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Conference Paper: On the parking sharing problem in a linear monocentric city
Title | On the parking sharing problem in a linear monocentric city |
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Authors | |
Keywords | Parking Sharing Parking Choice Equilibrium Two-Sided Market Parking Location |
Issue Date | 2018 |
Citation | Transportation Systems in the Connected Era - Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference of Hong Kong Society for Transportation Studies, HKSTS 2018, 2018, p. 745-752 How to Cite? |
Abstract | © 2018 Transportation Systems in the Connected Era - Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference of Hong Kong Society for Transportation Studies, HKSTS 2018. All rights reserved. This study models the parking sharing problem in a linear monocentric city, where private parking owners can share their vacant spaces to parking users via an e-platform, and then examines the platform operator's pricing strategies for revenue-maximization or social-cost-minimization. The model considers the spatial dimension of parking that both public curbside spaces and private ones potentially available for sharing are distributed along the linear travel corridor. On the supply side, private parking owners can rent or “sell the right-of-use” of their spaces to the platform based on the rent they can receive and the inconvenience they would suffer by sharing. On the demand side, travelers make their parking choices of space type (curbside or shared) and location (distance from the city center) under given parking capacities and prices. Properties of the resulting parking choice equilibrium are briefly discussed. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/281386 |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Liu, Wei | - |
dc.contributor.author | Zhang, Fangni | - |
dc.contributor.author | Wang, Xiaolei | - |
dc.contributor.author | Shao, Chaoyi | - |
dc.contributor.author | Yang, Hai | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-03-13T10:37:44Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-03-13T10:37:44Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2018 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Transportation Systems in the Connected Era - Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference of Hong Kong Society for Transportation Studies, HKSTS 2018, 2018, p. 745-752 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/281386 | - |
dc.description.abstract | © 2018 Transportation Systems in the Connected Era - Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference of Hong Kong Society for Transportation Studies, HKSTS 2018. All rights reserved. This study models the parking sharing problem in a linear monocentric city, where private parking owners can share their vacant spaces to parking users via an e-platform, and then examines the platform operator's pricing strategies for revenue-maximization or social-cost-minimization. The model considers the spatial dimension of parking that both public curbside spaces and private ones potentially available for sharing are distributed along the linear travel corridor. On the supply side, private parking owners can rent or “sell the right-of-use” of their spaces to the platform based on the rent they can receive and the inconvenience they would suffer by sharing. On the demand side, travelers make their parking choices of space type (curbside or shared) and location (distance from the city center) under given parking capacities and prices. Properties of the resulting parking choice equilibrium are briefly discussed. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Transportation Systems in the Connected Era - Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference of Hong Kong Society for Transportation Studies, HKSTS 2018 | - |
dc.subject | Parking Sharing | - |
dc.subject | Parking Choice Equilibrium | - |
dc.subject | Two-Sided Market | - |
dc.subject | Parking Location | - |
dc.title | On the parking sharing problem in a linear monocentric city | - |
dc.type | Conference_Paper | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85064642443 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 745 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 752 | - |