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Book Chapter: The Social Psychology of Financial Regulatory Governance

TitleThe Social Psychology of Financial Regulatory Governance
Authors
Issue Date2019
PublisherCambridge University Press.
Citation
The Social Psychology of Financial Regulatory Governance. In Avgouleas, E, Donald, DC (Eds.), The Political Economy of Financial Regulation, p. 160-188. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2019 How to Cite?
AbstractThis Chapter contributes to addressing a fundamental question: how do institutions, in general, and financial regulators, in particular, “think”? To this end, the analytical tools of social psychology are applied to the regulatory framework for financial services in the European Union. The paper reveals a relationship between the constitutional status of regulatory agencies and dominant group dynamics as they have been typified in the literature of social psychology. Such a relationship indicates that institutional structures might favour the emergence of specific behavioural patterns and modus operandi within regulatory bodies. Furthermore, the identification of dominant group dynamics paves the way to a more profound understanding of conflictual dynamics within groups of decision-makers. Such a novel analytical map is, then, applied to the context of the ongoing debate as to whether, following Brexit, the decision-making process of EU regulators is poised to be marked by a divide separating eurozone and non-eurozone Member States.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/275597
ISBN
SSRN
Series/Report no.International corporate law and financial market regulation

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorCastellano, GGF-
dc.contributor.authorHelleringer, GH-
dc.date.accessioned2019-09-10T02:45:42Z-
dc.date.available2019-09-10T02:45:42Z-
dc.date.issued2019-
dc.identifier.citationThe Social Psychology of Financial Regulatory Governance. In Avgouleas, E, Donald, DC (Eds.), The Political Economy of Financial Regulation, p. 160-188. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2019-
dc.identifier.isbn9781108612821-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/275597-
dc.description.abstractThis Chapter contributes to addressing a fundamental question: how do institutions, in general, and financial regulators, in particular, “think”? To this end, the analytical tools of social psychology are applied to the regulatory framework for financial services in the European Union. The paper reveals a relationship between the constitutional status of regulatory agencies and dominant group dynamics as they have been typified in the literature of social psychology. Such a relationship indicates that institutional structures might favour the emergence of specific behavioural patterns and modus operandi within regulatory bodies. Furthermore, the identification of dominant group dynamics paves the way to a more profound understanding of conflictual dynamics within groups of decision-makers. Such a novel analytical map is, then, applied to the context of the ongoing debate as to whether, following Brexit, the decision-making process of EU regulators is poised to be marked by a divide separating eurozone and non-eurozone Member States.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherCambridge University Press.-
dc.relation.ispartofThe Political Economy of Financial Regulation-
dc.relation.ispartofseriesInternational corporate law and financial market regulation-
dc.rightsThis material has been published in revised form in The Political Economy of Financial Regulation edited by Emilios Avgouleas and David C. Donald, https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108612821.007. This version is free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution or re-use. © Cambridge University Press.-
dc.titleThe Social Psychology of Financial Regulatory Governance-
dc.typeBook_Chapter-
dc.identifier.emailCastellano, GGF: g.castellano@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityCastellano, GGF=rp02415-
dc.description.naturepostprint-
dc.identifier.doi10.1017/9781108612821.007-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-85098029752-
dc.identifier.hkuros303623-
dc.identifier.spage160-
dc.identifier.epage188-
dc.publisher.placeCambridge, UK-
dc.identifier.ssrn3402265-
dc.identifier.hkulrp2020/011-

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