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- Publisher Website: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2020.03.002
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-85083692398
- WOS: WOS:000542210000006
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Article: Disguised Corruption: Evidence from Consumer Credit in China
Title | Disguised Corruption: Evidence from Consumer Credit in China |
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Authors | |
Keywords | Corruption Credit cards Credit Debt Household finance Government Bureaucrats Banking Political connections China |
Issue Date | 2020 |
Publisher | Elsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jfec |
Citation | Journal of Financial Economics, 2020, v. 137 n. 2, p. 430-450 How to Cite? |
Abstract | Using a comprehensive sample of credit card data from a leading Chinese bank, we show that government bureaucrats receive 16% higher credit lines than non-bureaucrats with similar income and demographics, but their accounts experience a significantly higher likelihood of delinquency and debt forgiveness. Regions associated with greater credit provision to bureaucrats open more branches and receive more deposits from the local government. After staggered corruption crackdowns of provincial-level political officials, the new credit cards originated to bureaucrats in exposed regions do not enjoy a credit line premium, and bureaucrats’ delinquency and reinstatement rates are similar to those of non-bureaucrats. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/283985 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 10.4 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 13.655 |
SSRN | |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Agarwal, S | - |
dc.contributor.author | Qian, W | - |
dc.contributor.author | Seru, A | - |
dc.contributor.author | Zhang, J | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-07-20T05:55:06Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-07-20T05:55:06Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2020 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Financial Economics, 2020, v. 137 n. 2, p. 430-450 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0304-405X | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/283985 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Using a comprehensive sample of credit card data from a leading Chinese bank, we show that government bureaucrats receive 16% higher credit lines than non-bureaucrats with similar income and demographics, but their accounts experience a significantly higher likelihood of delinquency and debt forgiveness. Regions associated with greater credit provision to bureaucrats open more branches and receive more deposits from the local government. After staggered corruption crackdowns of provincial-level political officials, the new credit cards originated to bureaucrats in exposed regions do not enjoy a credit line premium, and bureaucrats’ delinquency and reinstatement rates are similar to those of non-bureaucrats. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Elsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jfec | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Financial Economics | - |
dc.subject | Corruption | - |
dc.subject | Credit cards | - |
dc.subject | Credit | - |
dc.subject | Debt | - |
dc.subject | Household finance | - |
dc.subject | Government | - |
dc.subject | Bureaucrats | - |
dc.subject | Banking | - |
dc.subject | Political connections | - |
dc.subject | China | - |
dc.title | Disguised Corruption: Evidence from Consumer Credit in China | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.email | Zhang, J: zhangj1@HKUCC-COM.hku.hk | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jfineco.2020.03.002 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85083692398 | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 310796 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 137 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 2 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 430 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 450 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000542210000006 | - |
dc.publisher.place | Netherlands | - |
dc.identifier.ssrn | 3152892 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0304-405X | - |