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- Publisher Website: 10.1109/TrustCom/BigDataSE.2019.00084
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-85075144829
- WOS: WOS:000567324100071
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Conference Paper: Constructing strong designated verifier signatures from key encapsulation mechanisms
Title | Constructing strong designated verifier signatures from key encapsulation mechanisms |
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Authors | |
Keywords | Signature Post Quantum KEM Standard Model SDVS |
Issue Date | 2019 |
Citation | Proceedings - 2019 18th IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications/13th IEEE International Conference on Big Data Science and Engineering, TrustCom/BigDataSE 2019, 2019, p. 586-593 How to Cite? |
Abstract | © 2019 IEEE. A designated verifier signature (DVS) allows a signer to convince a verifier that a message has been endorsed in a way that the conviction cannot be transferred to any third party. This is achieved by the property that the signature can be generated by one of them. Since DVS is publicly verifiable, a valid DVS implies that the signature must be created by either the signer or the verifier. To enhance privacy of signers' identity, a strong DVS (SDVS) disallows public verification. In this paper, we investigate various aspects of SDVS with making two contributions. Firstly, we consider SDVS in the multi-user setting and propose two strengthened models, namely, multi-user and multi-user+. To illustrate the significance of our models, we show that it is possible to forge an SDVS when the attacker is given signatures from an honest signer to multiple dishonest verifiers. Secondly, we give a generic construction of SDVS from Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) and Pseudorandom Function (PRF) in the standard model. Our generic construction is secure in the multi-user setting if the underlying KEM and PRF are secure. We also give instantiations based on DDH and LWE assumptions respectively. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/280714 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Gong, Borui | - |
dc.contributor.author | Au, Man Ho | - |
dc.contributor.author | Xue, Haiyang | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-02-17T14:34:45Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-02-17T14:34:45Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2019 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Proceedings - 2019 18th IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications/13th IEEE International Conference on Big Data Science and Engineering, TrustCom/BigDataSE 2019, 2019, p. 586-593 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/280714 | - |
dc.description.abstract | © 2019 IEEE. A designated verifier signature (DVS) allows a signer to convince a verifier that a message has been endorsed in a way that the conviction cannot be transferred to any third party. This is achieved by the property that the signature can be generated by one of them. Since DVS is publicly verifiable, a valid DVS implies that the signature must be created by either the signer or the verifier. To enhance privacy of signers' identity, a strong DVS (SDVS) disallows public verification. In this paper, we investigate various aspects of SDVS with making two contributions. Firstly, we consider SDVS in the multi-user setting and propose two strengthened models, namely, multi-user and multi-user+. To illustrate the significance of our models, we show that it is possible to forge an SDVS when the attacker is given signatures from an honest signer to multiple dishonest verifiers. Secondly, we give a generic construction of SDVS from Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) and Pseudorandom Function (PRF) in the standard model. Our generic construction is secure in the multi-user setting if the underlying KEM and PRF are secure. We also give instantiations based on DDH and LWE assumptions respectively. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Proceedings - 2019 18th IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications/13th IEEE International Conference on Big Data Science and Engineering, TrustCom/BigDataSE 2019 | - |
dc.subject | Signature | - |
dc.subject | Post Quantum | - |
dc.subject | KEM | - |
dc.subject | Standard Model | - |
dc.subject | SDVS | - |
dc.title | Constructing strong designated verifier signatures from key encapsulation mechanisms | - |
dc.type | Conference_Paper | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1109/TrustCom/BigDataSE.2019.00084 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85075144829 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 586 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 593 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000567324100071 | - |