Experimental demonstration of phase-remapping attack in a practical quantum key distribution system

Abstract

Quantum key distribution (QKD) can, in principle, provide unconditional security based on the fundamental laws of physics. Unfortunately, a practical QKD system may contain overlooked imperfections and may thus violate some of the assumptions in the security proofs of QKD. It is important to explore these assumptions. One key assumption is that the sender (Alice) can prepare the required quantum states without errors. However, such an assumption may be violated in a practical QKD system. In this paper, we perform a proof-of-principle experiment to demonstrate a technically feasible 'interceptand-resend' attack that exploits such a security loophole in a commercial 'plug & play' QKD system. The resulting quantum bit error rate is 19.7%, which is substantially lower than the well-known 25% error rate for an intercept-andresend attack in BB84. The attack we utilize is the phase-remapping attack (Fung et al 2007 Phys. Rev. A 75 32314) proposed by our group. © IOP Publishing Ltd and Deutsche Physikalische Gesellschaft.