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- Publisher Website: 10.1086/674132
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-84894592060
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Article: International politics and import diversification
Title | International politics and import diversification |
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Authors | |
Issue Date | 2013 |
Citation | Journal of Law and Economics, 2013, v. 56, n. 4, p. 1091-1121 How to Cite? |
Abstract | This paper examines how international politics affects trade in the absence of empires or wars.We first show that deterioration of relations between the United States and another country, measured by divergence in their United Nations General Assembly voting patterns, reduced U.S. imports from that country during 1962-2000. Though statistically significant, the magnitude of the effect of political distance on trade is small. Indeed, we show that except for petroleum and some chemical products, U.S. imports are not affected by international politics. American firms, however, diversify their oil imports significantly away from political opponents of the United States. Oil trade is often associated with backward vertical foreign direct investment that is subject to the expropriation risk. In contrast to the usual claim that oil is a strategic commodity, we provide suggestive evidence that trade in products when rents are appropriable is more likely to be affected by international politics. © 2013 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/273660 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 2.2 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.295 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Mityakov, Sergey | - |
dc.contributor.author | Tang, Heiwai | - |
dc.contributor.author | Tsui, Kevin K. | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-08-12T09:56:17Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2019-08-12T09:56:17Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2013 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Law and Economics, 2013, v. 56, n. 4, p. 1091-1121 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0022-2186 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/273660 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper examines how international politics affects trade in the absence of empires or wars.We first show that deterioration of relations between the United States and another country, measured by divergence in their United Nations General Assembly voting patterns, reduced U.S. imports from that country during 1962-2000. Though statistically significant, the magnitude of the effect of political distance on trade is small. Indeed, we show that except for petroleum and some chemical products, U.S. imports are not affected by international politics. American firms, however, diversify their oil imports significantly away from political opponents of the United States. Oil trade is often associated with backward vertical foreign direct investment that is subject to the expropriation risk. In contrast to the usual claim that oil is a strategic commodity, we provide suggestive evidence that trade in products when rents are appropriable is more likely to be affected by international politics. © 2013 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Law and Economics | - |
dc.title | International politics and import diversification | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1086/674132 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-84894592060 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 56 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 4 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 1091 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 1121 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000331799400008 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0022-2186 | - |