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- Publisher Website: 10.1103/PhysRevA.77.052327
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Article: Quantum key distribution with an unknown and untrusted source
Title | Quantum key distribution with an unknown and untrusted source |
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Authors | |
Issue Date | 2008 |
Citation | Physical Review A - Atomic, Molecular, and Optical Physics, 2008, v. 77, n. 5, article no. 052327 How to Cite? |
Abstract | The security of a standard bidirectional "plug-and-play" quantum key distribution (QKD) system has been an open question for a long time. This is mainly because its source is equivalently controlled by an eavesdropper, which means the source is unknown and untrusted. Qualitative discussion on this subject has been made previously. In this paper, we solve this question directly by presenting the quantitative security analysis on a general class of QKD protocols whose sources are unknown and untrusted. The securities of standard Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol, weak+vacuum decoy state protocol, and one-decoy state protocol, with unknown and untrusted sources are rigorously proved. We derive rigorous lower bounds to the secure key generation rates of the above three protocols. Our numerical simulation results show that QKD with an untrusted source gives a key generation rate that is close to that with a trusted source. © 2008 The American Physical Society. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/285622 |
ISSN | 2014 Impact Factor: 2.808 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Zhao, Yi | - |
dc.contributor.author | Qi, Bing | - |
dc.contributor.author | Lo, Hoi Kwong | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-08-18T04:56:13Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-08-18T04:56:13Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Physical Review A - Atomic, Molecular, and Optical Physics, 2008, v. 77, n. 5, article no. 052327 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1050-2947 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/285622 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The security of a standard bidirectional "plug-and-play" quantum key distribution (QKD) system has been an open question for a long time. This is mainly because its source is equivalently controlled by an eavesdropper, which means the source is unknown and untrusted. Qualitative discussion on this subject has been made previously. In this paper, we solve this question directly by presenting the quantitative security analysis on a general class of QKD protocols whose sources are unknown and untrusted. The securities of standard Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol, weak+vacuum decoy state protocol, and one-decoy state protocol, with unknown and untrusted sources are rigorously proved. We derive rigorous lower bounds to the secure key generation rates of the above three protocols. Our numerical simulation results show that QKD with an untrusted source gives a key generation rate that is close to that with a trusted source. © 2008 The American Physical Society. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Physical Review A - Atomic, Molecular, and Optical Physics | - |
dc.title | Quantum key distribution with an unknown and untrusted source | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1103/PhysRevA.77.052327 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-44149092178 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 77 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 5 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | article no. 052327 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | article no. 052327 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1094-1622 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000257023900065 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 1050-2947 | - |