On the normative foundations of critical theory

Abstract

If critical theory is meant to be the “ruthless criticism of all that exists” (Adorno), on what basis can critical theory ground its evaluative claims without being self-defeating? Is there a normative ground on which critique can stand? For Jürgen Habermas, critical theory has a ground embedded in the normative logic of communicative interactions. On the contrary, for Michel Foucault, critique can stand on no ground: critique is the refusal of any given ground and the opening up of possibilities for “thinking and acting differently.” In this dissertation, I will show that a reconsideration of the Habermas-Foucault debate can be helpful for elucidating the normative foundations and the tasks of critical theory. Given the incommensurability of Habermas’s and Foucault’s positions, this elucidation aims to forge a non-assimilatory synthesis between them. Juxtaposing Habermas’s emphasis on moral universality and the participant’s perspective with Foucault’s focus on objectivating problematization, I will suggest that, taken in isolation, their critical theories are inadequate, and a ‘synthesis’ of their respective positions can be found in a “critical conception of participatory normativity.” This conception of normativity, which is in some sense outlined in the critical theories of Theodor Adorno and Judith Butler, will offer a way of understanding the normative foundations of critical theory.