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Article: When do experts cheat and whom do they target?
Title | When do experts cheat and whom do they target? |
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Authors | |
Issue Date | 2005 |
Citation | RAND Journal of Economics, 2005, v. 36, n. 1, p. 113-130 How to Cite? |
Abstract | A credence good is a product or service whose usefulness or necessity is better known to the seller than to the buyer. This information asymmetry often persists even after the credence good is consumed. I propose two new theories of expert cheating, suggesting that identifiable heterogeneities among customers can cause expert sellers to defraud their customers. According to these theories, cheating arises as a substitute for price discrimination, and experts cheat selectively. For instance, experts target high-valuation and high-cost customers. Finally, selective cheating may damage the communication of useful information from customers to experts and result in inferior services. Copyright © 2005, RAND. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/269675 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 2.8 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 3.860 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Fong, Yuk Fai | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-04-30T01:49:16Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2019-04-30T01:49:16Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | RAND Journal of Economics, 2005, v. 36, n. 1, p. 113-130 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0741-6261 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/269675 | - |
dc.description.abstract | A credence good is a product or service whose usefulness or necessity is better known to the seller than to the buyer. This information asymmetry often persists even after the credence good is consumed. I propose two new theories of expert cheating, suggesting that identifiable heterogeneities among customers can cause expert sellers to defraud their customers. According to these theories, cheating arises as a substitute for price discrimination, and experts cheat selectively. For instance, experts target high-valuation and high-cost customers. Finally, selective cheating may damage the communication of useful information from customers to experts and result in inferior services. Copyright © 2005, RAND. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | RAND Journal of Economics | - |
dc.title | When do experts cheat and whom do they target? | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-21644439753 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 36 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 1 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 113 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 130 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000229848900007 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0741-6261 | - |