File Download
There are no files associated with this item.
Links for fulltext
(May Require Subscription)
- Publisher Website: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.02.007
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-77349095415
- WOS: WOS:000284394500018
- Find via
Supplementary
- Citations:
- Appears in Collections:
Article: Bidding in a possibly common-value auction
Title | Bidding in a possibly common-value auction |
---|---|
Authors | |
Keywords | Common value Second-price auction Model uncertainty |
Issue Date | 2010 |
Citation | Games and Economic Behavior, 2010, v. 70, n. 2, p. 494-501 How to Cite? |
Abstract | We analyze a second-price auction with two bidders in which only one of the bidders is informed as to whether the object is valued commonly. We show that any equilibrium strategy of the bidder who is uninformed must be part of an equilibrium when both bidders instead know that the auction is not common value, regardless of the way in which the values are different. We derive sufficient conditions for equilibrium existence. © 2010 Elsevier Inc. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/269690 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 1.0 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.522 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Fong, Yuk fai | - |
dc.contributor.author | Garrett, Daniel F. | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-04-30T01:49:18Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2019-04-30T01:49:18Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Games and Economic Behavior, 2010, v. 70, n. 2, p. 494-501 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0899-8256 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/269690 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We analyze a second-price auction with two bidders in which only one of the bidders is informed as to whether the object is valued commonly. We show that any equilibrium strategy of the bidder who is uninformed must be part of an equilibrium when both bidders instead know that the auction is not common value, regardless of the way in which the values are different. We derive sufficient conditions for equilibrium existence. © 2010 Elsevier Inc. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Games and Economic Behavior | - |
dc.subject | Common value | - |
dc.subject | Second-price auction | - |
dc.subject | Model uncertainty | - |
dc.title | Bidding in a possibly common-value auction | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.geb.2010.02.007 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-77349095415 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 70 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 2 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 494 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 501 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1090-2473 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000284394500018 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0899-8256 | - |