A novel permit scheme for managing parking competition and bottleneck congestion

Abstract

Morning commuters may have to depart from home earlier to secure a parking space when parking supply in the city center is insufficient. Recent studies show that parking reservations can reduce highway congestion and deadweight loss of parking competition simultaneously. This study develops a novel tradable parking permit scheme to realize or implement parking reservations when commuters are either homogeneous or heterogeneous in their values of time. It is found that an expirable parking permit scheme with an infinite number of steps, i.e., the ideal-scheme, is superior to a time-varying pricing scheme in the sense that designing a permit scheme does not require commuters' value of time information and the performance of the scheme is robust to the variation of commuters' value of time. Although it is impractical to implement the ideal-scheme with an infinite number of steps, the efficiency loss of a permit scheme with finite steps can be bounded in both cases of homogeneous and heterogeneous commuters. Moreover, considering the permit scheme may lead to an undesirable benefit distribution among commuters, we propose an equal cost-reduction distribution of parking permits where auto commuters with higher value of time will receive fewer permits. © 2014 Elsevier Ltd.