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Article: Political decentralization and corruption: Evidence from around the world
Title | Political decentralization and corruption: Evidence from around the world |
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Authors | |
Keywords | Corruption Decentralization Political economy |
Issue Date | 2009 |
Publisher | Elsevier. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00472727 |
Citation | Journal of Public Economics, 2009, v. 93 n. 1-2, p. 14-34 How to Cite? |
Abstract | How does political decentralization affect the frequency and costliness of bribe extraction by corrupt officials? Previous empirical studies, using subjective indexes of perceived corruption and mostly fiscal indicators of decentralization, have suggested conflicting conclusions. In search of more precise findings, we combine and explore two new data sources—an original cross-national data set on particular types of decentralization and the results of a firm level survey conducted in 80 countries about firms' concrete experiences with bribery. In countries with a larger number of government or administrative tiers and (given local revenues) a larger number of local public employees, reported bribery was more frequent. When local—or central—governments received a larger share of GDP in revenue, bribery was less frequent. Overall, the results suggest the danger of uncoordinated rent-seeking as government structures become more complex. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/192328 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 4.8 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 5.144 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Fan, CS | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Lin, C | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Treisman, D | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-10-24T01:49:57Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2013-10-24T01:49:57Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2009 | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Public Economics, 2009, v. 93 n. 1-2, p. 14-34 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 0047-2727 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/192328 | - |
dc.description.abstract | How does political decentralization affect the frequency and costliness of bribe extraction by corrupt officials? Previous empirical studies, using subjective indexes of perceived corruption and mostly fiscal indicators of decentralization, have suggested conflicting conclusions. In search of more precise findings, we combine and explore two new data sources—an original cross-national data set on particular types of decentralization and the results of a firm level survey conducted in 80 countries about firms' concrete experiences with bribery. In countries with a larger number of government or administrative tiers and (given local revenues) a larger number of local public employees, reported bribery was more frequent. When local—or central—governments received a larger share of GDP in revenue, bribery was less frequent. Overall, the results suggest the danger of uncoordinated rent-seeking as government structures become more complex. | - |
dc.language | eng | en_US |
dc.publisher | Elsevier. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00472727 | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Public Economics | en_US |
dc.rights | This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. | - |
dc.rights | NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Public Economics. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in PUBLICATION, [VOL 93, ISSUE 1-2, (2009)] DOI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.09.001 | - |
dc.subject | Corruption | - |
dc.subject | Decentralization | - |
dc.subject | Political economy | - |
dc.title | Political decentralization and corruption: Evidence from around the world | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.description.nature | postprint | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.09.001 | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-57749199314 | en_US |
dc.identifier.volume | 93 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issue | 1-2 | en_US |
dc.identifier.spage | 14 | en_US |
dc.identifier.epage | 34 | en_US |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000262875900002 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0047-2727 | - |