File Download
There are no files associated with this item.
Links for fulltext
(May Require Subscription)
- Publisher Website: 10.1017/S1744133120000249
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-85092240093
- PMID: 32744214
- WOS: WOS:000659521800006
- Find via
Supplementary
- Citations:
- Appears in Collections:
Article: The constitutional economics of the World Health Organization
Title | The constitutional economics of the World Health Organization |
---|---|
Authors | |
Keywords | Constitutional economics COVID-19 global health law World Health Organization |
Issue Date | 2020 |
Publisher | Cambridge University Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=HEP |
Citation | Health Economics, Policy and Law, 2020, Epub 2020-07-03 How to Cite? |
Abstract | This paper brings a constitutional economics perspective to bear on the World Health Organization (WHO), the flagship United Nations intergovernmental health organisation, which is obligated by its Constitution to achieve ‘the highest possible level of health’ for the world's peoples. The WHO has in the seven decades of its existence used its formidable legislative powers only sparingly. It has been widely chided for being weak in regional coordination and unresponsive to transnational emergencies like the West African Ebola outbreak of 2014–2016. In 2020, it found itself at the centre of the COVID-19 pandemic and in the middle of the Sino-American geopolitical tug-of-war. This paper traces the discordance between the Constitution's stated purposes and the actual track record of the WHO not back to its organisational culture nor to weak leadership but to the design of the Constitution itself. It analytically distinguishes the Constitution's expressive from its instrumental halves, and shows that, whilst the former embodies a ‘constitutional moment’ of international health solidarity right after the Second World War, the latter embodies a reserved and limited delegation from member-states that are jealous of their sovereignty. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/286622 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 3.0 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.001 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Ip, EC | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-09-04T13:28:10Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-09-04T13:28:10Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2020 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Health Economics, Policy and Law, 2020, Epub 2020-07-03 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1744-1331 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/286622 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper brings a constitutional economics perspective to bear on the World Health Organization (WHO), the flagship United Nations intergovernmental health organisation, which is obligated by its Constitution to achieve ‘the highest possible level of health’ for the world's peoples. The WHO has in the seven decades of its existence used its formidable legislative powers only sparingly. It has been widely chided for being weak in regional coordination and unresponsive to transnational emergencies like the West African Ebola outbreak of 2014–2016. In 2020, it found itself at the centre of the COVID-19 pandemic and in the middle of the Sino-American geopolitical tug-of-war. This paper traces the discordance between the Constitution's stated purposes and the actual track record of the WHO not back to its organisational culture nor to weak leadership but to the design of the Constitution itself. It analytically distinguishes the Constitution's expressive from its instrumental halves, and shows that, whilst the former embodies a ‘constitutional moment’ of international health solidarity right after the Second World War, the latter embodies a reserved and limited delegation from member-states that are jealous of their sovereignty. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Cambridge University Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=HEP | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Health Economics, Policy and Law | - |
dc.rights | Health Economics, Policy and Law. Copyright © Cambridge University Press. | - |
dc.rights | This article has been published in a revised form in [Journal] [http://doi.org/XXX]. This version is free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. © copyright holder. | - |
dc.subject | Constitutional economics | - |
dc.subject | COVID-19 | - |
dc.subject | global health law | - |
dc.subject | World Health Organization | - |
dc.title | The constitutional economics of the World Health Organization | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.email | Ip, EC: ericcip@hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.authority | Ip, EC=rp02161 | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1017/S1744133120000249 | - |
dc.identifier.pmid | 32744214 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85092240093 | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 313999 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | Epub 2020-07-03 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000659521800006 | - |
dc.publisher.place | United Kingdom | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 1744-1331 | - |