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- Publisher Website: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2009.11.008
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Article: BOT projects: incentives and efficiency
Title | BOT projects: incentives and efficiency |
---|---|
Authors | |
Keywords | Incentive Infrastructure Modeling Monopoly Price determination |
Issue Date | 2011 |
Publisher | Elsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/devec |
Citation | Journal of Development Economics, 2011, v. 94 n. 1, p. 127-138 How to Cite? |
Abstract | In recent years, governments have been increasingly adopting Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) contracts for large infrastructure projects. However, BOT contracts have received little attention from economists. The apparent agency problem in BOT projects has never been analyzed. In this paper, we develop a model to examine the incentives, efficiency and regulation in BOT contracts. We show that a BOT contract with a price regulation during the concession period and a license extension after the concession period is capable of achieving full efficiency. Both license extension and price control are observed in many real-world BOT projects. We also investigate the efficiency in such contracts by considering other factors, including time consistency, price ceiling, foreign ownership, and the lack of price regulation. © 2009 Elsevier B.V. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/164731 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 5.1 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 3.737 |
ISI Accession Number ID | |
References |
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Qiu, LD | en_HK |
dc.contributor.author | Wang, S | en_HK |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-09-20T08:08:44Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-09-20T08:08:44Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Development Economics, 2011, v. 94 n. 1, p. 127-138 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.issn | 0304-3878 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/164731 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In recent years, governments have been increasingly adopting Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) contracts for large infrastructure projects. However, BOT contracts have received little attention from economists. The apparent agency problem in BOT projects has never been analyzed. In this paper, we develop a model to examine the incentives, efficiency and regulation in BOT contracts. We show that a BOT contract with a price regulation during the concession period and a license extension after the concession period is capable of achieving full efficiency. Both license extension and price control are observed in many real-world BOT projects. We also investigate the efficiency in such contracts by considering other factors, including time consistency, price ceiling, foreign ownership, and the lack of price regulation. © 2009 Elsevier B.V. | en_HK |
dc.language | eng | en_US |
dc.publisher | Elsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/devec | en_HK |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Development Economics | en_HK |
dc.subject | Incentive | en_HK |
dc.subject | Infrastructure | en_HK |
dc.subject | Modeling | en_HK |
dc.subject | Monopoly | en_HK |
dc.subject | Price determination | en_HK |
dc.title | BOT projects: incentives and efficiency | en_HK |
dc.type | Article | en_HK |
dc.identifier.email | Qiu, LD: larryqiu@hku.hk | en_HK |
dc.identifier.email | Wang, S: s.wang@ust.hk | - |
dc.identifier.authority | Qiu, LD=rp01093 | en_HK |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2009.11.008 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-77957786132 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 207599 | en_US |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 209929 | - |
dc.relation.references | http://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-77957786132&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpage | en_HK |
dc.identifier.volume | 94 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.issue | 1 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.spage | 127 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.epage | 138 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000284439400011 | - |
dc.publisher.place | Netherlands | en_HK |
dc.identifier.scopusauthorid | Wang, S=7410349142 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.scopusauthorid | Qiu, LD=7201538008 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.citeulike | 6302460 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0304-3878 | - |