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Article: A modified philosophical argument for a beginning of the universe
Title | A modified philosophical argument for a beginning of the universe |
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Authors | |
Issue Date | 2014 |
Publisher | Cambridge University Press. |
Citation | Think, 2014, v. 13 n. 36, p. 71-83 How to Cite? |
Abstract | Craig’s second philosophical argument for abeginning of the universe presupposes a dynamic theory of time, a limitation which makes theargument unacceptable for those who do not hold this theory. I argue that the argument can bemodified thus: If time is beginning-less, then it would be the case that a person existing and counting aslong as time exists would count an actual infinite by counting one element after another successively, but the consequent is metaphysically impossible, hencethe antecedent is metaphysically impossible. I defend the premises and show that this argument does not presuppose the dynamic theory. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/206303 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 0.2 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Loke, TEA | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-10-23T02:13:28Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2014-10-23T02:13:28Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2014 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Think, 2014, v. 13 n. 36, p. 71-83 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1477-1756 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/206303 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Craig’s second philosophical argument for abeginning of the universe presupposes a dynamic theory of time, a limitation which makes theargument unacceptable for those who do not hold this theory. I argue that the argument can bemodified thus: If time is beginning-less, then it would be the case that a person existing and counting aslong as time exists would count an actual infinite by counting one element after another successively, but the consequent is metaphysically impossible, hencethe antecedent is metaphysically impossible. I defend the premises and show that this argument does not presuppose the dynamic theory. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Cambridge University Press. | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Think | - |
dc.rights | Think. Copyright © Cambridge University Press. | - |
dc.title | A modified philosophical argument for a beginning of the universe | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.identifier.email | Loke, TEA: qaddeen@yahoo.com | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1017/S147717561300033X | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 13 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 36 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 71 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 83 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000218430400008 | - |
dc.publisher.place | United Kingdom | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 1477-1756 | - |