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Article: Remote data possession checking with enhanced security for cloud storage

TitleRemote data possession checking with enhanced security for cloud storage
Authors
KeywordsProvable security
Data integrity
Cloud storage
Algebraic signature
Issue Date2015
Citation
Future Generation Computer Systems, 2015, v. 52, p. 77-85 How to Cite?
Abstract© 2014 Elsevier B.V. Abstract Cloud storage allows users to enjoy the on-demand and high quality data storage services without the load of local data maintenance. However, the cloud server providers are not fully trusted. Whether the data over cloud servers are intact becomes a major concern of data owners. To offer cloud users with the capacity of data integrity verification, recently, Chen proposed a remote data possession checking (RDPC) protocol from algebraic signatures which achieves many desirable features such as high efficiency, short length of challenges and responses, non-block verification. Unfortunately, in this paper, we find that the protocol is vulnerable to replay attack and deletion attack launched by a dishonest server. Specifically, the server can deceive the users to believe that their data are well hold by replaying a previous evidence or re-constructing the deleted data blocks from the corresponding tags in the integrity checking process, while their data have been partially discarded in fact. Then, we present an improved scheme to fix the security flaws of the original protocol. Both the theoretical analysis and the implementation results show that the improvement is secure and practical.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/280830
ISSN
2023 Impact Factor: 6.2
2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.946
ISI Accession Number ID

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorYu, Yong-
dc.contributor.authorZhang, Yafang-
dc.contributor.authorNi, Jianbing-
dc.contributor.authorAu, Man Ho-
dc.contributor.authorChen, Lanxiang-
dc.contributor.authorLiu, Hongyu-
dc.date.accessioned2020-02-17T14:35:03Z-
dc.date.available2020-02-17T14:35:03Z-
dc.date.issued2015-
dc.identifier.citationFuture Generation Computer Systems, 2015, v. 52, p. 77-85-
dc.identifier.issn0167-739X-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/280830-
dc.description.abstract© 2014 Elsevier B.V. Abstract Cloud storage allows users to enjoy the on-demand and high quality data storage services without the load of local data maintenance. However, the cloud server providers are not fully trusted. Whether the data over cloud servers are intact becomes a major concern of data owners. To offer cloud users with the capacity of data integrity verification, recently, Chen proposed a remote data possession checking (RDPC) protocol from algebraic signatures which achieves many desirable features such as high efficiency, short length of challenges and responses, non-block verification. Unfortunately, in this paper, we find that the protocol is vulnerable to replay attack and deletion attack launched by a dishonest server. Specifically, the server can deceive the users to believe that their data are well hold by replaying a previous evidence or re-constructing the deleted data blocks from the corresponding tags in the integrity checking process, while their data have been partially discarded in fact. Then, we present an improved scheme to fix the security flaws of the original protocol. Both the theoretical analysis and the implementation results show that the improvement is secure and practical.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relation.ispartofFuture Generation Computer Systems-
dc.subjectProvable security-
dc.subjectData integrity-
dc.subjectCloud storage-
dc.subjectAlgebraic signature-
dc.titleRemote data possession checking with enhanced security for cloud storage-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.future.2014.10.006-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-84938057153-
dc.identifier.volume52-
dc.identifier.spage77-
dc.identifier.epage85-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000358807200009-
dc.identifier.issnl0167-739X-

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