The liberal reification of freedom

Abstract

The tension between ethics and politics is particularly pressing with regard to the concept of freedom. As a modern value, freedom arises out of ethical concerns; but in order not to destabilize politics, ethics must remain reasonably pluralistic. This means that the concept of freedom must be shaped in the interest of liberal politics. This process is what I shall call the reification of freedom. What remains ethically possible under such a reified notion of freedom depends on how well any conception of the good life can meet the demands of liberal freedom. Given liberalism’s privileged treatment of the capitalist economy, I will consider, both historically and conceptually, how freedom must be understood in this most impersonal relationship of practical life (Weber) that is impervious to ethical considerations. By default, markets are relieved from ethical demands and generate ethical homogenization to prevent the endless accumulation of capital from stagnating. This makes it possible to enjoy economic freedom without treating freedom as an intrinsic value and without considering its ethical basis. If it can be shown that the liberal reification and the particular economic interests behind it are responsible for determining the content of freedom, the question arises what role democracy is left with to play in our valorization of freedom. I will address this question through taking a look at democracy’s ambivalent relationship to the liberal capitalist hegemony. In order to redeem the ethical nature of freedom and to give more weight to pluralism than to reasonableness, we must treat freedom as an essentially contested concept. As such, it must remain antithetical to its empirical origin in society. I will argue that freedom remains an ethically open concept only if it remains in opposition to the existing political and economic order, which, at the same time, is freedom’s empirical condition as a value.