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Article: A class of differential games which admits a feedback solution with linear value functions

TitleA class of differential games which admits a feedback solution with linear value functions
Authors
Yeung, DWK
KeywordsGame theory
Differential games
Feedback Nash equilibrium
Dynamic programming
Management
Issue Date1998
PublisherElsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ejor
Citation
European Journal of Operational Research, 1998, v. 107 n. 3, p. 737-754 How to Cite?
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0377-2217(97)00093-3
AbstractThis paper presents a class of differential games which admits a feedback Nash equilibrium solution with linear value functions. An interesting feature is that not only may the equilibrium strategies be highly nonlinear, they may even assume a general structure instead of an explicit specification. A number of existing games are shown to be games belonging to this class of games. Two new applications — one in political support scrambling and one in common pool non-renewable resources extraction — are provided.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/224792
ISSN
0377-2217
2023 Impact Factor: 6.0
2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 2.321
ISI Accession Number ID
WOS:000074031900020

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorYeung, DWK-
dc.date.accessioned2016-04-15T02:51:56Z-
dc.date.available2016-04-15T02:51:56Z-
dc.date.issued1998-
dc.identifier.citationEuropean Journal of Operational Research, 1998, v. 107 n. 3, p. 737-754-
dc.identifier.issn0377-2217-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/224792-
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents a class of differential games which admits a feedback Nash equilibrium solution with linear value functions. An interesting feature is that not only may the equilibrium strategies be highly nonlinear, they may even assume a general structure instead of an explicit specification. A number of existing games are shown to be games belonging to this class of games. Two new applications — one in political support scrambling and one in common pool non-renewable resources extraction — are provided.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherElsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ejor-
dc.relation.ispartofEuropean Journal of Operational Research-
dc.rightsPosting accepted manuscript (postprint): © <year>. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/-
dc.subjectGame theory-
dc.subjectDifferential games-
dc.subjectFeedback Nash equilibrium-
dc.subjectDynamic programming-
dc.subjectManagement-
dc.titleA class of differential games which admits a feedback solution with linear value functions-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.emailYeung, DWK: dwkyeung@econ.hku.hk-
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/S0377-2217(97)00093-3-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-0032099786-
dc.identifier.hkuros35845-
dc.identifier.volume107-
dc.identifier.issue3-
dc.identifier.spage737-
dc.identifier.epage754-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000074031900020-
dc.publisher.placeAmsterdam, Holland-
dc.identifier.issnl0377-2217-

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