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Book Chapter: Cloud Resource Pricing Under Tenant Rationality

TitleCloud Resource Pricing Under Tenant Rationality
Authors
Jin, XKwok, YK
Issue Date2015
PublisherSpringer-Verlag
Citation
Cloud Resource Pricing Under Tenant Rationality. In Khan, SU & Zomaya, AY (Eds.), Handbook on Data Centers, p. 583-605. New York: Springer-Verlag, 2015 How to Cite?
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4939-2092-1_19
AbstractWith the recent emergence of the cloud market, cloud resource pricing fundamentally determines cloud revenue, cloud resource allocation and tenant demand dynamics. However, strategic interactions between cloud providers and tenant users are largely unknown. In this chapter, we consider a monopoly cloud market by formulating a competitive market among tenants. A novel Stackelberg game is proposed to tractably analyze such strategic interactions for optimal cloud resource pricing. To empirically evaluate our analyses, we conduct extensive simulations driven by 40 GB of realistic workload traces from Google.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/205235
ISBN
9781493920914

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorJin, X-
dc.contributor.authorKwok, YK-
dc.date.accessioned2014-09-20T02:04:41Z-
dc.date.available2014-09-20T02:04:41Z-
dc.date.issued2015-
dc.identifier.citationCloud Resource Pricing Under Tenant Rationality. In Khan, SU & Zomaya, AY (Eds.), Handbook on Data Centers, p. 583-605. New York: Springer-Verlag, 2015-
dc.identifier.isbn9781493920914-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/205235-
dc.description.abstractWith the recent emergence of the cloud market, cloud resource pricing fundamentally determines cloud revenue, cloud resource allocation and tenant demand dynamics. However, strategic interactions between cloud providers and tenant users are largely unknown. In this chapter, we consider a monopoly cloud market by formulating a competitive market among tenants. A novel Stackelberg game is proposed to tractably analyze such strategic interactions for optimal cloud resource pricing. To empirically evaluate our analyses, we conduct extensive simulations driven by 40 GB of realistic workload traces from Google.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherSpringer-Verlag-
dc.relation.ispartofHandbook on Data Centers-
dc.titleCloud Resource Pricing Under Tenant Rationality-
dc.typeBook_Chapter-
dc.identifier.emailKwok, YK: ykwok@eee.hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityKwok, YK=rp00128-
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/978-1-4939-2092-1_19-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-84945120966-
dc.identifier.hkuros238464-
dc.identifier.spage583-
dc.identifier.epage605-
dc.publisher.placeNew York-

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