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- Publisher Website: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2011.11.007
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-84857044530
- WOS: WOS:000301406300007
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Article: Corporate suppliers and customers and accounting conservatism
Title | Corporate suppliers and customers and accounting conservatism |
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Authors | |
Keywords | Financial disclosures Suppliers Conservatism Customers |
Issue Date | 2012 |
Citation | Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2012, v. 53, n. 1-2, p. 115-135 How to Cite? |
Abstract | We argue that a firm's suppliers and customers prefer it to account more conservatively due to information asymmetry and these stakeholders' asymmetric payoffs with respect to the firm's performance. We predict that a firm meets this demand for accounting conservatism when suppliers or customers have bargaining advantages over it that enable them to dictate terms of trade or whether trade occurs at all. We show that when a firm's suppliers or customers have greater bargaining power, the firm recognizes losses more quickly. Our findings provide insights into how a firm's powerful suppliers and customers are associated with its accounting practices and also support the contracting explanation for accounting conservatism. © 2011. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/238077 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 5.4 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 8.337 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Hui, Kai Wai | - |
dc.contributor.author | Klasa, Sandy | - |
dc.contributor.author | Yeung, P. Eric | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-02-03T02:12:48Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2017-02-03T02:12:48Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2012 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2012, v. 53, n. 1-2, p. 115-135 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0165-4101 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/238077 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We argue that a firm's suppliers and customers prefer it to account more conservatively due to information asymmetry and these stakeholders' asymmetric payoffs with respect to the firm's performance. We predict that a firm meets this demand for accounting conservatism when suppliers or customers have bargaining advantages over it that enable them to dictate terms of trade or whether trade occurs at all. We show that when a firm's suppliers or customers have greater bargaining power, the firm recognizes losses more quickly. Our findings provide insights into how a firm's powerful suppliers and customers are associated with its accounting practices and also support the contracting explanation for accounting conservatism. © 2011. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Accounting and Economics | - |
dc.subject | Financial disclosures | - |
dc.subject | Suppliers | - |
dc.subject | Conservatism | - |
dc.subject | Customers | - |
dc.title | Corporate suppliers and customers and accounting conservatism | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jacceco.2011.11.007 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-84857044530 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 53 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 1-2 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 115 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 135 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000301406300007 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0165-4101 | - |