Rethinking the demandingness objection in ethics

Abstract

This thesis can be seen as both an introduction and an examination of the demandingness objection in ethics. Unlike many other discussions in the literature, which aim to avoid the objection by introducing new empirical evidence, or by defending or amending the targeted theories and principles, this thesis has a primary focus on (the difficulty of) the formulation and foundation of the allegedly compelling demandingness objection. After introducing the main idea, history, some new developments, and the variety of the presentations of the demandingness objection in the literature, I propose what I call the Schematic Demandingness Objection (SDO) and consider some standard replies to it. Next, I investigate the question of what moral demandingness is. I explore two recent attempts which aim to shed light on this matter, namely, Chappell’s willpower account and McElwee’s hybrid view, both of which discuss the relevance of difficulty. I examine their arguments in detail and argue that neither is plausible. With this in mind, I point out that there are actually two different senses of demandingness—being demanding in a practical sense, and being demanding in a moral sense. In the second sense, many objections that are often bundled with the problem of moral demandingness could also be understood as demandingness objections. However, I suggest that we should stick with the more common and traditional view—the welfarist understanding of moral demandingness. I then attempt to provide an examination of the welfarist demandingness objection and point out some of its difficulties. I first introduce what could be called the intuitive version of the demandingness objection, and argue that it is inadequate and can hardly be decisive. Next, I discuss Sobel’s Impotence Argument which reveals the non-self-standing nature of the welfarist demandingness objection, and I contend that his argument is effective when we consider DO as DOC (demandingness objection particularly against consequentialism). I continue to point out that the proponents of the welfarist demandingness objection should also realize that their focus is actually almost only on principles of beneficence (DOPB), and the tension between raising forceful moral complaints based on welfare costs and the hope of directing such complaints against only principles of beneficence is difficult to resolve. Next, I continue to argue that there are still further problems for a welfarist demandingness objection, particularly against principles of beneficence. I discuss the problem of finding a proper baseline of the assessment of demandingness. I examine two candidates, namely, the baseline of factual status quo and the normative baseline, and argue that neither is plausible. Finally, I discuss the charge that some moral theories or principles are “unreasonably demanding”, and argue that this construal of the objection might not be particularly relevant here. I conclude that it is at least as questionable to believe in as it is to challenge or dispute the force of the demandingness objection. (472 words)