File Download

There are no files associated with this item.

  Links for fulltext
     (May Require Subscription)

Book Chapter: Central Banks’ New Macroprudential Consensus

TitleCentral Banks’ New Macroprudential Consensus
Authors
Keywordsprudential regulation
monetary stability
financial stability
macroprudential policy
financial regulatory structure
Issue Date2019
PublisherOxford University Press.
Citation
Central Banks’ New Macroprudential Consensus. In Mays, DG. Siklos, PL and Sturm, J (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Central Banking, p. 482-502. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019 How to Cite?
AbstractThe traditional central bank consensus is designed around two mandates: monetary and financial stability. Following the Great Stagflation of the 1970s, central banks’ policy objective became biased toward maintaining a low and stable rate of inflation or monetary stability. This was based on the presumption that a stable price level would achieve both monetary and financial system stability. The deemphasis on financial stability remained until the global financial crisis, when the prevailing consensus was exposed for being thoroughly inadequate. A new consensus has emerged that broadens central banks’ financial stability mandate to include macroprudential supervision. This chapter analyzes the new central bank consensus, how this has resulted in institutional redesign, and the effectiveness of discharging postcrisis financial and monetary stability mandates.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/279935
ISBN
Series/Report no.Oxford Handbooks

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorTaylor, MW-
dc.contributor.authorArner, DW-
dc.contributor.authorGibson, EC-
dc.date.accessioned2019-12-23T08:23:54Z-
dc.date.available2019-12-23T08:23:54Z-
dc.date.issued2019-
dc.identifier.citationCentral Banks’ New Macroprudential Consensus. In Mays, DG. Siklos, PL and Sturm, J (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Central Banking, p. 482-502. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019-
dc.identifier.isbn9780190626198-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/279935-
dc.description.abstractThe traditional central bank consensus is designed around two mandates: monetary and financial stability. Following the Great Stagflation of the 1970s, central banks’ policy objective became biased toward maintaining a low and stable rate of inflation or monetary stability. This was based on the presumption that a stable price level would achieve both monetary and financial system stability. The deemphasis on financial stability remained until the global financial crisis, when the prevailing consensus was exposed for being thoroughly inadequate. A new consensus has emerged that broadens central banks’ financial stability mandate to include macroprudential supervision. This chapter analyzes the new central bank consensus, how this has resulted in institutional redesign, and the effectiveness of discharging postcrisis financial and monetary stability mandates.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherOxford University Press.-
dc.relation.ispartofThe Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Central Banking-
dc.relation.ispartofseriesOxford Handbooks-
dc.subjectprudential regulation-
dc.subjectmonetary stability-
dc.subjectfinancial stability-
dc.subjectmacroprudential policy-
dc.subjectfinancial regulatory structure-
dc.titleCentral Banks’ New Macroprudential Consensus-
dc.typeBook_Chapter-
dc.identifier.emailArner, DW: douglas.arner@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.emailGibson, EC: egibson8@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityArner, DW=rp01237-
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190626198.013.16-
dc.identifier.hkuros308793-
dc.identifier.spage482-
dc.identifier.epage502-
dc.publisher.placeNew York-

Export via OAI-PMH Interface in XML Formats


OR


Export to Other Non-XML Formats