File Download

There are no files associated with this item.

  Links for fulltext
     (May Require Subscription)
Supplementary

Book Chapter: Liberty Rights and the Limits of Liberal Democracy

TitleLiberty Rights and the Limits of Liberal Democracy
Authors
Issue Date2015
PublisherOxford University Press
Citation
Liberty Rights and the Limits of Liberal Democracy. In Cruft, R; Liao, SM & Renzo, M (Eds.), Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights, p. 588-607. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2015 How to Cite?
AbstractLiberty rights begin life as liberal rights, rights enjoyed by members of liberal societies, and come to be treated as human rights through extension to the international arena. Thus, liberty rights have dual identity and ambitions: as liberal rights, they create, legitimate, and intensify the desire characteristic of members of liberal societies for nothing less than self-determination; as human rights, they generalize what originally was a culturally particular desire into a universal human aspiration worthy of the strongest protection. This chapter considers how well liberty rights live up to these two ambitions and what lessons can be drawn if they fall short. By considering liberty rights in their double identity, it seeks to arrive at a critical appraisal of liberty rights as human rights that would be difficult to reach by attending to liberty rights as human rights alone.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/218454
ISBN

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorCi, J-
dc.date.accessioned2015-09-18T06:38:02Z-
dc.date.available2015-09-18T06:38:02Z-
dc.date.issued2015-
dc.identifier.citationLiberty Rights and the Limits of Liberal Democracy. In Cruft, R; Liao, SM & Renzo, M (Eds.), Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights, p. 588-607. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2015-
dc.identifier.isbn9780199688630-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/218454-
dc.description.abstractLiberty rights begin life as liberal rights, rights enjoyed by members of liberal societies, and come to be treated as human rights through extension to the international arena. Thus, liberty rights have dual identity and ambitions: as liberal rights, they create, legitimate, and intensify the desire characteristic of members of liberal societies for nothing less than self-determination; as human rights, they generalize what originally was a culturally particular desire into a universal human aspiration worthy of the strongest protection. This chapter considers how well liberty rights live up to these two ambitions and what lessons can be drawn if they fall short. By considering liberty rights in their double identity, it seeks to arrive at a critical appraisal of liberty rights as human rights that would be difficult to reach by attending to liberty rights as human rights alone.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherOxford University Press-
dc.relation.ispartofPhilosophical Foundations of Human Rights-
dc.titleLiberty Rights and the Limits of Liberal Democracy-
dc.typeBook_Chapter-
dc.identifier.emailCi, J: jiweici@hkucc.hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityCi, J=rp01218-
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199688623.003.0034-
dc.identifier.hkuros252383-
dc.identifier.spage588-
dc.identifier.epage607-
dc.publisher.placeOxford-

Export via OAI-PMH Interface in XML Formats


OR


Export to Other Non-XML Formats