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- Publisher Website: 10.1007/978-3-030-36938-5_8
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Conference Paper: Strong Known Related-Key Attacks and the Security of ECDSA
Title | Strong Known Related-Key Attacks and the Security of ECDSA |
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Authors | |
Keywords | Blockchain ECDSA Related-key attack Schnorr signature |
Issue Date | 2019 |
Publisher | Springer. The Proceedings' web site is located at https://link.springer.com/conference/nss |
Citation | 13th International Conference on Network and System Security (NSS 2019), Sapporo, Japan, December 15–18, 2019, Proceedings. In Liu, JK & Huang, X (eds.). Network and System Security, p. 130-145. Cham: Springer, 2019 How to Cite? |
Abstract | The classical related-key attack (RKA) model fails to capture some real world systems that introduce related secret keys by design. In some blockchain applications, public keys are generated in a way that the corresponding secret keys are additively related. The difference between two secret keys are known to some third parties. In this paper, we propose the Strong Known Related-Key Attack (Strong KRKA) model to capture this scenario. ECDSA has long been considered to be inferior to Schnorr signature in terms of security, in sprite of its popularity in the standardization and real world usage. In this paper we show that Schnorr signature is not secure in the Strong KRKA model. In contrast, the security of ECDSA in the Strong KRKA model can be reduced to the unforgeability of ECDSA under chosen message attack. This theoretical result gives a different view of the relative security level of ECDSA and Schnorr, since ECDSA was developed in 1992. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/282972 |
ISBN | |
ISSN | 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.606 |
ISI Accession Number ID | |
Series/Report no. | Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS) ; v. 11928 |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Yuen, TH | - |
dc.contributor.author | Yiu, SM | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-06-05T06:23:39Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-06-05T06:23:39Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2019 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | 13th International Conference on Network and System Security (NSS 2019), Sapporo, Japan, December 15–18, 2019, Proceedings. In Liu, JK & Huang, X (eds.). Network and System Security, p. 130-145. Cham: Springer, 2019 | - |
dc.identifier.isbn | 9783030369385 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0302-9743 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/282972 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The classical related-key attack (RKA) model fails to capture some real world systems that introduce related secret keys by design. In some blockchain applications, public keys are generated in a way that the corresponding secret keys are additively related. The difference between two secret keys are known to some third parties. In this paper, we propose the Strong Known Related-Key Attack (Strong KRKA) model to capture this scenario. ECDSA has long been considered to be inferior to Schnorr signature in terms of security, in sprite of its popularity in the standardization and real world usage. In this paper we show that Schnorr signature is not secure in the Strong KRKA model. In contrast, the security of ECDSA in the Strong KRKA model can be reduced to the unforgeability of ECDSA under chosen message attack. This theoretical result gives a different view of the relative security level of ECDSA and Schnorr, since ECDSA was developed in 1992. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Springer. The Proceedings' web site is located at https://link.springer.com/conference/nss | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | 13th International Conference on Network and System Security (NSS 2019) | - |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS) ; v. 11928 | - |
dc.subject | Blockchain | - |
dc.subject | ECDSA | - |
dc.subject | Related-key attack | - |
dc.subject | Schnorr signature | - |
dc.title | Strong Known Related-Key Attacks and the Security of ECDSA | - |
dc.type | Conference_Paper | - |
dc.identifier.email | Yuen, TH: johnyuen@hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.email | Yiu, SM: smyiu@cs.hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.authority | Yuen, TH=rp02426 | - |
dc.identifier.authority | Yiu, SM=rp00207 | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/978-3-030-36938-5_8 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85076995616 | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 310225 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 11928 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 130 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 145 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1611-3349 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000724601900008 | - |
dc.publisher.place | Cham | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0302-9743 | - |