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- Publisher Website: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.09.005
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-79951516282
- WOS: WOS:000288309300002
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Article: Why do CFOs become involved in material accounting manipulations?
Title | Why do CFOs become involved in material accounting manipulations? |
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Authors | |
Keywords | CEO power CFO turnover Earnings quality Incentive compensation Accounting manipulation |
Issue Date | 2011 |
Citation | Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2011, v. 51, n. 1-2, p. 21-36 How to Cite? |
Abstract | This paper examines why CFOs become involved in material accounting manipulations. We find that while CFOs bear substantial legal costs when involved in accounting manipulations, these CFOs have similar equity incentives to the CFOs of matched non-manipulation firms. In contrast, CEOs of manipulation firms have higher equity incentives and more power than CEOs of matched firms. Taken together, our findings are consistent with the explanation that CFOs are involved in material accounting manipulations because they succumb to pressure from CEOs, rather than because they seek immediate personal financial benefit from their equity incentives. AAER content analysis reinforces this conclusion. © 2010 Elsevier B.V. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/257055 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 5.4 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 8.337 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Feng, Mei | - |
dc.contributor.author | Ge, Weili | - |
dc.contributor.author | Luo, Shuqing | - |
dc.contributor.author | Shevlin, Terry | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-07-24T08:58:42Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2018-07-24T08:58:42Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2011, v. 51, n. 1-2, p. 21-36 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0165-4101 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/257055 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper examines why CFOs become involved in material accounting manipulations. We find that while CFOs bear substantial legal costs when involved in accounting manipulations, these CFOs have similar equity incentives to the CFOs of matched non-manipulation firms. In contrast, CEOs of manipulation firms have higher equity incentives and more power than CEOs of matched firms. Taken together, our findings are consistent with the explanation that CFOs are involved in material accounting manipulations because they succumb to pressure from CEOs, rather than because they seek immediate personal financial benefit from their equity incentives. AAER content analysis reinforces this conclusion. © 2010 Elsevier B.V. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Accounting and Economics | - |
dc.subject | CEO power | - |
dc.subject | CFO turnover | - |
dc.subject | Earnings quality | - |
dc.subject | Incentive compensation | - |
dc.subject | Accounting manipulation | - |
dc.title | Why do CFOs become involved in material accounting manipulations? | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.09.005 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-79951516282 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 51 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 1-2 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 21 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 36 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000288309300002 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0165-4101 | - |