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- Publisher Website: 10.1111/1746-8361.12041
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Article: Primitive truth
Title | Primitive truth |
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Authors | |
Issue Date | 2013 |
Citation | Dialectica, 2013, v. 67, n. 4, p. 503-519 How to Cite? |
Abstract | Conceptual primitivism is the view that truth is among our most basic and fundamental concepts. It cannot be defined, analyzed, or reduced into concepts that are more fundamental. Primitivism is opposed to both traditional attempts at defining truth (in terms of correspondence, coherence, or utility) and deflationary theories that argue that the notion of truth is exhausted by means of the truth schema. Though primitivism might be thought of as a view of last resort, I believe that the view is independently attractive, and can be argued for directly. In this paper I offer what I take to be the strongest argument in favor of conceptual primitivism, which relies upon the Fregean doctrine of the omnipresence of truth. © 2014 The Author dialectica © 2014 Editorial Board of dialectica. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/202217 |
ISSN | 2020 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.483 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Asay, Jamin | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-08-22T02:57:49Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2014-08-22T02:57:49Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2013 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Dialectica, 2013, v. 67, n. 4, p. 503-519 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0012-2017 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/202217 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Conceptual primitivism is the view that truth is among our most basic and fundamental concepts. It cannot be defined, analyzed, or reduced into concepts that are more fundamental. Primitivism is opposed to both traditional attempts at defining truth (in terms of correspondence, coherence, or utility) and deflationary theories that argue that the notion of truth is exhausted by means of the truth schema. Though primitivism might be thought of as a view of last resort, I believe that the view is independently attractive, and can be argued for directly. In this paper I offer what I take to be the strongest argument in favor of conceptual primitivism, which relies upon the Fregean doctrine of the omnipresence of truth. © 2014 The Author dialectica © 2014 Editorial Board of dialectica. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Dialectica | - |
dc.title | Primitive truth | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1111/1746-8361.12041 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-84897839477 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 67 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 4 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 503 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 519 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1746-8361 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000332762200006 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0012-2017 | - |