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- Publisher Website: 10.1103/PhysRevLett.108.130503
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-84859361763
- WOS: WOS:000302173000005
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Article: Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution
Title | Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution |
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Authors | |
Issue Date | 2012 |
Citation | Physical Review Letters, 2012, v. 108, n. 13, article no. 130503 How to Cite? |
Abstract | How to remove detector side channel attacks has been a notoriously hard problem in quantum cryptography. Here, we propose a simple solution to this problem-measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (QKD). It not only removes all detector side channels, but also doubles the secure distance with conventional lasers. Our proposal can be implemented with standard optical components with low detection efficiency and highly lossy channels. In contrast to the previous solution of full device independent QKD, the realization of our idea does not require detectors of near unity detection efficiency in combination with a qubit amplifier (based on teleportation) or a quantum nondemolition measurement of the number of photons in a pulse. Furthermore, its key generation rate is many orders of magnitude higher than that based on full device independent QKD. The results show that long-distance quantum cryptography over say 200km will remain secure even with seriously flawed detectors. © 2012 American Physical Society. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/285688 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 8.1 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 3.040 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Lo, Hoi Kwong | - |
dc.contributor.author | Curty, Marcos | - |
dc.contributor.author | Qi, Bing | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-08-18T04:56:23Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-08-18T04:56:23Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2012 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Physical Review Letters, 2012, v. 108, n. 13, article no. 130503 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0031-9007 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/285688 | - |
dc.description.abstract | How to remove detector side channel attacks has been a notoriously hard problem in quantum cryptography. Here, we propose a simple solution to this problem-measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (QKD). It not only removes all detector side channels, but also doubles the secure distance with conventional lasers. Our proposal can be implemented with standard optical components with low detection efficiency and highly lossy channels. In contrast to the previous solution of full device independent QKD, the realization of our idea does not require detectors of near unity detection efficiency in combination with a qubit amplifier (based on teleportation) or a quantum nondemolition measurement of the number of photons in a pulse. Furthermore, its key generation rate is many orders of magnitude higher than that based on full device independent QKD. The results show that long-distance quantum cryptography over say 200km will remain secure even with seriously flawed detectors. © 2012 American Physical Society. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Physical Review Letters | - |
dc.title | Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1103/PhysRevLett.108.130503 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-84859361763 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 108 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 13 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | article no. 130503 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | article no. 130503 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1079-7114 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000302173000005 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0031-9007 | - |