The Proliferation of International Criminal Law Courts: Multiple Standards or Different Angles of International Criminal Law?

Abstract

Whereas in 1920 there was the solitary Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), today there is a multitude of international tribunals. The effect that this has on the impact of international human rights and international criminal law cannot be underestimated; although regional and ad hoc courts may result in more culturally relevant justice, they may also run the risk of unintentionally importing bias, profiling justice-seekers as in the Kunerac case, and may also result in 'forum shopping'.

This paper seeks to examine the extent to which international human right law is included and implemented in newly created courts, specifically the international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the International Criminal Court. This paper will discuss whether the same standard of human rights can or should be applied by each or whether justice is more adequately served for the individual or group depending on the court that hears the case. In instances of international criminal law, where can an individual or a group take their claim to redress injustices and criminal human rights failures? Moreover, has such a proliferation allowed a more relevant and precise method of judicial recourse for such parties or has it rather blurred the lines of what constitutes an international crime?

I intend to debate the implications of the different mandates given to the ICTR, ICTY and the ICC and the discerning inclusion of international human rights law. The mandates of each slightly differ in which acts are specifically criminalized and I intend to scrutinize the distinct differences in detail before discussing whether tailor-made mandates for international criminal courts amounts to moving the goalposts. I will also examine whether a by-product of the proliferation of international tribunals is not the selective rejection of international human rights law that is not applicable in each particular case. I will then discuss if this is the right choice to be made and if it is setting a dangerous precedent for future judicial processes. Given that international criminal law was intended to end acts carried out with impunity, is the proliferation of courts setting an example that crime may no longer be a crime depending on where it has been perpetrated?

This paper will conclude by finding that there indeed exists a need for a more uniform interpretation of international criminal law and that such an interpretation would ensure that the standard of international human right law is universally maintained in practice just as in theory. Whilst some may raise concerns about a Western hegemony and forced implementation of human rights values foreign to non-Western cultures and traditions, I surmise that by altering the parameters, thresholds and definitions of what constitutes an international crime would be a constant shift of legal values tantamount to a violation of the nullen crimen principle itself.