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- Publisher Website: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00659.x
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-82355192059
- WOS: WOS:000297456100004
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Article: Product quality, reputation, and market structure
Title | Product quality, reputation, and market structure |
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Authors | |
Issue Date | 2011 |
Citation | International Economic Review, 2011, v. 52, n. 4, p. 1059-1076 How to Cite? |
Abstract | In a repeated game in which firms simultaneously choose price and product quality, but quality is observed only after consumption takes place, equilibria exhibiting high quality may exist in oligopoly markets even when the low-quality one is a unique equilibrium outcome in monopoly and competitive markets. Oligopolists can sustain high quality through the threat of both a loss of reputation and a breakdown in tacit collusion. While we abstract from other reasons that market structure might affect product quality, we show that the inverted-U shaped relationship between feasible quality and market structure is robust to several generalizations of the model. © (2011) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/269700 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 1.5 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 2.350 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Dana, James D. | - |
dc.contributor.author | Fong, Yuk Fai | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-04-30T01:49:20Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2019-04-30T01:49:20Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | International Economic Review, 2011, v. 52, n. 4, p. 1059-1076 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0020-6598 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/269700 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In a repeated game in which firms simultaneously choose price and product quality, but quality is observed only after consumption takes place, equilibria exhibiting high quality may exist in oligopoly markets even when the low-quality one is a unique equilibrium outcome in monopoly and competitive markets. Oligopolists can sustain high quality through the threat of both a loss of reputation and a breakdown in tacit collusion. While we abstract from other reasons that market structure might affect product quality, we show that the inverted-U shaped relationship between feasible quality and market structure is robust to several generalizations of the model. © (2011) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | International Economic Review | - |
dc.title | Product quality, reputation, and market structure | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00659.x | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-82355192059 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 52 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 4 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 1059 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 1076 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1468-2354 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000297456100004 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0020-6598 | - |