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Article: A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents
Title | A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents |
---|---|
Authors | |
Issue Date | 2013 |
Publisher | Springer Verlag. The Journal's web site is located at http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/index.htm |
Citation | Social Choice And Welfare, 2013, v. 40 n. 3, p. 871-911 How to Cite? |
Abstract | We consider a problem of allocating infinitely divisible commodities among a group of agents. More specifically, there are several commodities to be allocated and agents have continuous, strictly convex, and separable preferences. We establish that a rule satisfies strategy-proofness, unanimity, weak symmetry, and nonbossiness if and only if it is the uniform rule. This result extends to the class of continuous, strictly convex, and multidimensional single-peaked preferences. © 2012 Springer-Verlag. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/177791 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 0.5 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.582 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Morimoto, S | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Serizawa, S | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Ching, S | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-12-19T09:39:55Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-12-19T09:39:55Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2013 | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | Social Choice And Welfare, 2013, v. 40 n. 3, p. 871-911 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 0176-1714 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/177791 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We consider a problem of allocating infinitely divisible commodities among a group of agents. More specifically, there are several commodities to be allocated and agents have continuous, strictly convex, and separable preferences. We establish that a rule satisfies strategy-proofness, unanimity, weak symmetry, and nonbossiness if and only if it is the uniform rule. This result extends to the class of continuous, strictly convex, and multidimensional single-peaked preferences. © 2012 Springer-Verlag. | en_US |
dc.language | eng | en_US |
dc.publisher | Springer Verlag. The Journal's web site is located at http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/index.htm | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartof | Social Choice and Welfare | en_US |
dc.title | A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.identifier.email | Ching, S: steve.ching@hku.hk | en_US |
dc.identifier.authority | Ching, S=rp01056 | en_US |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s00355-011-0648-9 | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-84872618285 | en_US |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 224293 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 871 | en_US |
dc.identifier.epage | 911 | en_US |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000313662000014 | - |
dc.publisher.place | Germany | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopusauthorid | Morimoto, S=54910207900 | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopusauthorid | Serizawa, S=7004199377 | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopusauthorid | Ching, S=16411142700 | en_US |
dc.identifier.citeulike | 10313905 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0176-1714 | - |