazard in virtual enterprise based on probability constraintsen_US
dc.typeConference_Paperen_US
dc.identifier.emailChing, WK:wching@hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityChing, WK=rp00679en_US
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltexten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/CCDC.2010.5498191en_US
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-77955385388en_US
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-77955385388&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_US
dc.identifier.spage1370en_US
dc.identifier.epage1373en_US
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000290460300275-
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridChen, G=36241248200en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridHuang, M=26643214600en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridChing, WK=13310265500en_US

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